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Living into Military Leadership:
The Personal Reflections of an ex-RSAF Officer
by COL(NS) Goh Teck Seng

2008 CDF Essay Competition Top 3 Essays

On Fourth Generation Warfare: Implications to the SAF
by CPT Ong Yan Zhi, Victor

Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia
– A Case Study on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Network
by MAJ Alan Foo Chai Kwang

Transformational Leadership for the 3rd Generation SAF
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EDITORIAL

In this issue of *POINTER*, we have lined up six feature articles that deal with a diverse range of issues from Military Leadership to Fourth Generation Warfare and that of Generation Y.

In this issue, we are honoured to feature an article, *Living into Military Leadership: The Personal Reflections on an ex-RSAF Officer* by COL(NS) Goh Teck Seng. What is leadership? And how can we become better leaders? These are just some of the points that COL(NS) Goh will go ponder over in his article.

We are also delighted to publish the article, *Sipping Afghan Chay in Battle Gear: The Military in Afghanistan's Reconstruction* by LTC James Tan. As we hear positive news of the SAF's overseas mission in war-torn Afghanistan, some of us may wonder what really goes on there. This article can provide some answers to these thoughts. It explains the military's role in the reconstruction process and brings up several reality challenges and opportunities for the multinational force promoting peace in Afghanistan.

We are also pleased to publish the top three essays of the 2008 Chief of Defence Force Essay Competition. The award ceremony was recently held in conjunction with the CDF Seminar on 27 Aug 09. *On Fourth Generation Warfare: Implications to the SAF* by CPT Victor Ong Yan Zhi, is the first prize winner of the essay competition. The theory of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) has begun to gain currency in recent years. Characterised by the blurring of lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, peace and conflict, battlefield and safety, 4GW represents a new military paradigm. In taking a closer look at this new realm, the essay observes the factors characteristic of 4GW and analyses the implications for the SAF. With reference to the twin policy of diplomacy and deterrence, strategies are proposed to prepare for this new kind of warfare.

The second prize essay, *Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia – A Case Study on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Network* is written by MAJ Alan Foo Chai Kwang. Decades of Islamisation within the region has built the intricacy and resilience of the Southeast Asia's terrorist networks. JI is a case in point. Beyond disrupting their operational capability, the author posits that an insightful understanding of their "strategic logic" is necessary to effectively undermine their regenerative capacity and systematically erode their cause. The "strategic logic" of the terrorist organisations is examined in detail and various methods to counter JI's strategies including targeting their ideological infrastructure and alienating them from their allies are proposed. Specific to the SAF, the author suggests three aspects of enhancing the way our soldiers can be prepared for the war on terrorism.

The third prize was awarded to *Transformational Leadership for the 3rd Generation SAF* by CPT Gareth Wong Wei Han. As the SAF embarks on a journey of force transformation, the challenges that remain are multi-faceted, complex and constantly evolving. To tackle the metamorphosing challenges of the 3rd Generation SAF, the author posits that beyond just developing leaders adept at transformation, what is more imperative is *developing transformational leaders who are adept for organisation*. The essay examines the tenets and benefits behind transformational leadership for the 3rd Generation SAF, and expounds on transformational leadership as a style/theme in relation to the existing Leadership Development (LD) framework for application to all levels of command within the SAF.

The sixth article is about Generation Y. The way we see the world, our fears and aspirations, are very much shaped by experiences during our formative years. Gen Y soldiers are inherently different from Gen X ones or the babyboomers; they have lived in a time of peace, prosperity and advancing technology. How then can the army change to ensure it stays relevant to this new group? In the article, *Generation Why – So What?*, the authors give their take on this issue, explaining the Gen Y and its needs within the SAF.

We are also pleased to announce that the 2009 Chief of Defence Force Essay Competition is now open for entries. We encourage our readers to take part in the competition and details can be found on the *POINTER* website: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer.

Finally all of us at the *POINTER* Editorial Team would like to extend our deepest appreciation to COL Chan Wing Kai for his leadership, guidance and support as Chairman of the *POINTER* Editorial Board. We would also like to extend our warmest welcome to COL Ng Kin Yi as the new Chairman.

We hope you will enjoy reading this issue.

Happy Reading!

Editor, *POINTER*

Living into Military Leadership: The Personal Reflections of an ex-RSAF Officer

by COL(NS) Goh Teck Seng

We in the military cannot speak of leadership without regard to officership: military leadership and officership are intertwined – one defines the other; and neither can be understood except in the context of the other. Simply put, you are a leader because you are an officer and officership carries with it the burdens and obligations of leadership.

The military, more than any other organisations, is a leader-centric and a leader-led outfit. The military leader enjoys an esteemed position of power which the authority of rank confers on him and only the exercise of such authority would galvanise mass commitment towards a common cause. There can be no follower-ship unless there is leadership in the first instance; and without leadership and organised follower-ship, the military malfunctions or just seizes up. Where military leaders do not lead, or where they mislead, the military will pay disproportionately for its leadership failings.

Therefore it bears emphasising that the leadership role as an SAF officer is instrumental: it is a role that should be discharged dutifully without fear or favor and under all circumstances, fair or foul. The military profession is one of unlimited liabilities; while the bottom-line of a private-sector corporation is profits and that of a government agency, the maximisation of welfare, the success of a military is victory in war. The military exists for no other reason than to face up to a prospective hostile contest that may never come; but if that day should come, the military must prevail and so save the nation, or otherwise perish along with the vanquishing of the state. This calls for the ultimate sacrifice of precious lives in the service of the nation; there can be no higher calling or nobler ideal than that which defines the military profession. As our current Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, so aptly reminded us of our martial ideals in his farewell speech to the SAF in 1984 before he joined politics, "*the SAF is the flaming sword in the righteous cause of national survival*".

All SAF officers are the guardians of Singapore's security and the custodians of the men whom they lead and whose lives they will have to put in harm's way when harm comes our way (but we pray that the day never comes). Officership carries the weight of such responsibilities which only effective leadership can make light. Even if effective leadership can lighten up the weight of responsibility, SAF officers should never wear their ranks lightly.

As an officer and a leader, what should be the guiding philosophy? Here, the SAF Officer's Creed serves as a good start point. The Officer's Creed emphasises the SAF officer's duty "to lead, to excel and to overcome", "to serve with pride, honour and integrity" and "to dedicate his life to Singapore". This carries echoes of the "Duty, Honor, Country" speech General Douglas MacArthur delivered to the graduating class at West Point in 1962.

These are the excerpts of his speech to West Point graduands.

"*Duty, honor, country – those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be and what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; and to create hope when hope seems forlorn.*

They build your basic character; they mould you for your role as custodians of the nation's defense; they make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid. They teach you …… never to substitute words for actions nor to seek the

path of comfort …… to master yourself before you master others; to have a heart that is clean, a goal that is high; to be serious yet never to take yourself too seriously. They create in you …... the inspiration of life; they teach you in this way to be an officer and a gentleman – and in my opinion, also 'a leader'".

MacArthur's "Duty, Honor, Country" clarion call gives purpose and meaning to the profession as an SAF officer. It can also serve as a useful philosophical guide for an approach to leadership and the image of an SAF officer.

"Duty, Honor, Country" provides a useful philosophical frame for a leader's reflection; the leader needs to reflect and have a conversation with oneself so that whatever conclusions one comes to, one will hold these with conviction.

As military officers entrusted with the noble mission of national defence, they must be guided by equally noble ideals. These ideals may seem abstract, even irrelevant, in a country at peace for so long and in a world where conventional war, though always a distinct possibility, is nonetheless going out of fashion. Living as we do in a capitalist, consumerist society, our instinct is understandably materialistic. SAF officers, being drawn from the citizenry, are naturally motivated more by extrinsic factors than intrinsic beliefs. But officership obliges them to balance the high-mindedness of institutional ideals with the narrow-mindedness of material pursuits. Society expects military officers to forge the right balance so that in a bind, military officers can be relied upon to discharge their sacred duties honourably and in

the service of the nation. Though this may sound a little old-fashioned here, perhaps even a little highbrow, it is definitely not over the top. It is because sometimes, old-fashioned views are in fact enduring wisdoms that just fade into the deep recesses of our memory as we focus on more material and contemporary concerns. Such wisdoms, even if they are deeply recessed within us, need to echo from time to time in our minds so that we can stay anchored to what we stand for. Officers first and foremost possess great custodial responsibilities, for which the effective exercise of leadership is key.

Leadership

Leadership is more an art than a science; and since it is an art, it is hard precisely because it is soft. To begin with, there is no singular definition of "leadership", and even great military leaders like General Patton, when once asked what leadership was, simply said "*I have it but I will be damned if I can define it*". Field Marshal Montgomery did better; he described "leadership" as "*the capacity and will to rally men to a common purpose and the character which inspires confidence*".

Fundamentally, leadership is the art of getting things done through people. Those most likely to succeed in it are those who study it, work at it and reflect enough on it to sharpen their leadership performance.

My leadership experience in the SAF was one principally of self-learning and self-discovery. I recall that OCS trained me to be a leader, but only to the extent of equipping me with the tactical

knowledge and military craft to lead a platoon into firefights and hopefully, prevail. I had no theoretical grounding in military leadership or ample practice even if I had been taught the ways of leadership. Even as I rose through the ranks, I was not systematically developed in a formal way as a leader.

Did the SAF therefore under-perform on developing its officers as leaders? Not entirely – arguably the SAF could have done better in some respects; but what I would like to point out is that leadership is more learned than taught. The learning I went through was subconscious as well as explicit; I learned by observation, osmosis and self-reflection, adapting my leadership style as I went along. I was in apprenticeship even as I exercised leadership. This is the whole point of being a leader; you learn all the time and you must be prepared to invest the intellectual and emotional energies to hone your leadership craft even while you are in a leadership position. Like any master craftsman, one cannot master one's leadership craft until one succeeds in self-mastery.

My Leadership Experience in the SAF

Military leadership is double-faceted: on the one hand, it has a universal core that applies irrespective of contexts and on the other, an adaptable dimension that needs to be customised to circumstances.

My first lesson that leadership was not "one size fits all" occurred in the nascent years following my commission. I was commissioned as an army platoon commander before I became a WSO (ADA)[1] in the air force. In the army, the leadership mantra was "leadership by example" but "leadership by example" had a specific connotation given the strong command culture of the army – "leadership by example" meant "leadership from the front". This meant taking charge and projecting your command presence in a way that left your subordinates in no doubt who was in charge.

Joining the air force, I soon learned that there was little, if no, need to physically lead men from the front. We do not lead charges up hills as what army officers do; we either fly over hills or we ride up these hills on wheels. Really, how we lead in the air force depends on who we are; pilots, WSOs and AEOs – they all lead differently.

Unlike WSOs(ADA) and AEOs, junior pilots and WSOs(C3) in line units may command no subordinates even as commissioned officers. I am not suggesting that WSOs(ADA) and AEOs are more privileged than the others; it is just that what we do is different, and with it, the leadership demands differ.

I had the good fortune in 1984 of being attached for a week to 143 Squadron, then an A4 squadron, and of observing at close quarters the workings of a fighter squadron. What struck me was the informal leadership style of the squadron CO and OCs; the squadron ticked not because there was a single directing mind but because there were many steering hands among the flight commanders, squadron shacks

and technicians that somehow self-synchronised. Once airborne, however, flying formations on a mission began to behave like platoons on a charge.

Of the WSO(C3) community, I made the following observations: other than when a C3 unit comes to "action stations", the leadership style of the commanders is generally collegial, even subtle. When activated, however, the directive leadership mode takes over, but within a prescribed operating template.

As for AEOs, the default leadership style is technocratic: AEOs exercise leadership more like management science than an art. The leadership style mirrors the generally deterministic nature of engineering work even though it takes keen judgment at times to solve technical problems.

WSOs(ADA) are perhaps the most directive leaders in the air force. This is because ADA officers directly command men and assets and have to effectively employ these to fulfil assigned missions; yet the ADA fire unit is not necessarily homogeneous; nor is the operating environment cut-and-dried. It takes command-and-control leadership to draw the disparate parts together into a single unifying effort.

What are the Instructive Points?

Leadership is contextual; depending on your operating environment, the nature of your operations and the make-up of your unit, you will need to calibrate your leadership style. Where the nature of operations is non-complex,

the operating template relatively well-defined and the composition of the fighting team fairly homogeneous, an informal "read my lips" leadership style would suffice; where the converse is true, a more directive, "follow me" leadership approach is perhaps more appropriate. Style flexibility is integral to the effective exercise of leadership.

At the same time, the exercise of leadership has its set of universal principles, which I believe are good for all times and all circumstances. These principles may be represented differently; but for me, I would like to just share three such principles with you as I have distilled them. These are: (a) the 'I' in the 'We' leadership dictum; (b) Going beyond Command-and-Control to Trust-and-Entrust; and (c) Doing What is Proper, not What is Popular.

The 'I' in the 'We' Leadership Dictum

As leaders, we need to first learn to speak the language of leadership. In leadership, the least important word is the pronoun 'I' and the most important word, the pronoun 'we'. The leader cannot be the stand-alone 'I', the self-styled chieftain on high horseback without a following. For he is a leader only because he has followers; follower-ship defines leadership and legitimises it. A leader has to connect with the ground both intellectually and emotionally so that bonding rather than saluting becomes the basis over time for conformity.

So the leader needs to be a part of those he leads; yet he also needs to stand apart from those he leads. The leader has

A leader has to connect with the ground both intellectually and emotionally so that bonding rather than saluting becomes the basis over time for conformity.

to distinguish himself from the masses; he has to be more accomplished in terms of values orientation, professionalism, commitment and personal standards. If as a leader you are only on par with those you lead, then you will lead heads but not necessarily hearts; you will have power but not much respect, authority but not much legitimacy. As they say, "rank is what you wear; respect is what you earn". A successful leader has to earn his leadership spurs by working hard to be different and above par.

Going beyond Command-and-Control to Trust-and-Entrust

There is always a place in the military for command-and-control leadership. Indeed command-and-control leadership is a phenomenon unique only to the uniformed service. The harrowing experience of war where death is a clear and present danger dictates that military actions should be tightly coordinated and well-directed; in this, only command-and-control leadership can assure the best outcome.

But the basis of effective command-and-control is a trusting relationship. How do we build trust? We build trust by first giving trust; as leaders we must first trust those we lead even as

we run a tight ship. Trusting people means allowing them to act as they deem fit, after you, as the leader, have given your guidance. It means you lead not by mandating outputs but by managing outcomes. When you dictate outputs, you tend to be prescriptive and so stifle initiative; but when you seek outcomes, you show enlightenment and a willingness to empower, which builds trust.

Trust is a great power leveler and performance multiplier; it melts away hierarchy while preserving the structure of authority and in so doing induces open communication and risk-taking.

Trust may be built; but it is reaffirmed only during leadership moments. By leadership moments, I mean those moments where a challenge has arisen that calls for a decisive leadership response.

I recall one such leadership moment. The occasion was an overseas live-firing exercise. The live-firing did not start off on the right note. As the Exercise Director, I was understandably disappointed. I could have allowed my disappointment to get the better of me and gone into overdrive by assuming direct command and thus

marginalize the Exercise Commander. I did not; instead I allowed the Exercise Commander and his team to do a proper post-mortem and to recommend appropriate follow-up actions. I believe I had acted decisively by not being interventionist, trusting that the team had done its best and that it would somehow figure a way out. It did; and the rest of the live-firing went according to expectation. We pulled off the exercise as a team; but more importantly, we re-affirmed our trust in one another.

Command-and-control leadership can be decisive, but only for the moment or at best the duration of an activity run; a trusting leadership approach builds social capital and is more enduring. Command-and-control is good, even necessary; but it is better still to trust and entrust.

Do What is Proper, Not What is Popular

As a leader, you should certainly strive to be a star performer; but you are not a star. Leadership is not a celebrity contest; rather it is the test of moral standards that you must stand up to.

So always do what is proper not what is popular. I say this because it is human of us to want to seek approval of whatever we do; and the higher the approval rating, the more comforted we feel, however self-illusory. Leaders are human beings and so are vulnerable to such temptations. We should resist such temptations and be guided by our leadership conscience in whatever we do. We should always do right, which is to advance organisational interests and the welfare of the group rather than specific individuals.

As General Colin Powell once put it, "*Good leadership involves responsibility to the welfare of the group as a whole, which means some people will be displeased with your decisions and actions… This is inevitable if you act honorably. Trying to get everyone to like you is a sign of mediocrity*".

A leader should never choose mediocrity. You should let your values guide you in choosing to do what is proper over what is popular.

In mid-1995, shortly after I took over as a squadron CO, I faced my first command challenge. My squadron experienced within a short span of 6 months a spate of personnel and equipment incidents including two major cases of equipment damage.

What went wrong? As it turned out, the squadron lacked a safety culture. Where safety is concerned, there are no half-measures; so I instituted comprehensive pre-movement, field and post-deployment safety checks. These measures consumed considerable time and effort, and were not popular with the ground. Even some of my OCs demurred.

The choice for me was between watching my popularity index and discharging my mandate as CO. I did not believe in command by popularity poll; I did what I thought was proper to

save limbs and lives. Taking decisions when the ground, and when even those you worked closely with, were not aligned with you was not easy. When you hear doubting voices all round, you, as the leader, sometimes need to listen to your voice within.

Doing what is proper also means you should stretch your unit to do ever better and not stay "business-as-usual" just so that you do not have to make demands and so gain popularity. As leaders, especially in a peacetime military, you can perform below what you are capable of and still do creditably. For you are not being tested; and since you are not tested anyhow, why should you stress-test your men and yourself? But this would be a misplaced view because any leader who holds such a view has abnegated on his responsibilities. On the contrary, it is precisely because you are not tested that you should do all you can in peace to prepare for the test if it ever comes. The military should always prepare in good times and in good time for the eventual test of war that we all hope will never come.

Conclusion

It is an honour and a privilege to be commissioned as an SAF officer and to serve in the RSAF. The military is an institution unto itself – it has its values, rituals and traditions. An officer is part of this institution and of its proud heritage. The officer will uphold this proud heritage only if he or she honours the scared duty as a military leader.

Leaders touch lives and shape history. Karl Marx might hold that "leaders make history, but they do not make it as they please but under circumstances directly found and transmitted from the past"; yet it is undeniable that leaders can, of their own free choice, lift outcomes and so carry the day or otherwise languish and cause an organisation to fall flat.

Leaders therefore leave a legacy. Officers need to decide what kind of a legacy they will want to leave behind. If I were one, I would pick a good legacy; and I hope the martial ideals espoused, which leaders should be guided by and on the need for them to adapt their leadership style and yet abide by the timeless principles, will go some way towards helping them to bequeath to the RSAF and those they lead an inspiring legacy.

Endnote

[1] WSO (ADA) stands for Weapons Systems Officer (Air Defence Artillery). AEO stands for Air Engineering Officer. C3 stands for Command, Control and Communications.

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Sipping Afghan *Chây* in Battle Gear: The Military in Afghanistan's Reconstruction

by LTC James Tan

Introduction: The Military Warrior and Reconstruction?

The Significance of Reconstruction Operations within a COIN Strategy

Many parts of Afghanistan remain embroiled in a state of insurgency, lawlessness, crime and corruption, with resurgent violence threatening to undermine previous achievements made by the Coalition Forces. While kinetic "left hand side" operations remain important in combating the insurgency, some view the concurrent effort to reconstruct Afghanistan as *the* essential "right hand side" component of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy that will ultimately stabilise the land, win hearts and minds, and shape a sustainable tomorrow.

Although important, kinetic operations may often play a supporting effort for nation-building activities. Due to the population-centric nature of the ongoing Afghan COIN, the fundamental and ultimate aim of reconstruction and related non-kinetic operations is to persuade and convince target populations to support friendly forces over the insurgents.

Increasingly, contemporary COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have also witnessed the military leading and co-ordinating reconstruction efforts. With security as a prime concern in the Afghan operating environment, the military could present an attractive competency and capability proposition. Hence, sipping *châi* (tea) with an Afghan head of *shurâ* (council) and discussing his district's reconstruction needs, while dressed in battle gear and

Figure 1. Sipping Châi (Tea) with Key Afghan Community Leaders

alert to security threats, has become a way of life for many a foreign military warrior deployed in Afghanistan.

Aim

This article examines the military's role in Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts, within the framework of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Selected US, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and SAF experiences at the provincial level will be used to illustrate the military's limitations and challenges. Opportunities for the military to strengthen its value proposition in Afghanistan's reconstruction process will also be identified.

The Military's Role in Reconstruction Operations

Afghanistan's harsh and often volatile security conditions make the presence of many civilian aid groups, NGOs and government agencies a high risk proposition. Without adequate mobility and force protection capabilities, many of these organisations cannot hope to undertake meaningful and sustainable reconstruction work. Insurgent and/or criminal groups seeking to dominate an area and its people will often target these aid groups deliberately, compelling them to worry more about personal and collective safety than rendering effective aid.

The military, on the other hand, can deploy into a theatre, equipped with good organisational structure, expertise, robust force protection and mobility assets. These assets and capabilities enable the military to focus effort on leading and orchestrating reconstruction programmes in a not-yet-secure environment, with comparatively less vulnerabilities that insurgents can exploit.

The US and NZ experiences suggest that other governmental and international agencies have found it more possible to operate in these environments within a military-led arrangement. Even most NGOs, who typically seek to assert their neutrality and independence, have had to (often grudgingly) concede that the military presence offers some degree of stabilising and protective influence in a contested area. Between the military and insurgent/criminal groups, it is also not difficult to imagine which side is more likely to assist a NGO in distress. Over time, the PRT has emerged as a viable structure where such agencies and the military can effectively collaborate to reconstruct, help and stabilise the different Afghan provinces.

The Utility of the PRT as an Instrument for Reconstruction

Origins and Character of the PRT

PRTs in Afghanistan are key instruments through which the international community delivers assistance and development at the provincial and district level, including not-yet-secure areas. A PRT generally covers one or more provinces in Afghanistan. Since October 2006, the 26 PRTs have become part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.[1]

While there is currently no homogeneous nor "standard PRT model", most adopt a three-pronged focus at the provincial level to: (1) improve security, (2) enable reconstruction, and

(3) support good governance. Since 2003, PRTs have evolved from a quick-impact programming focus, designed to meet immediate needs, to a more transitional programming designed to support Afghanistan's longer term development objectives. The PRT has been perceived as an innovative and attractive approach to building peace and security.[2] Certain fundamental characteristics which dominate every PRT may be identified:

- The PRTs' long-term aim and fundamental success criterion is to enable the Afghan government to assume a credible and legitimate leadership in the population's eyes.
- PRTs act on the premise of the UN's *light footprint* approach, and provide assistance at the Afghan Government's invitation.
- They engage and network with key government, military, tribal, village and religious leaders in the provinces via presence patrols and meetings, while gathering intelligence, monitoring and reporting on important political, military and reconstruction developments.
- They work with Afghan authorities to provide security and support for key events such as the presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia forces.
- They assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assigned to the provinces.
- In partnership with the Afghan Government, the UN, other donors and NGOs, PRTs provide needed development and humanitarian assistance. Development work is very diverse, and might involve advising and mentoring the provincial governor on a range of governance and security matters, including crises and emergencies; working with the various government ministries on capacity-building programs. Development might also involve the direct funding and supervision of projects ranging from road, bridging and building construction to hydro-electric projects and agriculture- and livestock-related programmes.
- PRTs regard themselves as a stabilising force, and often possess a multi-national, -functional and -institutional flavour.
- Their command and control follows the *lead nation principle.*
- Military and civilian aspects are intertwined, but the lead nation's military/defence department tends to assume responsibility for security and force protection, and in many instances, overall leadership.[3]
- They depend on logistical support provided by ISAF, and a robust quick reaction combat force (air and ground assets), in direct and/or general support, on request.
- PRT lead nations often pursue a proliferation of their own model, with an ad-hoc approach in the areas of security and development.[4]

The military-led NZ PRT in Bamiyan Province reflects many of the above characteristics. The PRT includes representatives from NZ Police, NZAID, USAID, US CERP, US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), US State Department as well as a SAF Project Team (PT). Many of these agencies respond to their own chains of command, but all attempt to collaborate

and provide mutual support within the PRT framework where possible. In the SAF's case, for instance, the team commander reports to his headquarters in Singapore, but the team operates and trains together with the New Zealanders, consults and collaborates closely with them on all in-theatre project and operational matters.

The PRT, under a NZDF commander, co-ordinates assessment and execution of reconstruction operations by NZAID, US CERP and to a limited extent, the SAF PT. The PRT also works with USAID and UN agencies like UNAMA to assist the Provincial Government in prioritising development and reconstruction, primarily through the Provincial Development Council (PDC) mechanism.

In terms of force protection, the PRT is configured for self-defence, and all commanders and troopers regularly undergo combat skills currency and continuation training to sustain a sharp edge. Despite its relatively light footprint, it "possesses" scalable combat power by leveraging ISAF/US' assets when and where required.

Several of the PRT's patrols operate out of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in the outlying districts. They establish and sustain presence, collect intelligence and provide updates, inspect ongoing or completed construction projects, and generally "feel the local pulse" and help shape perceptions through frequent meetings with the District Sub-Governors (DSGs), ANP and village or district heads of *shurâ* (council). The main NZDF base in Bamian District functions as the nerve centre to command, control and co-ordinate patrolling, assistance and reconstruction operations, as well as to engage and mentor the Provincial Government. The remaining patrols operating from NZDF base move about the district to engage the people and community leaders.

Reality Challenges and Opportunities for the Military in Reconstruction

Although most military forces have generally found the PRT to be a potentially effective structure to undertake and co-ordinate reconstruction efforts and promote stability, they are confronted with

Figure 2. Finalising Plans During a SAF Presence Patrol

Figure 3. Preparing to Commence a Joint NZDF-SAF Presence Patrol

several "reality challenges". Yet, opportunities also exist amidst these challenges. Four sets of such challenges and opportunities may be discussed.

Reality Challenge 1: Continuing Instability and Vulnerability vs Opportunity 1: Stabilising and Protective Influence of the Military

One, it is a reality that the many Afghan provinces are in a state of instability, but the opportunity exists for the military-led PRT to make a positive difference. Some analysts have opined that the military-led PRT in places like Bamiyan has outlived its mandate, but a closer examination of the current operating environment suggests otherwise.

Bamiyan Province, though comparatively more secure and permissive, remain vulnerable and are faced with periodic security threats. Located in the heart of Afghanistan and surrounded by eight other neighbouring provinces, Bamiyan's borders are porous. Insurgents, criminals, drugs and weapons smugglers can access the province via different points. While the oft-cited "Hazaran Effect" remains a deterrent, bribery, intimidation and other forms of corruption are means for anti-government/criminal elements to persuade the local ANP, district authorities or security services to look the other way. A few successful IED strikes, whether insurgent- or criminal-inspired, could rapidly reverse Bamiyan's security climate. The persistent instability in neighbouring provinces can also have rub-off security effects on Bamiyan, while political tussles amongst influential personalities within the Provincial Government can weaken cohesion and divert focus from important governance and development work.

In Afghanistan's reconstruction resource prioritisation and strategy formulation, the international Coalition and the Central Government have to grapple with a central issue: to reinforce and enlarge success, and enable provinces like Bamiyan to become a shining symbol of Afghanistan's future, or to let anti-government elements encroach and rapidly consume what hard-fought, limited successes and progress that have been gained over the last few years? The military, with its stabilising and protective influence, could form an important, and indeed essential, ingredient in a success reinforcement and success enlargement strategy.

In 2004, for example, an additional eight PRTs throughout Afghanistan were rapidly added to the existing four PRTs in Gardez, Konduz, Mazar-e-Sharif and Bamiyan, as part of a bold and calculated risk to enlarge the Coalition offensive. Although the PRTs were relatively lean and scattered, the enemy well understood that 20 minutes after a distress call, any PRT could have combat aircraft overhead and a rapid reaction force of "boots on the ground" arriving shortly after. Military-led PRTs could therefore be "a powerful offensive weapon in (the Coalition's) strategic arsenal", as they send "an incontrovertible message" to the insurgents about the Coalition's commitment to advance Afghanistan's security and reconstruction.[5]

*Figure 4. Location of Bamiyan Province in Afghanistan*

Figure 5. Original and Newly Established PRTs in 2004

Reality Challenge 2: Unlimited Needs vs Opportunity 2: More Broad–Based and Inclusive PRT Framework

A second reality is that the myriad needs of a province will usually far exceed what the available PRT budget, human resources and expertise can afford. Years of unceasing conflict have set the country back, and despite recent injections of reconstruction effort, most Afghan provinces remain at a low developmental baseline and governance capacity. Besides ensuring his troops' well-being and force protection measures in a still hostile or unstable operating environment, while being constantly mindful of the national caveats and the limited resources at his disposal, the military commander will often find himself and his subordinates coping with the multiple developmental hat-wearing described earlier.

A more broad-based and inclusive PRT framework could create the opportunity to reap better success. The military alone cannot be expected to handle the myriad tasks; neither can it claim to possess all the requisite expertise and competencies to perform the varied roles. Within the PRT, there is therefore ***the need for a*** "***combined arms***" ***approach that synergises multi-agency and multi-national elements***.

In the German PRT model, for instance, the inter-ministerial, civil-military, double-headed MoD-MoFA command system has infused an "integrated attitude" in approaching the PRT's tasks. In the NZ PRT, the various NZDF, NZ Police, US and SAF representatives respond to their own chains of command, but all collaborate on the basis of partnership, shared goals, mutual support and a division of "developmental labour". Such an attitude has often helped to achieve collective goals, and have enabled the PRT to present a better value proposition to the people it is trying to help.

For the SAF and NZDF, for example, undertaking joint reconstruction project efforts will certainly deepen SAF-NZDF co-operation in general and demonstrate their collective commitment towards Bamiyan in particular. More importantly, joint efforts may enlarge the PRT's overall resource capacity, enabling it to consider system-level projects that could yield a higher impact for the populace.

Shaping, fusing and co-ordinating civil-military, multi-agency, and at times, multi-national efforts, could be regarded as "combined arms operations" in another form. Collaborating with agencies and nationalities having different agendas, ethos, cultures and competencies may not be necessarily easy nor always pleasant. Nonetheless, if military warriors are willing to apply relevant combined arms-type of organisational principles and attitudes when collaborating with other multi-national or non-military partners within the PRT context, they might discover that many different hands do make light work, and that it is also possible to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes and successes.

Reality Challenge 3: National Caveats vs Opportunity 3: Greater Operational Latitude

A third reality is that military commanders and their contingents often have to operate within national caveats and various limitations imposed by their home countries and policymakers. Commanders are subject to considerable limitations in resources, personnel, conduct of operations, rules of engagement (ROE) and armament. Home countries also tend to impose various restrictions on what their participating military forces may or may not do.

Commanders need to be given sufficient operational latitude and flexibility, trust and resource support to do their jobs, and to effect meaningful and positive change in the local operating environment. There will frequently be a temptation and tendency for home country policy-makers to micro-manage and micro-decide, or attempt to impose a "long-range-command-and-control" mechanism on the ground commander.

These attitudes are especially tempting, given the wonders of modern communications and technology. Policy-makers at home also ought to provide a clear, forward-looking and, most importantly, viable contribution strategy, so that the military commander knows how to develop and pursue an effective value proposition on the ground.

The above are especially pertinent for smaller participating nations like Singapore, where the SAF military team in Bamiyan operates within the NZ PRT framework, in collaboration with other military and civil elements; and whose human and monetary resource contributions will probably never be on a scale like the US or the UK. It is therefore imperative that whatever limited resources that Singapore commits to the cause of Afghanistan's reconstruction must yield the highest possible payoffs.

Policy-makers ought to articulate a strategy for the SAF that will enable Singapore to be regarded as *a modest contributor of disproportionate significance*. The SAF military teams sent to contribute and assist the people of Afghanistan must be supported by a clear mandate which allows them to (1) tangibly portray and demonstrate Singapore's steadfast commitment to other members in this *Coalition of The Willing*, while (2) also showing the Afghan government and people that our contributions yield meaningful impact.

Figure 6. Rendering Aid to Afghan Children and Villagers in Need

To its military partners, the SAF's presence and modest contributions must add positive and disproportionate value to the overall PRT assistance effort. To the Afghan head of *shurâ*, who is primarily concerned for the livelihood, survival and security of the numerous villagers under him, Singapore's contributions via the SAF ought to make an important and direct sense to him. To the Afghan provincial governor, the projects and programmes undertaken by the SAF must target maximum outreach and impact, while helping to build up governance and administrative capacity.

Reality Challenge 4: Attitude and Capacity of Local Power Brokers vs Opportunity 4: Winning Hearts and Minds, and Establishing Local Ownership and Capacity

A fourth reality is that commanders on the ground depend on the attitude and capacity of the local power brokers (i.e. provincial and district government figures, community leaders and elders, and ANSF commanders). Their attitude and capacity generally fall into one of the four categories: the willing and able; the willing but not yet able; the able but unwilling; and worst of all, the unable and also unwilling.

Those in the former categories tend to be curious, energetic, hardworking and eager to co-operate. They are not afraid to consider new perspectives and paradigms, or to assume ownership of issues and programs. Sadly, they are also few in number. At the risk of unfair stereotyping, many of the Afghan local power brokers currently belong to the latter categories.

In the early days of the PRT, "quick impact" was the password for generous project and programme funding, as part of the COIN offensive to win hearts and minds. Many of the local requests and needs were readily met without too much scrutiny. Over time, this could have cultivated an over-reliance and unrealistic "just-ask-the-PRT-and-you-shall-receive" expectation amongst the local leadership. Today, a PRT attempting to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the need, value and sustainability of a project proposal might be labelled "choosy", "insincere" or more commonly, "uncaring of the people's sufferings". When a PRT-constructed village well runs dry after some time, blaming the PRT might be more convenient for the local head of *shurâ* than exploring self-help means.

From the COIN perspective of winning hearts and minds, the Afghan people remain central to Coalition success. Therefore, the need to shape the local leadership's expectations, attitudes and capacity has never been greater. Likewise, the need to avoid perpetuating a mentality of dependence and reliance on the PRT ranks just as high. In this regard, a simultaneous "top-down-bottom-up" dual-tiered approach to reconstruction may be proposed.[6]

The Bottom-Up tier encourages and incentivises village- and district-level ownership of projects and programmes, while providing the time and space for larger scale Top-Down initiatives to take shape. Community participation and employment could be leveraged via small-scale assistance projects, e.g. wells, culverts, bridges and flood protection wall construction and micro-hydro plants. These projects, when accompanied by deliberate training on servicing, maintenance and repair techniques, tend to inculcate greater self-reliance and local ownership. As they yield direct, real-world, here-and-now tangible benefits for the villagers, such a holistic approach will also make them more supportive of the PRT and less inclined towards the insurgents' other-worldly causes.

Concurrently, the Top-Down tier adopts a systems approach to reconstruction projects and programmes, and attempts to build the provincial government's capacity and ownership. This tier may be implemented through an effort-and-resource prioritisation mechanism, such as the Provincial Development Council (PDC). Based on the limited resources available, the PRT leadership could oblige the PDC to deliberate and prioritise what projects and programmes make the most sense and impact. Furthermore, the PDC should also integrate piecemeal project proposals into a coherent system with wide benefits.

A well-designed reconstruction effort takes more than just selecting projects that villages, districts, or provinces fervently desire. Stand-alone projects tend to have limited impact on the welfare, economy, security and community needs. Initiatives must instead be considered in a larger context, as *a system of complementary projects and programmes that will generate mutually reinforcing effects*. These will ensure sustainability and contribute to a broader system of development.

To illustrate, the SAF PT utilised the SAF-funded Regional Health Training Centre (RHTC) project in the summer of 2008 to complement and integrate NGO, CERP and USAID healthcare projects/programmes in Bamiyan. Although the RHTC's construction process was itself challenging due to work-site disruptions, intimidation and threats by ex-landowners, contractor competency and bureaucratic "roadblocks" posed by other government ministries, the SAF PT sought to concurrently engage, include and enthuse the other healthcare stakeholders in Bamiyan. It succeeded in helping the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) frame and initiate a system to, in military parlance, "Raise, Train and Sustain" the province's healthcare workers (see Figure 7).

RHTC
- Trains Medical Trainers
- Provides Skills Sustenance Trg (ie Upgrading & Refresher) for PH & DH Health Workers
- Conducts Health Workshops + Public Education Programs

PH & DHs
- PH & DHs provide Med Services to People + Med Trainers to RHTC

RHTC

RHTC
- Provides Medical Trainers
- Provides Skills Sustenance Trg (ie Upgrading & Refresher) for CHC, BHC & SHC Health Workers

CHCs & BHCs
- Provides Med Services + Med Trg + Med Education + Med Supplies

SHCs
- Provides Med Services Only

x 3 DHs

| Provincial Hospital | District Hospital |

x 12 CHCs | x 24 BHCs | x 7 SHCs

| Comprehensive Health Clinics (CHCs) | Basic Health Clinics (BHCs) | Sub-Health Clinics (SHCs) |

1 x CHC/BHC provides Med Services + Med Trg + Med Education + Med Supplies for 25 x VHPs + 50-60 C'unity Medics

x 25 VHPs | x 25 VHPs

| Village Health Post | Village Health Post |

Figure 7. RHTC's "Raise, Train and Sustain" Operating Model

The RHTC provided a critical single-stop facility for the healthcare workers' skills sustenance training (i.e. upgrading and refresher training). The healthcare workers, comprising doctors, nurses, midwives, vaccinators, health supervisors and trainers, etc., underwent these courses sponsored by USAID, the Aga Khan Health Services and other healthcare-oriented NGOs. The RHTC also enabled NGOs, like Marie Stoppes International (MSI) and Afghan Red Crescent Society, to run ailment/condition-specific workshops and public education programs, e.g. family planning, child mortality prevention, nutrition and communicable diseases prevention.

In addition, roving RHTC-certified trainers also visited USAID- and US CERP-constructed, but NGO-operated, District Hospitals (DHs), and People's Health Clinics (PHCs) throughout the province to:

Audit and sustain the skills of doctors, nurses, mid-wives and vaccinators;

Conduct basic health education for villagers; and

Train and sustain the skills of Community Medics (CMs) "raised" by the villages.

Thus, each PHC also served as a skills training, education and medical supply node for approximately 50-60 CMs deployed in the surrounding Village Health Posts.

By connecting the RHTC to the various healthcare centres, by synergising the healthcare-oriented NGOs' resources and focus, and by helping to establish a role for the community to play, this training and clinic/hospital operation

network encouraged and proliferated community participation and healthcare ownership. In all this systems approach to healthcare delivery addressed both Top-Down and Bottom-Up objectives simultaneously.

Conclusion

While kinetic "left hand side" operations remain important in combating the insurgency, the Coalition's concurrent "right hand side" effort to win Aghans' hearts and minds, and shape a sustainable tomorrow through reconstruction operations is essential to the COIN strategy. Insurgents preaching other-worldly causes and engaging in acts of intimidation, "night letters", and attacks cannot ultimately compete with real-world progress at the provincial level with other agencies and partners. In the still dangerous and vulnerable environment of Afghanistan, the military can also be one of the most significant "touch points" with the local leadership and populace. Therefore, sipping *châi* with an Afghan *shurâ*, a district sub-governor or a ministry director to establish friendship, shape preceptions, collect intelligence and discuss reconstruction needs, while dressed in battle gear, will become an increasingly esssential part of the military warrior's reconstruction modus operandi in Afghanistan. ☺

Endnotes

[1] ISAF Multinational PRTs include: Baghlan (Hungary), Chaghcharan (Lithuania), Fayzabad (Germany), Herat (Italy), Kunduz (Germany), Mazari Sharif (Sweden), Maymana (Norway), Qala-e Naw (Spain), Kandahar (Canada), Lashkar Gah (United Kingdom), Tirin Kowt (Netherlands), Maydan Wardak (Turkey), Parwan (US/South Korea), and Bamiyan (New Zealand). US-Led PRTs include: Asadabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Khowst, Mehtarlam, Farah, Qalat, Sharana, Nurestan, Jalalabad, and Panjshir. http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx, (accessed on 10 Jul 08).

[2] William Maley, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – How They Arrived and Where They Are Going", *NATO Review* (Autumn 2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/art2.html, (accessed on 10 Jul 08); Gauster, Markus, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series, No.16, (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Jan 08), p8.

[3] A notable difference would be the German PRT double-command model, where the defence ministry-appointed military and foreign ministry-appointed heads assume co-leadership.

[4] Gauster, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, pp18-19; http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx, (accessed on 10 Jul 08).

[5] LT-Gen David W. Barno, U.S. Army (Ret), "Fighting 'The Other War': Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 2003-05", in *Military Review* (Sep-Oct 07), p40.

[6] Mick Ryan, "The Military and Reconstruction Operations", *Parameters* (Winter 2007-08), pp60-63.

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On Fourth Generation Warfare: Implications to the SAF

by CPT Ong Yan Zhi, Victor

Introduction

Among the myriad of books and debates on the shape of future warfare and the utility of force, the theory of a Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) seems to be the most prominently featured. It has been proposed that the future of combat, usually carried out by non-state actors, is characterised by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, peace and conflict, battlefield and safety. 4GW was first proposed by military historian William Lind[1] in 1989 and it was considered as one of the "big ideas[2]" or "grand narratives" in contemporary strategic discourse and did not get much attention, particularly due to its two main implicit assertions. The first is that the "Clausewitzian" view of warfare[3] – the "Trinity of Forces" that limits war to only between states – is no longer valid in today's context. The second is that developed nations, with their military forces trained for state-to-state combat, will be incapable of coping with this new paradigm.

Although initially dismissed, the theory has gained currency in the post-9/11 era and after the conflicts in Vietnam, Mogadishu, Lebanon

and Mumbai. In each area, non-state, insurgent actors carried out the attack, and in each incident the country's military failed first in prevention and then in achieving decisive victory over the responsible party. The insurgent actors – including terrorist groups HAMAS, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Al Qaeda – remain active today.

Given this, Singapore should be concerned with the possibility of 4GW becoming the dominant mode of warfare. The SAF is an armed force shaped around the concept of victory through state-to-state warfare; in other words, it is the exact kind of military force that 4GW theory predicts will be ineffective in a 4GW playing field. Even as a matter of precaution, then, the SAF would do well to see how it could prepare for this new conduct of war.

The Evolution Of Warfare

It is important to understand the evolution of warfare as a dynamic process of action-reaction. It has been argued by the proponents of 4GW that warfare, itself, has gone through three generations.[4] The first generation, characterised by the French revolutionary armies and its massed manpower and tactics of line and column, reflected the rigidity of operational art on the battlefield and the rudimentary training level of conscripted troops. The second generation was based on fire and movement and the support from indirect fire, emphasising the importance of firepower replacing the need for massed manpower. The third generation was about manoeuvre warfare, a derivative of the imbalance in battlefield firepower,

whereby weaker "fire powered" states developed non-linear tactics to bypass the adversary's combat force instead of a head-on confrontation. And in the fourth generation, in response to the overwhelming capability of the modern conventional military force, weaker opponents, typically non-state actors, began resorting to alternative ways of engaging war, such as insurgency, "terrorism", and other forms of irregular conflict[5], thus resulting in the disappearance of characteristics commonly found in regular warfare.

A Closer Look At 4GW...

Certainly insurgency is not a new idea and it has a historical precedent. However, the application of this form of conflict has differed vastly from its predecessors.[6] Several interlocking factors contribute to this paradigm shift, resulting in the State losing its monopoly on the use of force, and the emergence of many other war-fighting entities which the conventional military force is not prepared for. A prominent advocate of 4GW, John Robb, a former Air Force Officer, astutely summarised the critical factors that contributed to the subversive character of 4GW[7]:

• Global: Modern technologies and economics integration enabling global operations;

• Pervasive: The decline of nation-state warfare forcing all open conflict into the 4GW mould;

• Granular: The multiplication of many extremely small viable groups creating a broad variety of reasons for conflict;

- Vulnerable: Open societies and economics offering many vulnerabilities and targets of opportunity, while allowing unrestricted movement of individuals;

- Aided by technology: Advanced and affordable technologies dramatically enhancing the capability of individuals and small groups;

- Concerned with media: Global media saturation allowing unprecedented reach and manipulation of public opinion;

- Networked: New organisational models being much better at learning, adapting, surviving and acting, as a result of advancement in technology.

Col. Dr. Frans Osinga[8], another 4GW advocate, adds that the endgame of 4GW combatants is the conversion of others through any means available: politically, by utilising networks that transcend geographical boundaries, they seek to convey their ideologies to desired audiences; strategically, by garnering the support of like-minded individuals; and operationally, by breaking the will of decision-making opponents through tactical strikes. On this last point, Col. Dr. Osinga elaborates that 4GW combatants will avoid direct confrontation as far as possible, choosing instead to employ guerrilla and terrorism tactics for aggression, and to rely on low-cost Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide-bombers and other cost-effective means. The inevitable result of this is the destruction of strategic targets chosen for high visibility in the political arena.

The inevitable corollary is the blurring of distinctions between military and civilian victims, and the unpredictability and dispersion of battlefields. Finally, Col. Dr. Osinga predicts that 4GW warriors will plan for long wars, believing that this will eventually convince state opponents to surrender due to the cost of suppression.[9]

Implications to the SAF

State military forces, like the SAF, are generally structured, equipped and trained to fight other armies that have similar characteristics. In regular warfare, victory is seen as the decisive defeat of the enemy on the battlefield. The problem with 4GW is that although there exist an armed enemy, the defeat of this adversary on the battlefield is not the prime objective of the war effort.[10] Although weapon capabilities might allow accurate engagement of predefined targets and seeks victory through the destruction of the enemy's forces. However, enemies in 4GW would certainly present fewer targets that are susceptible to conventional strike doctrine, and their followers

Source: Army News

State military forces, like the SAF, are generally structured, equipped and trained to fight other armies that have similar characteristics.

are more likely to be willing to fight and die for their causes. When the familiar connection between tactical, even operational, military excellence and strategic success disappears, how is victory secured against this elusive adversary? Especially when the opponents is adamant on fighting a long war, does the SAF even have the resources for this long-term commitment?

Strategies for the SAF

The mission of MINDEF and the SAF is to enhance Singapore's peace and security through **deterrence** and **diplomacy**, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive **victory** over the aggressor.[11] This would be the framework where we embark for the strategies to counter the possible "evolved-insurgency" – as suggested in 4GW.

Deterrence

First and foremost, Singapore would have to strengthen its Total Defence[12] components. Deterrence goes beyond merely having a credible military; it also encompass having a resilience population – a population that exhibits positive behavioural adaptation when encountering significant adversity.[13] Terrorists cannot prosper without recruits: the first method of deterrence is then the education of the populace as to the identity and methods of the terrorists, such that the latter will not be able to exploit any latent social unrest. The second method of deterrence builds upon the first: by having the support of the public, social surveillance can be used to expose existing terrorists. With the recent loss of a countrymen to a terrorist act[14], this prescription would serve well to harness the emotions and strength

of the people. As thoughtfully put by Deputy Prime Minister S Jayakumar "I think all Singaporeans feel as if they know and are touched by this tragedy... It could so easily have happened to any one of us or our loved ones...".[15]

Non-state actors can also be deterred or dissuaded in other ways. As suggested by Paul K Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins in their "Escalation Ladder of the Coerciveness of Influence[16]", a strategy to winning hearts and minds is a necessity in the aim to influence. Such a broad-front strategy is often prescribed in overcoming the daunting challenges of unconventional and irregular low-intensity conflicts in which terrorism is a main feature. Through the conduct of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) such as peace-support operations, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and even participation in community outreach projects, the SAF can play a useful role in helping to undercut the grassroots support and indiscriminate violence of terrorism proponents by winning the (moral high) ground. At the same time, the SAF showcases its operationally ready force, thus achieving deterrence on two separate levels. The "plug and play" concept of OOTW allows SAF units to project their basic roles into missions with strategic depth. A good example would be the RSAF aerial refuelling aircraft's deployment to the Gulf.[17] Although the aircraft is still performing its primary function of aerial refuelling, it was then functioning as part of an international coalition force in support of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. This is but one example; the SAF can channel more of its resources to similar high "return-on-investment" activities.

The "plug and play" concept of OOTW allows SAF units to project their basic roles into missions with strategic depth. A good example would be the RSAF aerial refuelling aircraft's deployment to the Gulf.

And Diplomacy...

Besides deterrence, diplomacy also undermines terrorist efforts. Countries increasingly recognise the value of co-operation and dialogue in matters of security, and in this area, Singapore has had much experience. In June 2005, for example, a plan was proposed to enhance security in both Singapore and the Strait of Malacca. The Strait, a vital international waterway, is of paramount importance to its littoral and user states, as well as to other stakeholders. As such, the three littoral states[18] (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) and Thailand agreed to enhance security by conducting combined maritime air patrols over the Strait of Malacca and Singapore while respecting their respective sovereignties and territorial integrities. This form of co-operation and diplomatic relationship is exemplary and crucial in the realm of 4GW, where the threat transcends different nationalities and is physically dispersed – a collective effort among different nations may be necessary to stamp out malignant individuals. Furthermore, a combination of resources

may be essential if the longevity of a threat extends beyond the defensive and offensive capabilities of a single nation.

Securing Victory

The problems 4GW point at requires a different vocabulary, approaches and psychologies. Treating non-state threat as criminal activity rather than as war would make opposing them easier. Several countries have been able to defeat very capable insurgents – Euskadi Ta Askatasun (ETA), the Bader-Meinhof Gang, the IRA – primarily through law enforcement agencies, with occasional military intervention.[19] When national security is threatened, it is a crime, and therefore primarily a job for the security and justice departments, police forces and other crime-fighting entities. We should not look at the evolved-insurgencies through the lens of warfare only. Therefore, at the operational level in the 4GW domain, the other instruments of national power will have to be called into play, such as the Singapore Police Force (SPF) or the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF). It is imperative that the SAF develops, strengthens and eventually sharpens this inter-agency collaboration when dealing with 4G threats. These collaboration would entail a combination of military and non-military means, such as intelligence, diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, to advance the national-security linkages when operating in the 4GW environment. Assuming 4GW opponents of Singapore to operate in a fashion similar to the LeT, pertinent lessons should be drawn from the recent Mumbai attack and the Indian response[20]:

- Sharing of Intelligence: Relevant intelligence obtained prior to the attack was not disseminated to agencies such as the police and coast guard, resulted in inaction[21];

- Response timing issues: The delay in response time was a result of poor inter-agency communication. An unclear political decision on the choice of which "quick response" team to engage the terrorists, combined with the lack of collaboration with the Indian Air Force, resulted in the delayed transportation of the response team[22];

- Poor strategic communications and information management: Central government and security forces failed to project an image of control and breaches of basic OPSEC, such as broadcasting the reaction plan over national television, providing vital operational intelligence for the terrorists[23];

- Inadequate preparedness: Lack of suitable basic equipment, such as weapon-matching bullet-proof vests, night vision goggles and thermal imaging systems, resulted in the first response force being unprepared.[24]

Giving the lessons a local context, Singapore must maintain a channel for rapid dissemination of sensitive information from the SAF to other national agencies. The SAF must also understand the shortcomings of other agencies so as to provide necessary support. In recent research conducted by RAND for the US Department of Defense (DOD)[25], analysts identified six integrated-operations task categories that enhance inter-agency operations. They are (1) Establish relationship with partners, (2) Provide security cooperation, (3) Understand partner capabilities, (4) Conduct operations with and for partners, (5) Collect and disseminate information and (6) Support inter-partner communications.[26]

The suggested categories would be a good starting point for the SAF to explore to adequately prepare itself for better inter-agency relationship. Although it might seem like a daunting task, the SAF and Singapore have shown on a few occasions that it is able to work with other government agencies as a single entity to handle national events. The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in 2003 was such a case in point; thermal infra-red scanners were loaned from the SAF and manpower was also provided for assistance in the screening of passengers arriving into Singapore.[27] In response to this crisis, the SAF and other agencies work in concert with the medical sector to restore confidence and stability within the Nation. More recently, the manhunt[28] mounted on the escaped Jemaah Islamiyah detainee, Mas Selamat bin Kastari, also showed the ability of the SAF in working with other government agencies. This incident has certainly sparked off a series of collaboration between the coast guard, police force, the SAF and a few other government agencies. Being a tightly knitted but resource-limited society like Singapore, we need to overcome our shortcomings by capitalising on our strengths. The SAF would need to take the lead in charting new grounds in the area of inter-agency operations, so that Singapore would be ready to "fight" 4G threats.

A Caveat...

Beyond the strategies suggested here, other possible solutions to the 4GW problem exist. Before being implemented, however, those solutions – and their effect on SAF functions – should be considered deeply. The SAF remains primarily a military force built to defend Singapore in state-to-state warfare. Because we only have one army, we cannot afford to de-programme our regulars to the detriment of performance in conventional warfare[29]: defeat in a nation-state conflict remains fraught with much higher stakes than defeat to non-state actors.

Conclusion

The landscape of future warfare is likely to change with advances in technology and the rapidly "flattening world[30]". 4GW may be just the tip of the iceberg, ushering in many variant forms of conflict. Singapore has been able to overcome past challenges because of its citizens' adaptability; likewise, its armed force must adapt its policies to changes in the security environment. Only this will ensure its relevance in the 21st century and the protection of Singapore's future. That being said, it should not lose sight of its primary purpose in more traditional warfare. This balancing act will be difficult, but it is imperative that the SAF gets it right. ⊕

(Ed note: This essay is the first prize winner of the 2008 CDF Essay Competition)

Endnotes

1   See William Lind, Kieth Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, Gary Wilson," The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct. 1989, pp22-26.

2   Col. Dr. Frans Osinga,: On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory:, article posted on http://www.au.af. mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf.

3   Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968).

4   Lind, *et al.*, "Changing Face of War", p22.

5   *Ibid.*, pp22-26.

6   See John Robb, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas, accessed 12 Jan 09.

7   *Ibid.*

8   Osinga, "On Boyd", http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf.

9   Also distilled and summarised from Lind, *et al.*, "Changing Face of War", pp22-26 and Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, (St. Paul, WI.: Zenith Press, 2004).

10 See Colin S. Gray, Irregular Warfare "One Nature, Many Characters", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2007, p46.

11 See Mission of MINDEF and the SAF posted on http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/mission.html.

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Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism In Southeast Asia – A Case Study On Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Network

by MAJ Alan Foo Chai Kwang

Introduction

"上兵伐谋，其次伐交…"

"*Thus, the most supreme strategy is to attack the plans and strategies of the enemy. The next best strategy is to attack his relationships and alliance with other nations…*"– Sun Zi [1]

Sun Zi's Military Philosophy has long been widely acclaimed for its superb philosophical principles. Sun Zi emphasised that one must always strive to defeat the adversaries' strategies and plans, rendering them ineffective, so that potential armed conflict can be avoided. Beyond this, the next best approach seeks to attack the adversaries' relationship with their alliances, thereby alienating them from the necessary support and resources to wage a protracted war.

Since *al-Qaeda's* simultaneous attacks on American's iconic landmarks in September 2001, the limitations of kinetic tools: military force, the criminal justice system, and the traditional intelligence approaches, have become increasingly apparent. The watershed event has emboldened the radical Islamic terrorist groups[2] in Southeast Asia, leading to a series of terrorist attacks in recent years, such as the two Bali nightclub bombings, the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing; and the Jakarta Australian Embassy bombing by *Jemaah Islamiyah*. The global and regional counter-terrorist organisations' inability to pre-empt or neutralise such attacks within Southeast Asia has revealed the urgent need to move beyond existing solutions. Expounding on Sun Zi's wisdom, we need to have a deeper understanding of the Strategic Logic of the regional radical Islamic terrorist groups in order to defeat them. Using JI as a proxy for the study of countering regional Islamic terrorists[3], this paper will attempt to analyse its Strategic Logic i.e. underlying ideology, organisational objectives, likely strategic options and broad actions with the purpose of locating unique characteristics which may be turned into points of vulnerability. These vulnerabilities would provide a conduit for exploitation to erode JI's ideological, physical infrastructure and network.

JI bombing in Jakarta, 2009

"Constructing" Jl's Strategic Logic

故曰：" 知彼知己者，百战不殆； "

"*Thus it is said: He who knows the other side (the enemy) and knows himself will not be defeated in a hundred battles.*" – Sun Zi[4]

Extrapolated from ancient wisdom: to effectively counter today's elusive and constantly evolving terrorist networks such as JI, it is vital for us to "construct" their strategic logic. This can be done by framing the strategic context underpinning their development and analysing their likely ideological/political motivations and organisational objectives.

Framing the Strategic Context

The Origin

Islam was brought to Southeast Asia around the 14th century by the West and Central Asian traders. Between the 16th to 18th centuries, intellectual exchange between the Malay-Indonesian students and ulama[5] resulted in a reform movement emphasising a return to the "*pure and pristine Islam as practised by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in West Sumatra of Indonesia*". A *caliphate* (the Islamic form of government representing the political unity and leadership of the Muslim world)[6] was thus established. This laid the ground for Islamic extremists to resort to forceful methods, including jihad ("the struggle"), to compel fellow Muslims to return to the so-called fundamentals of Islam. This was strikingly similar to the *Wahhabism* in Saudi Arabia[7] and the global *jihadi* movement today.

Notion of Islamic Statehood and Struggle of Radical Islam

During Indonesia's struggle for independence in the 1940s, the idea of Islamic statehood spread rapidly throughout the country. This emerging notion, which called for the application of *Sharia* ("Islamic law") to all Indonesian Muslims[8], was rejected by General Sukarno. To undermine Sukarno's nationalistic agenda, the *Darul Islam* (DI), founded by Sekar Marijan Kartosuwiryo in 1947, sought to establish a secessionist Islamic state (*Nusantara Raya*), but failed. Under the subsequent Suharto's New Order regime, though the DI was illegal, it became non-violent and was quietly tolerated. While DI failed to attain its political goal, it nevertheless "inspired subsequent generations of radical Muslims with its commitment to a *Sharia*-based state and its heavy sacrifices in the cause of *jihad*".[9]

In comparison, the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII) founded by Mohammad Natsir in 1967, restrained itself from outright political engagement. Natsir believed *dakwah* (means literally "making an invitation", or missionary) was a better way of Islamising society. DDII set up a network of mosques, preachers, publications and Muslim schools (*Pesantren*[10]) and established itself as the "main channel in Indonesia for distributing scholarships" from the Saudi-funded *World Islamic League* for study in the Middle East. Many graduates became preachers on Indonesian university campuses, ensuring that the particularly harder-edged Saudi *Wahhabism* permeated throughout the society.[11]

The Rise, Struggle and Resilience of JI

Democratic Transition in Indonesia

The fall of strongman Suharto in 1998 radically altered the political environment. Weak democracy and intense political competition ensued, as military institutions lost their formal political power, while the parliament received a sudden surge in power. The aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis further revealed the state's incompetence, resulting in the loss of the populace's support. Radical political Islam flourished, and a sharp escalation of political and sectarian violence followed. "Hundreds of radical Muslim exiles, including the two JI founders – Abdullah Sungkar[12] and Abu Bakar Bashir[13], returned to Indonesia and demanded political space, encouraged by statements from political leaders that the aspirations of all people and groups could no longer be ignored."[14]

The Afghanistan *Jihadi* Experience

In conjunction, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan (1978-1989), drew thousands of foreign Muslims to assist the various Afghanistan *Mujahideen*[15] groups. This gave the volunteers much guerrilla warfare experience, and brought together veterans and founding leaders of today's Southeast Asia radical Islamic terrorist groups, including JI's key operational leader, Riduan Isamuddin, Hambali[16]. The shared experience in defeating the Soviet instilled confidence and conviction in the Islamists to defy any superpower in "the name of God" and fostered ideological connections between the Southeast Asia groups. Those who interacted with Osama were influenced by his radical views of Islamic struggle.

Global *Jihadi* Movement and Latest JI Development

The US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan on October 2001 reinforced Osama's calling of "*Universal jihad vs. Western Infidelity*". Subsequently, US's failure in justifying the invasion of Iraq and the prolonged occupation allowed al-Qaeda to further their propaganda agenda on "*Islam, as a religion, is under attack.*" This message behind the global *Jihadi* movement found resonance even among the moderate Muslims. Al-Qaeda and its associate groups such as JI successfully generated wider support for its campaign against US and its allies.

Within Southeast Asia, JI has perpetrated attacks almost on an annual basis even while swallowing a string of defeats.[17] More than 400 members have been arrested, and Indonesia has prosecuted over 250

militants, including many top leaders and operatives. Its regional system of cells has been disembowelled and overall command and control has significantly disrupted, with the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and the killing of master bomb-maker and close friend of Noordin Mohammed Top[18], Dr. Azahari bin Husin in November 2005. In July 2008, a Singaporean bomb expert and student of Dr. Azahari, Mohammed Hassan was arrested in South Sumatra, together with 9 other suspected JI members, and 20 makeshift bombs, detonators, and explosive chemicals.[19] Despite losing some top leadership and being denied of the ability to perpetrate a major terrorist attack over the last few years, this seizure of weapons is a case in point highlighting JI's determination to rebuild its capabilities for future attacks.

JI's Likely Ideological/Political End State and Organisational Objectives

Ideological Framework

The unique strategic context has shaped JI's motivation, modus operandi and its likely approaches for regeneration. Founded in 1992-1993 by Sungkar and Basir, JI was established as a clandestine organisation with the explicit intent of bringing down the secular state through force and political struggle. As a direct offshoot of DI, the foundation of JI was largely built upon DI's ideology. Sungkar also understood the rationale for *dakwah* and the necessity for Islamising the individual Muslim as a prelude to Islamising the wider society. Suppressed by Suharto's regime, both leaders drew insight that *dakwah* in the absence of

jihad would be a futile exercise. Their thinking was subsequently shifted towards a focused propagation of the Islamic faith through a *vanguard jemaah* advocated by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. This led to JI's broad definition of defensive *jihad* to "justify" the killing of Westerners as "*Islam is under attack*" and "*Muslim lands are being occupied*". It encourages martyrdom, branding innocent Muslims who died as a result of terrorist attacks as martyrs, and promises the rewards of paradise for Muslims who die carrying out *Allah's* deeds, especially through suicide attacks. A statement issued by JI immediately after the Jakarta's Australian Embassy bombing, revealed that JI was motivated by al-Qaeda's "*global jihadi*" ideology, characterised by a globally orientated, violently anti-western animus.[20]

End–State and Organisational Objectives

JI's proclaimed ideological end state is to establish a pan-Islamic Southeast Asian state incorporating Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, and inevitably, Brunei and Singapore.[21] This long-term vision was spelt out in their primary organisational and philosophical document know as the "*General Guidebook of the Struggle of JI*" (PUPJI)[22], which is exceptionally religious in nature. From the PUPJI, it was made clear that the cornerstone of JI is a deepened understanding and practice of Islam and their desire end-state remains at the ideological realm. Bruce Hoffman opined that the religious terrorist groups "live in the future which is divinely decreed" and the belief that "themselves are specifically anointed"

to "attain the ultimate realisation of their political destiny".[23] This proposed ideological logic suggests the uphill task in countering the hardliner terrorists' mindset.

Although Southeast Asia's step-up in regional security has significantly degraded JI's capabilities, JI remains a remarkably resilient organisation. The author would like to propose four organisational objectives that JI would strive towards to realise its long-term goal. Firstly, JI will always aim to "Islamise the local societies", through violent or peaceful means. Secondly, JI will seek to regenerate its degraded operational capability. Thirdly, JI would attempt to negate counter-terrorism efforts, such as, through compartmentalising its planning and changing its modus operandi. Lastly, JI is commited towards the global *jihad* to liberate Iraq and Afghanistan from the "western oppressors" and their supported "apostate" governments.

Likely Strategic Options

To achieve the four organisational objectives, JI is likely to adopt three non-mutually exclusive strategic options: "*Winning the Hearts & Minds*"; "*Consolidating a Firm Base*"; and "*Strengthening the Core*".

Winning the Hearts & Minds

"道者，令民以上同意也，故可以与之死，可以与之生，而不畏危。"

"*Moral influence refers to measures and policies that align the people with the sovereign so as to be in complete agreement and harmony with each other. In this way,*

the people will be prepared to co-exist with as well as die for the sovereign without any fear of dangers." – Sun Zi [24]

JI has greatly broadened its ideological appeal, and increasingly people support both its means and ends. Its basic message focuses on a few key issues that have broad resonance, even among the moderate Muslims: "*Islam is under attack*"; "*westerners especially the Americans are oppressors who occupy Muslim lands, and kill Muslim civilians*"; "*it is a religious obligation to wage jihad.*"[25] Public opinion polling conducted by the Indonesia Survey Institute in 2006 found that 17.4 percent of the respondents supported JI's use of violence to establish an Islamic state. Most alarmingly, the Pew Center[26] for People and the Press' 2005 polling data revealed that the number of Indonesians who believed their religion is "under attack" grew from 15 percent to over 80 percent.[27]

Building upon this ideological success, JI is likely to employ *dakwah* as a means to "Islamising the local societies". This includes building up its popular support and forging greater links to Islamist parties and organisations through good deeds, social work and charity. This viable regrouping strategy aims to "widen and deepen their recruitment and support pool". For instance, the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*[28] (MMI) under Bashir's leadership, established a command post in Banda Aceh to "help evacuate dead bodies, distribute aid and give spiritual guidance to survivors" during the 2004 Asian Tsunami.

On the same note, JI would probably be more selective in their target designations to minimise collateral damages. However, such shift in tactics may have brought about resentments among the pro-bombing factions led by Noordin. Noordin's announcement on the formation of *Tandzim Qoedtatal Jihad*, a separate faction with a decidedly anti-Western, pro-bombing agenda in 2005[29] reflected the leadership differences over longer-term strategies on waging *jihad* as well as shorter-term impatience. Such ideological rifts within JI could be further exploited.

Consolidating a Firm Base

Indonesia will probably remain as a viable option for JI to establish its firm base before extending its tentacles to the rest of Southeast Asia. The country's historical, political and socio-cultural backdrop presents a fertile ground for "nurturing the seed of radical Islam". JI would collaborate with like-minded radical political parties and seek to undermine the secular government through inciting social unrests and sectarian conflicts. Evidently, JI's active involvement in the recent marked increase of sectarian violence in the troubled outer islands of the Malukus and Sulawesi clearly reflects its intention to undermine the *Malino Accord*[30] as part of its regrouping strategy. JI is also cognisant that sectarian violence does not put international pressure on Indonesian authorities to crack down, as do attacks on Western targets. For instance, the beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005 was an attempt to undermine confidence in the state.[31]

This thinking is reflected in the current JI documents, which describe an Indonesia-centric organisation with the regional *mantiqi* structure being taken apart. Beneath the leadership body, are now four sections: Religious Training, Education, Logistics, and *Sariyah* ("military operations"). The *Sariyah*, divided into four regions, focusing mainly on Java. In addition, the three geographical commands for Indonesia: the West Area Mantiqi, the East Area Mantiqi, and the Poso Mantiqi, signify that Indonesia is JI's clear area of operations and interest at present.[32]

Strengthening the Core

Several very hardened JI leaders are still at large, some with significant organisation skills or technical/military competencies. A cadre has regrouped on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, where members are probably protected by the ASG. Others have long-standing ties with al-Qaeda and its financing mechanisms.[33] The complimentary strength of these leaders across the socio-economic and educational spectrum is a reflection of JI's organisational dynamics and its ability to retaliate. More significantly, JI has demonstrated its resolve and ability to learn from past operations and experiences of other organisations.

In fact, evidence has reflected the new JI re-organised structure comprising of many autonomous and compartmentalised cells. *Abu Dujana*, the military leader of JI from 2005 until June 2007 when he was arrested told CNN in a jail-house interview, "it [JI]

will continue to exist and continue to move on with its plans ... When a part of it is cut off, [in this case] the head is cut off, there will be a replacement. It's only natural."[34]

JI's recent tactical shift from large truck bombs to small backpack bombs demonstrates learning – a desire to evade counter-measures established by the police. Evidence gathered in 2007 raids suggests that JI was preparing a campaign of targeted assassination – a strategy requiring few resources that has been successfully employed in the outer islands. Hence, the key concern remains in JI's desire to learn as an organisation, which might drive them to seek for new competencies such as bio-chemical or cyber attacks. This potentially requires lower costs, yet yields unimaginable psychological or economical impact. Nonetheless, the access to such expertise could force them out of their "safe havens", allowing us to pre-empt and disrupt their operations.

Countering JI's Strategies

The feasibility of executing JI's strategies (Refer to Figure 1.) hinges on its ability to: promote its ideological appeal; source and secure the funding; select, recruit and train new cadres; conduct deliberation in-group isolation and indoctrination; and maintain ties with the other radical groups. By understanding the intricacies of these actions; we can identify possible gaps for exploitation, and/or create a hostile environment to stifle JI's regenerative efforts so as to render its strategic options irrelevant or ineffective. (Refer to Figure 2.)

Undermining JI's Ideological Appeal

Even as JI's physical infrastructure is targeted to eradicate immediate threats, the key in defeating JI remains at the ideological realm. Conscious effort must be invested to undermine JI members' unwavering religious faith


Figure 1. JI's Regenerative Strategy

Figure 2. Countering JI's Strategies

and interpretation of their religion while containing its ideological influence.

In the immediate term, the focus should be on disrupting the propagation of the "hatred messages" by attacking JI's channels of transmissions as well as converting the detained terrorists through religious rehabilitation. In the longer run, the social base of JI's recruitment pool must be targeted by marginalising the radical Islamists, promoting the ideological tenets of traditional Islam (undermining the cause of global *jihadi*) and strengthening bonds between Muslim communities and the state. Governments must work closely with the Muslim communities, and address the ethnic, economic and social causes of Muslim anger, e.g. facilitate job-generating investments, provide alternate secular educational systems,

and modernise and police the curricula of the *madrasas*. This long-term effort will diminish the crucial support for JI's regeneration, e.g. financial and moral support from sympathisers and shrink its recruitment pool.

Draining JI's Resource Pool

Evidence has revealed that the major source of funding for Southeast Asian *jihadist* groups is through donations. Intended for disaster relief or for the building of mosques, they are often diverted. For MMI, these types of donations are the main source of funds, as there is very little accountability or audit trail. To control such illegal fund diversions, governance on charity organisations' financial usage must be established. Singapore's experience in handling cases of fund mismanagement by charity organisations can be learnt and adopted.

Interestingly, JI has developed a profitable publishing consortium around the Bashir's *pesantren* which serve as an alternate source of funding. Although the publishing houses are owned by individuals, some revenues are almost certainly being ploughed back into JI activities. The government needs to enforce laws and regulations to ensure adequate scrutiny to the publishing, labour, corporate registration and taxation.

Exploiting JI Recruitment Process

JI's ability to regenerate hinges greatly on its recruitment. To safe-guard its operational security and survival, the recruitment into JI is trust-based and often on *kinship*. Specifically, the intricate network of marriages in JI at times makes it seem like a giant extended family. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure.[35] In fact, one criterion for formal membership in JI appears to be the reliability of the wife.[36] This can be a potential gap through which one can infiltrate the network or to "cultivate" valuable sources for the security agencies.

Disrupting Ideological Indoctrination

A common tactic employed by JI to facilitate ideological indoctrination of new member involves in-group isolation.[37] It forges a sense of belonging to the surrogate family and instils conformity and consensus that result in "blind obedience" to the leaders. It also cultivates a strong desire for martyrdom in some members – who eventually volunteer as suicide bombers for a "greater cause".

Jonathan Drummond stated that deliberately self-isolating communities place huge reliance on "alternative news sources", "home schooling" and "closed religious/ritual systems". These may "pull one away from competing social networks and constructions of reality".[38] Hence, we need to expose certain educational environments that deliberately limit contact with the outside world and appear to propagate alternate constructions of reality, and expose their student populations to wider informational and intellectual vistas.

Eroding Ties between the Radical Groups

Though the *global jihadi* movement and the local groups leverage upon each other to further their cause, marked differences between their ideologies exist. Besides the earlier-mentioned differences between JI and al-Qaeda, the differing strategic logic between JI and its regional counterparts can also be exploited to create alienation and distrust. One such example is the JI's diminishing ties with MILF, seeing the latter's support greatly declined since 2001. The MILF leadership attempted to break away from JI's hardliner faction and has expelled two most well-known JI militants in 2004. Thus, the ability to identify the ideological rifts between the radical groups can help to alienate them, and if possible, instigate infighting.

Valuable Lessons for the SAF

The evolving security climate brought about by radical Islamic terrorists should never be overlooked. Lapses like the escape of Mas Selamat Kastari,

Family of terrorists

HAMBALI, whose real name is Riduan Isamuddin is married to Nor Alwizah Lee Abdullah, a Sabahan. Nor Alwizah controlled JI's finances as treasurer. She is also believed to be head of the women wing. Both Hambali and Nor Alwizah were captured by the CIA and Thai police in August last year. Hambali was al-Qaeda's regional director and the mastermind of Jemaah Islamiah and is said to be responsible for the Bali bomb blast in October 2002 that killed more than 200 people.

Hambali

Nor Alwizah Lee Abdullah

NORDIN MOHD TOP an explosives expert and on the run is married to Rahmah Rusdi, the sister of JI leader Rais Rusdi. He is a UTM graduate and former senior supervisor of the Luqmanul Hakiem School.

Nordin Mohd Top

Jaafar Anwarul is a former sundry shop owner and co-founder of the Luqmanul Hakiem religious school in Ulu Tiram, Johor. Three of his brothers are also senior JI members.

Jaafar Anwarul

Photo not available

FATHUR ROHMAN AL GHOZI who was shot dead when he escaped from a Manila prison last year was married to Sheila Mubin, an Indonesian JI member who is Amrozi's cousin.

Fathur Rohman Al Ghozi

AMROZI has been sentenced to death by firing squad for his part in the Bali bombing. He is the brother of Mukhlas and Ali Imron. Mukhlas has been sentenced to death while Ali Imron sentenced to life imprisonment for their role in the Oct 12 Bali bombing.

Amrozi

FAIZ and his brother Hashim are JI members. Their sister is married to JI leader Shukri Omar Talib.

Faiz Bafana

ALI IMRON has been sentenced to life in prison for his role in the Bali bombing. He is the brother of Mukhlas and Amrozi.

Ali Imron

MOHD NASIR ABAS, 35, was the Mantiqi III in charge of Sabah, Labuan, North and Central Sulawesi and Mindanao. Three of his sisters are married to JI leaders. One of them is married to Mukhlas, the Bali bomber.

Nasir Abas

MUKHLAS, also known as Ali Ghufron, an Afghan-trained preacher had overall control of the bombings on Oct 12, 2002, that killed 202 people, mostly foreign tourists on the resort island of Bali. He is the brother-in-law of Mohd Nasir Abas.

Mukhlas

TAUFIK who was involved in the Plaza Atrium bombing in July 2000 had his left leg blown off during that incident. His sister is married to JI member Zulkifli Hir who is on the run.

Taufik Abdul Halim

MUCHLIS @FERRY is married to Abdullah Sungkar's daughter. Abdullah Sungkar is the founder of the Jemaah Islamiah.

Muchlis

Related

JI family of terrorists – JI is trust-based and often on kinship. Specifically, the intricate network of marriages in JI at times makes it seem like a giant extended family.

Singapore's JI leader and terror fugitive, from detention on 27 February 2008 remind us of the continual regional threat that terrorists pose. The complexity of radical Islamic terrorism has initiated a paradigm shift in the way SAF conducts its operations and the types of expertise and core competencies required by its personnel. Specifically, there are three aspects worth exploring to enhance the way our soldiers discharge their duties: by defining and maintaining clear *Rules*

of Engagement (ROE), strengthening social and ethnic-integrity, and training our leaders and soldiers.

First, while SAF has established *clear ROE* to guide our soldiers in performing their duties i.e. protecting the key installations, conducting counter-terrorist operations and handling suspected terrorists, these ROE must be constantly reviewed based on the changing operating environment, incorporating the ground's inputs. Tragedies such as the suffocation of 85 arrested Muslim youth (because of staging a demonstration outside a police station) on October, 2004 during their transport to the intended detention, brought shame upon the Thailand's security forces and government. Furthermore, such incidents would continue to fuel the *jihadi* fire and provide them with new motivation and sustenance.

Second, the SAF must continue to play its part in *strengthening the social and ethnic-integrity* of Singaporeans who go through national service (NS) each year. Majority of the captured Singapore JI members went through the NS and the secular education system, yet still chose to embrace the misconstrued *Jihad*. The SAF must continue to place emphasis in national education and provide a platform for confidence-building among the different ethnic and religious groups, as a basis for developing deeper friendships and trust. Leaders across every level must commit to promote better inter-ethnic and inter-religious understanding between different communities.

Third, SAF needs to comprehend the complexity and embrace consensus and commitment to the basic ideology underlying the war on terrorism. We need to train our leaders and soldiers to be more adaptive in handling uncertainties posed by the elusive threats. This requires a deeper study of our current training pedagogy, especially the drill-centric lower level training. Adopting a problem-based training methodology, in appropriate dosage, would strengthen the soldiers' mental agility in managing complexity.

Besides changes in the organisational structure, procedures and systems, the need for SAF to work closely with ministerial agencies and civil authorities remains crucial in a winning battle against the terrorists at the home front. Beyond Singapore, SAF also needs to play an important role in collaborating with its international and regional counterparts, such as the sharing of resources and intelligence, to strengthen the counter-terrorism efforts at the regional military-strategy level.

Conclusion

Decades of Islamisation within the region has built up the intricacy and resilience of the Southeast Asia's terrorist networks. JI is just a case in point. Beyond disrupting their operational capability, we need to realise that to defeat the likes of JI, we need to undercut their ideological basis. This calls for an insightful understanding of their Strategic Logic to effectively undermine their regenerative capacity and systematically erode their cause.

The key remains in the ability to target their ideological infrastructure and alienate them from their allies or incite infighting. Specific to SAF, appropriate training and systems must be established to mentally and psychologically prepare our leaders and soldiers in dealing with an elusive enemy and an increasingly complex threat environment. Beyond this, SAF and its members must also recognise their key roles in strengthening Singapore's social-ethnic fabric as part of the trust and confidence building between communities. ☺

(Ed note: This essay is the second prize winner of the 2008 CDF Essay Competition)

Endnotes

1   Chow-Hou Wee, *Sun Zi Art of War – An Illustrated Translation with Asian Perspectives and Insights*, (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003), pp59-61.
2   Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Kumpulan Militant/ Mujahideen Malaysi, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) etc.
3   The author chooses JI as it is arguably the most well-connected and dangerous group in Southeast Asia, with unique transnational aspirations: besides establishing ties with regional entities such as the MILF, JI has also had contact with Osama's Al-Qaeda.
4   Wee, *Art of War*, p77.
5   *Ulama* refers to the Muslim legal scholars engaged in the several fields of Islamic studies. They are best known as the arbiters of *Sharia* law.
6   Kumar Ramakrishna, "Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol 27, no.3 (2005), pp345-346.
7   The modern Saudi state is founded on the 18th-century alliance between the *Wahhabi* religious movement and the House of Saud. *Wahhabism* is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia and some MiddleEast countries.
8   Zachary Abuza, "Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia: An Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?", *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sep 2004), p13.
9   Kumar Ramakrishna, "Constructing the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry", *IDSS Commentaries*, No. 71, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (October 2004), pp2-3.
10 *Pesantren* are Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia. They are led by a group of Muslim teachers, who also play important roles in the community as a religious leader and in recent years as a political figure.
11 "Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix", *International Crisis Group Asia Report*, No. 83 (13 September 2004), pp6-8.
12 Abdullah Sungkar (1937-1999) founded and led JI with the support of Abu Bakar Bashir. He was also the founder of Al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki, Central Java, in 1972, which exists till today.
13 Abu Bakar Bashir, (born in 1938), is an Indonesia Muslim cleric and leader of the Indonesia Mujahedeen Council (MMI). He runs the Al-Mukmin boarding school and is believed to be the spiritual head of JI.
14 Abuza, "Muslims, Politics, and Violence", p8.
15 *Mujahideen* is the plural form of *Mujahid*, which refers to a Muslim involved in a *jihad*, i.e. fighting in a war or involved in any other struggle involving militant Islamic ideologies.
16 Hambali is JI's former military leader. He was often described as "the Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia". He was highly trusted by Al-Qaeda and was the main link between the two organisations.
17 Zachary Abuza, "The State of Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five Years After Bali", *The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Nov 2007), p1.
18 Noordin Mohammed Top is alleged to be one of the key bomb makers for JI. Noordin was reported by the US FBI to be "an explosives expert" and "an officer, recruiter, bomb-maker, and trainer for the JI group". Noordin and Azahari Husin were thought to have masterminded the series of bombings between 2002 and 2005.
19 http://www.todayonline.com/articles/263309.asp
20 Kumar, "Constructing the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist", p344.
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26 The Pew Research Center is a "fact tank" based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the USA and the world.
27 Abuza, "The State of Jemaah Islamiyah", p3.
28 An overt civil society organisation, established by Bashir in mid-2000, as an instrumentation that tries to implement *sharia* peacefully through the democratic process.
29 Abuza, "The State of Jemaah Islamiyah", p2.

30 A peace agreement drew up by local leaders following hundreds of deaths in December 2001.

31 Abuza, "The State of Jemaah Islamiyah", p2.

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Transformational Leadership for the 3rd Generation SAF

by CPT Wong Wei Han, Gareth

"*Consider that, while advances in materials and technology have changed the face of battle, the Army continues to rely most heavily on strong leaders at all levels – exceptional leaders who are self-aware, adaptive, and agile; leaders who will hold units together in the midst of tragedy; leaders who will achieve their objectives in the face of concerted opposition and the most overwhelming odds. These are leaders of indomitable spirit who fulfil their obligations to their assigned mission and to their people.*"[1] – US General Eric K. Shinseki (Ret'd)

Even as the SAF embarks on the massive journey towards force transformation, the challenges that remain are multi-faceted, complex and constantly evolving. For the SAF

to continue being innovative and responsive as a credible and capable force for the 21st century, the next generation of leaders must continue to build on transformation efforts and steer the organisation forward in foreboding unknown waters. Rapid advancements in information and communication technologies synergised with improved tactics, techniques and procedures have greatly enhanced the modern military. The introduction of the Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2) framework for the SAF has henceforth transformed Integrated Warfare doctrine by leveraging on these information advances[2]. At the strategic and operational level, increased demands to manage these technological advances and developments will require new-age inspirational military leaders to drive continued performance from our soldiers.

Aside from hardware advances, the continued development of our people's "heart"-ware is thus equally as paramount. Increasingly we have come to recognise the broader context of the SAF transformation, one that is not solely associated with the latest in information-communications technology, but also tied to the maturing of our post-Independence nation and the changing nature of the military profession[3]. "People-centric" issues will be an intricate facet which the SAF will have to increasingly confront as part of its transformation efforts, and these may take unprecedented and previously not experienced emotional, psychological and intellectual forms. In short, to address such metamorphosing challenges, we will need inherently transformational leaders to drive transformation for the 3rd Generation SAF.

Spirit and System: The Current SAF Leadership Doctrine

"Leadership is being able to influence and motivate one's peers and fellow soldiers – to imbue them with trust and confidence so that they will carry out a mission confidently and to their best ability… The SAF therefore demands the highest standards of leadership at all levels of command and expects them to lead, excel and inspire others to give their best to the nation[4]." – *The SAF Core Values (1997) p7*

Leadership in the SAF is defined as "a process of influencing people to accomplish the mission, inspiring

Competencies	"Core Competencies" (For Leader Performance)				"Meta-competency" (For Growth / Adaptability)
	Conceptual Thinking	Social	Mission	Developmental	Self
Skills	Critical Thinking	Communicating to Influence	Planning	Developing People	Self-Awareness
	Creative Thinking	Interpersonal Effectiveness	Decision Making	Developing Team	Self Management
	Ethical Reasoning		Execution	Improving Organisation	Personal Mastery

Figure 1. The SAF Leadership Competency Model (LCM)

their commitment and improving the organisation"[5]; and as one of the SAF Seven Core Values, it has always been considered to be an imperative pillar of the organisation. Currently, the SAF uses a Leadership Competency Model (LCM) to articulate leadership frameworks and paradigms. It consists of five competency domains and fourteen skill sets; four of the competency domains are "core" competencies that directly influence leadership performance, and the fifth is a "personal meta-competency" required for leader adaptability and growth[6] (See Figure 1 on previous page):

Building on the previous "Knowledge, Abilities & Qualities" (KAQ) Model, the LCM emphasises new behavioural competency domains that go beyond mere people / social and task / mission domains.[7] The behavioural descriptors highlighted above are meant to "facilitate the assessment, observation, feedback and reflection" on specific leadership competencies and skills at the school and unit level, with increased attention paid to specific skill sets such as decision-making, ethical reasoning, team-building, organisational development and personal mastery.[8]

The SAF Leadership Development (LD) Framework deals with the subject of various leadership styles, which can be loosely interpreted as the approaches one can take in response to various matters or problems. The various core- and meta-competencies deal with the cognitive domain, and can be largely personality-centric in its enforcement and promulgation. In terms of an overarching theme, there is perhaps a lack in articulation of a specific style that transcends the five

competencies and fourteen skill sets. It has been acknowledged that the articulation of the LD Framework is based "heavily on an assumption of leadership in hierarchical rather than flatter, networked organisational arrangements".[9] There remains a need to appreciate, project and evaluate the paradigm shifts needed for leadership in a more network-centric and knowledge-empowered SAF for the future. These complications have therefore resulted in various difficulties aligning these various concepts to a particular leadership style and theme.

The SAF's Centre for Leadership Development (CLD) has articulated that the future ahead for leadership development must rest on synergising the *Spirit and System*[10], where systems refer to the doctrines, curriculum and tools driving the thinking behind leadership, and spirit refers to the ethos and motivation of SAF Leaders driving their daily work and actions. Hype over transformation efforts has so far centered on the hardware; there is a pressing need now to enhance and promulgate the leadership to drive this gargantuan task of transformation. To internalise the SAF LCM, we must educate, empower and enthuse our people to apply the rubrics of this coherent framework. We must strive to create leaders who are "cool in the head, warm in the heart and hot in the hands".

Thus, beyond just developing leaders adept at transformation, what is perhaps more imperative is *developing transformational leaders who are adept* for the organisation. At the risk of sounding pedantic, this paper seeks to identify and examine the tenets and benefits

behind transformational leadership for the 3rd Generation SAF, and to expound on transformational leadership as a style / theme in relation to the existing LD framework for application to all levels of command within the SAF.

Transformational Leadership

Leadership for the New Frontier

Throughout the ages, military forces have relied on organisational forms and practices that are systematic, but often rigid and inflexible, to develop standard operating procedures in an effort to eliminate uncertainties and confusion in combat. This tension of "flexibility versus discipline, empowerment versus control, and centralisation versus decentralisation in the organisation" is thus something that military leaders often have to grapple with.[11] Often, military leaders rely on traditional "carrot-and-stick" measures to enforce conformance to established norms; engaging in forms of "transactional" leadership to ensure tasks are accomplished.

In a new era of "Fourth Generation Warfare", the rapidly evolving 'backdrop' of military tactics and strategy demands that modern militaries now be able to rapidly adapt to changing circumstances and conditions, and not merely follow previously established norms which may already be antiquated and obsolete. At the tactical level, the increasing prominence of the "strategic corporal" further demands the transfer of appropriate skills and the empowerment of leadership to levels further and further down the chain of command. This flexibility and adaptability required therefore demands a new form of leadership in this age of

warfare transformation – an altogether transformational leadership.

Transformational vs. Transactional Leadership

As mentioned, transactional leadership emphasises the transaction or exchange that takes place among leaders, colleagues, and followers. This exchange is based on the leader discussing with others what is required and specifying the conditions and rewards (economic or political or psychological) if they fulfil those requirements.[12] Depending on the adequacy of the follower's performance, the leader rewards or disciplines the follower accordingly.

Transformational leadership however, raises the bar – it certainly does more than just set up simple exchanges or agreements. Transformational leadership involves inspiring followers to commit to a shared vision and goals for an organisation or unit, challenging them to be innovative problem solvers, and developing followers' leadership capacity via coaching, mentoring,

Source: Army News

Transformational leadership involves inspiring followers to commit to a shared vision and goals for an organisation or unit, challenging them to be innovative problem solvers, and developing followers' leadership capacity via coaching, mentoring, and provision of both challenge and support.

and provision of both challenge and support.[13] In relation to the SAF LCM, tenets of transformational leadership are manifested most in the "Self" and "Developmental" competencies, which entail more cognitive and meta-psychological skills.

What's in a Transformational Leader?

Transformational leaders motivate others to do more than they originally intended and often even more than they thought possible. They set challenging expectations and typically achieve higher performances. Transformational leaders also tend to have more committed and satisfied followers. Transformational leadership is a "process that changes and transforms individuals, and is primarily concerned with values, ethics, standards and long-term goals".[14]

Conceptually, in summary, a transformational leader is charismatic, and followers seek to identify with the leader so as to emulate him or her. The leadership inspires followers, providing both meaning and understanding. The leadership is intellectually stimulating, and seeks to expand followers' use of their abilities. The leadership is individually tailored, providing the follower with support, mentoring and coaching. Academically, there are 4 recognised components for transformational leadership to be effective[15]: *(1) Idealised Influence, (2) Inspirational Motivation, (3) Intellectual Stimulation* and *(4) Individualised Consideration*. We will look at each component in turn.

A transformational leader who manifests traits of "Idealised Influence" behaves in ways that allow them to serve as role models who are admired, respected and trusted. Leaders who have a great deal of idealised influence are willing to take risks and are consistent rather than arbitrary.[16] There is confidence in a shared vision, and an emphasis on the importance of purpose, commitment and the ethical consequences of various decisions.

Transformational leaders are those who can also provide "Inspirational Motivation" for their followers, by providing meaning and challenge for them. Emphasis is placed on team spirit, and the encouragement of enthusiastic and optimistic outlooks. There is a lucid articulation of a promising future toward which the transformational leader encourages and motivates his followers to strive for.

Transformational leadership also entails a process of "Intellectual Stimulation" for those under one's charge – to harness their cumulative innovation and creativity by probing for questions and modified assumptions, re-framing problems and approaching old situations in new ways.[17] There is an emphasis placed on soliciting new ideas and creative solutions to existing / emerging problems and challenges. Re-framing existing paradigms and possessing a versatile capacity to change[18] are all instrumental in encouraging this intellectual stimulation.

"Individualised Consideration" is also an important hallmark trait of a transformational leader. In this respect, there is special attention paid to each individual follower's needs for growth and achievement through active coaching and mentoring.[19] With proper

identification and acknowledgement of the individual's capabilities and limitations, a suitable level of empowerment is then accorded to the individual to carry out assigned tasks and responsibilities.

Given this background, the pertinent question is: How does transformational leadership augment and enhance the modern military's capability to deal with a new age of challenges? Let us examine this in greater detail.

Transformational Military Leaders

Engendering Greater Commitment to Defence

Leaders play an important role in raising followers' levels of commitment by fostering and augmenting their dedication to the team, to the leader, and finally to the organisation. Research has highlighted that transformational leaders are able to influence the followers' commitment and identification with the leader, and also positively influence their social identification with the group or organisation.[20]

For the military, the idea of commitment and dedication to a cause is all the more imperative. Commitment should be the central focus in soldier motivation over and above compliance through obedience; for without commitment, there may be a deficiency in the will to fight.[21] For the individual soldier, the ultimate test of commitment is up to the point of death – the "unlimited liability" clause that each military member sacredly carries.[22] Commitment is thus certainly the "backbone of the military profession"[23],

especially when we consider the high risk, extremely demanding and severely stressful nature of military activities.

To engender such commitment, transformational leadership is needed at all levels, especially considering how significantly the new-age soldiers' demographic composition has changed. More likely than not, they are knowledge workers – "informed, enlightened, and often knowing more than the leader about how to get the task done".[24] They are an increasingly diverse group with more varied and more numerous needs; one leadership style may not be sufficient in dealing with them. Furthermore, they are the leaders of the future, and must thus be equally well-developed and empowered. For today's soldier, a transformational adaptive leader needs to remain cognisant of these requirements whilst still remaining stimulating and inspirational.

Nurturing and Engaging a First Class People

Source: SAFTI Link 2009

Nurturing and Engaging a First Class People

A key component of transformational leadership centres on intellectual stimulation, i.e. intellectually engaging one's subordinates to elicit creative solutions to joint problems and challenges. This intellectual engagement can facilitate the unprecedented development of breakthrough products and resolve previously-embroiled conundrums. The development of Scotch Tape and Post-It Notes were made possible because renowned 3M Chief Executive William McKnight encouraged engineers to spend up to 15% of their time pursuing whatever projects they liked.[25] In World War II, a US Army non-commissioned officer provided a novel solution to overcome the Normandy hedgerows when he conceptualised the modification of tanks into bulldozers.[26] Intellectual stimulation is certainly important to encourage one's subordinates to overcome existing boundaries to break new ground.

Another key component of transformational leadership rests on individualised consideration, where followers feel like their own personal needs are being met. The coaching and mentoring provided empowers them with a sense of increased competence to fulfil existing tasks and requirements. There has been evidence to suggest that greater perceived fulfillment of training goals indirectly raises military commitment and performance, as well as levels of motivation and self-efficacy.[27] Transformational leadership is thus clearly important for nurturing and engaging a first class people for a world class organisation.

Conceptualisations of transformational leadership and notions of nurturing and engagement can be easily misconstrued to be too soft and all 'smoke and mirrors'[28]; i.e. a feel-good factor that does not raise the bar for performance and results. However, it has been proven that such concepts are imperative in raising group performance, be it measured by normative or objective means. It is often overlooked how such factors influence followers to collectively raise the quality of the overall effort – which is more creative, more dynamic and resistant, more adaptable to change, and on the whole, self-propagating for even more success.

Ready, Relevant, Decisive

In combat, the presence of visible inspirational leadership is the key definer of a successful operation. As Montesquieu once famously remarked, "A rational army would run away". His words still ring much truth in our modern day context. A transformational leader makes the tipping point between a rout and a rally. Repeated studies have suggested that the disruption of leadership during combat is one of the key factors responsible for psychiatric breakdowns in battle, along with other transformational leadership aspects such as group identification and group cohesiveness.[29] General Eric Shinseki elucidates this point aptly: "Leadership matters. It matters in the life and death situations in which a lack of trust, teamwork, clear focus, confidence and motivation could spell disaster… Leadership matters also

when preparing soldiers for the rigours of combat in realistic training scenarios that simulate combat with inherently dangerous equipment and munitions. And leadership matters during the down time, as well, when soldiers prepare for future missions, plan training, repair and maintain equipment, and spend time with their families".[30] For the SAF, this is certainly a critical component we must not neglect in our quest to remain ready, relevant and decisive.

The SAF being Ready, Relevant and Decisive

The concept of a "fog of war" was first articulated by the prescient Carl von Clausewitz when he asserted that war never remained a constant; "friction" in war thus demands a need to be fluid and dynamic. "Every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea full of reefs. The commander may suspect the reef's existence without ever having seen them; now he has to steer past them in the dark."[31] In this age, this still remains relevant. Asymmetric and complex irregular

warfare will increasingly dominate the future of warfare; one where war will be "custom-designed" by hybrid adversaries that will avoid predictability or linear operations. A sole reliance on technological advancements alone is unlikely to prove efficacious; what is needed is strong transformational leadership to steer the course in these unnerving and uncertain times.

Transformational military leaders will also be increasingly challenged to embrace cultural and anthropological foundations of traditional peoples and societies in future military campaigns. A new approach is needed – one that is anchored in historical, anthropological and traditional cultural narratives. Given this widening new spectrum of operations, it comes as no surprise that the honing of cultural intelligence (CQ) has become one of the key competencies identified for the military. The next generation of transformational leaders will need to develop cross-cultural leader competencies and awareness to maintain a cultural sensitivity.[32]

At the organisational level, transformational leadership also plays an imperative role, particularly in improving the organisation's "image, recruitment, selection, promotion, management of diversity, teamwork, training, development and ability to innovate".[33] The influence of the organisation's norms, values and culture also has significant impact for her strategic planning, design of jobs and overall structure. From an organisational policy perspective, transformational leadership is thus necessary to retain the overall level of competitiveness, relevance and development.

Imbuing Resilience

Repeated studies have suggested that the transformational components of "charisma, inspirational leadership, intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration"[34] are all key components of effective leadership under stress / duress. Across the board, charismatic transformational leaders were able to maintain stability under stress, and were not easily disconcerted or discomposed when faced with adversity or crisis. In comparing Israeli medal winners in the Yom Kippur war with ordinary soldiers, the medal winners were noted to be more emotionally stable, exhibiting strong transformational leadership traits – perseverance under stress, decisiveness and devotion to duty.[35] The presence of transformational leadership is thus a critical component in imbuing an underlying base of resilience and tenacity.

In this age, notions of "strategic depth" become inconsequential when no nation can now depend on secure territorial borders to tackle an amorphous adversary. Today, responding to any unforeseen scenario may almost be as important as trying to deter one. As a case in point, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the transformational leadership displayed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his administration proved critical in ameliorating much of the community's panic. The advance emergency preparations and structured readiness for such an event was enforced in the preceding years, and this foresight allowed the community to be well prepared for the recovery process because resources were well organised and coordinated.[36] Giuliani recognised the importance to keep the public well-informed of the situation at hand and conveyed a sturdy message that the government was fully in control of the situation. His example clearly demonstrates that beyond the underlying hardware needed to rally confidence, the underlying "heartware" must be equally as strong. In times of crisis, existing local civil defence agencies are critical human resources whose effective management will prove paramount. The effective leadership of these resources in such exigencies thus determines the effectiveness of the organised response to disaster.

Transformational Leadership for the 3rd Generation SAF

As espoused in the above discussion, it is apparent that a transformational leadership style has immense benefits for the next generation of military leaders. CLD has acknowledged that there is a "need to research on the level of leadership for which change-oriented, transformational leadership development is most relevant".[37] In some cases (particularly at junior levels), transactional leadership may be more appropriate for task-oriented operations. However, there is evidence suggesting that transformational leadership as a style will prove more efficacious in achieving longer term intents and goals. The current SAF LCM is a strident move toward formulating the domain of styles required at different levels of leadership. To be fully assimilated as part of the organisational culture however, transformational leadership as a central overarching theme / style can be promoted to further enhance the SAF LD framework.

In the Army's latest TV commercial, the central theme rests on the "strength of character in our people".[38] In similar fashion, the importance of strong leadership for the organisation has been clearly underscored. Buy-in for the SAF's envisioned future and culture however, must be emphasised at **all** levels of leadership. Training schools and ground units must take the initiative to ensure that the correct messages are being proliferated on the ground. There is certainly much that can be done to propagate the principles of "idealised influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration". Beyond mere ownership, this vision must also be communicated and understood in a way that empowers subordinates and followers to seek to achieve it.[39] The challenge for our transformation journey is to bridge discontinuity while continuing to operate in today's context. Transformation is not simply to accommodate discontinuities or to keep pace with changes benchmarked by others; it is leaping into the future and creating new standards[40]; this cannot be accomplished via a top-down approach – it requires all hands-on-deck.

Transformational leadership emphasises a capacity to translate a vision into reality. It emphasises the empowerment of authority and command from a "whole person" paradigm, which is certainly resonant with the ONE SAF vision. Efforts have been made to address the "hearts and minds" of our people through various initiatives such as the Human Capital Development Framework (HCDF) and the overarching Nurturing & Engagement (N & E) thrust; yet in the midst of all these efforts, we may not have quite addressed the "spirit & soul" of our people. The fostering of a culture centred on transformational leadership may provide alternate kaleidoscopic perspectives required for our transformation efforts. A transformational leadership ethos demands the elimination of divergences between an espoused vision and the expressed behaviour on the ground. It entails the development of true robust measures to crystallise learning and knowledge management. It promotes synergistic interdependent competition vis-à-vis individualistic independent competition. All of these may prove essential in promulgating a truly organisational learning climate desired within the ONE SAF.

Transforming Transformational Leadership

"*A small group of men who are employed full-time as professionals to run this machine must be men of great quality. By that I don't just mean qualities of the mind. For this job, it is the character, the mettle in a person which determines whether the men you lead have that élan, the confidence, the verve which is possible only given dedicated and inspired leadership*"[41] – Excerpt from PM Lee Kuan Yew, now MM, at the opening of the 1st Officers' Course at SAFTI on 19 Dec 1966

No matter how high-tech warfighting becomes, war is about the people and the military; it is thus not enough to dominate the technological domain alone.[42] The variegated battlefield of the future will challenge the military to grapple with multi-faceted cultural

and social paradigms, and can be considered akin to a "Herculean" battle against a multi-headed Hydra.[43] It must be recognised that military operations, though paramount on their own, must be carefully calibrated according to political, social and economic imperatives. And at the forefront, strong stewardship and transformational leadership must be instilled to charter new frontiers and expound new boundaries.

At its core, transformational leadership is "about issues around the processes of transformation and change".[44] The notion of a 3rd Generation transformation has indeed stirred much enthusiasm when we consider the technological imperatives, but it is equally important that we do not lose this alacrity when it comes to thinking about people imperatives. The idea of a "Technological" Revolution in Military Affairs per se should not be taken as a *fait accompli*. There is certainly a softer aspect which drives the monstrous machine of change. For the SAF, it is thus immensely important that we instil not just a capability, but an enduring capacity – come what may.

(Ed note: This essay is the third prize winner of the 2008 CDF Essay Competition)

Endnotes

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[44] Bass & Riggio, *Transformational Leadership*, p225.

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Generation Why – So What?

by Mr Hao Shuo, MAJ Andrew Wan
and LTA David Tang

Prologue – A Day in the Life

Imagine a morning in the life of Heng89, a typical Gen Y Singaporean, fresh from junior college, awaiting his enlistment. Without the need to rush for classes in the morning, he wakes up slightly past noon. Rising slowly from his bed, he brushes his fingers across the touchpad of his notebook computer to wake the screen from power-saving mode. He checks his email, blog and Facebook account, and skims through the movies he downloaded the night before. He smiles to himself as he is satisfied with the quality of DivX rip of a blockbuster that has not yet been released in Singapore. After dousing himself in the shower, he rushes to dress up for a youth conference meeting scheduled in an hour's time. Equipping himself with his usual mobile gadgets, he leaves his house, smsing his parents that he won't be back for dinner. In the lift on his way down, he struggles to untwine the mesh of earphone wires and at the same time remembers to send another SMS to his friends reminding them of the meeting later. As he selects his favourite playlist from his Ipod Touch and checks on the progress of his character in his PSP RPG, he muses on what life would be like as an enlistee in the SAF but decides that that's too far in the future for him to care right now.

Introduction

The term "Gen Y" is familiar to us today, because it often appears in the media and even day-to-day conversations. We often hear older, slightly frustrated or even resigned, people talk about how *Gen Y wants this*, or *Gen Y won't do that*. For commanders, the complaint is that *they always ask why*! Why can't they just follow orders? Often, it is used as a blanket term for generational differences in attitudes and values. But how many of us know what Gen Y is really like? Why are they this way? And most importantly, what are the implications of this?

Today there is a wide array of academic literature to answer just these questions. In our short anecdote on Heng89, we observe many qualities attributed to a Gen Y teenager. However, most of the studies originate from the U.S. Hence this article will build on these studies to develop a better understanding of Gen Y in a Singaporean context and its impact on the SAF. In Part 1, we will survey the academic literature to understand the environment in which Gen Y grew up, and the kind of character traits that developed. In Part 2, we test these traits and implied preferences through a survey of Army Officers. In Part 3, we propose some ideas about how understanding Gen Y could give a different perspective to policy formulation, and to the management of our Gen Y regulars, NSFs and NSmen.

Part 1: Portrait of Gen Y

Gen Y – A Product of their Times

The way we see the world, our fears and aspirations, are very much shaped by experiences during the formative years of our lives. The Baby Boomers (post-WWII) experienced a time of growing affluence and redefinition of cultural values. Gen X (1980's and 1990's) saw the end of the Cold War and are credited for Dot.coms, MTV and Grunge. And Gen Y (1990's and 2000's) has grown up in a time of peace, prosperity, advancing technology and the prevalent internet.[1] So how has this shaped their outlook on life?

Tech–Savvy[2]

Gen Y grew up surrounded by electronics and gadgets that are constantly vying for their attention. They have played a wide variety of computer and console games that train them to intuitively navigate through new menus and interfaces, master new control sequences and process images faster than they can process words. The advantage of having a new generation of tech-savvy soldiers is that much time and cost could be saved in the training and deployment of new technology on the battlefield. However, they also have a certain expectation of the workplace and a desire for access to new and existing technology. This poses both a challenge and an advantage to the SAF. The challenge would be to manage Gen Y's expectations of technology on the battlefield; despite all the technological advances, soldiers are still needed to fight on the ground. The advantage is that this generation can easily adapt to the latest technologies incorporated on the battlefield.

Staying Connected[3]

Technology is no longer just a convenience but has become a defining factor in their well-being. It allows

people to establish bonds in virtual space, make friends across continents and oceans, and bridge the gap between religions, races and cultures. Through social networking, (micro)blogging, Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) and the entire gamut of communication software, Gen Y have overcome geographical constraints to form ties with people from abroad and beyond. "Heng89" might have hundreds of friends, whose true names he knows not, but who share the same ideology and opinions. They might even know him better than the people who surround him physically. As they seek to stay connected with their online friends, this creates a conflict with the need for information security within the SAF.

Constant Feedback[4]

Those who grew up playing Atari console games would understand the exhilaration of getting a new high score on "Space Invaders". Gen Y also grew up counting the number of "frags"[5] in CounterStrike, watching their ranking shoot up on Battlenet[6], or getting their character to the highest level in WOW[7]. Instant gratification is probably more important to Gen Y than to the generations before. Similarly, in the modern workplace, Gen Y would demand constant feedback from their superiors to affirm or advise on their work performance. Semi-annual or annual performance review is not sufficient to meet the demands of this new generation, nor the semi-annual award of performance bonus. The new generation would rather take small rewards for their work all year round than to take a huge bonus cheque at the end of the year. Recognition from

their immediate superiors is critical to keeping troops' morale up during tough training times. For a conscript-based SAF, learning how to recognise, appreciate and motivate servicemen regularly is an important skill that junior and senior commanders must possess.

Learning Generation

Gen Y is the most highly educated generation yet, and the expectation of these people will be different. The factors influencing their career choice will be more than just the paycheck; they will expect further education opportunities on transferable knowledge and skills during their tenure in the organisation. With a higher proportion of 'A' Level and Diploma holders in the NSF population, the organisation can engage them better by making "learning", not "training", a prerogative. The military can leverage on their interest in learning by "teaching" more and "drilling" less.

Work–Life Balance[8]

Gen Y have grown up with two working parents and they have seen first-hand how a family has to strike the right balance between the career needs of the parents and the parental needs of the children. This generation has "helicopter" parents that seem to hover over them perpetually, providing guidance and advice on their education and career choices. Growing up in such an environment naturally makes Gen Y realise the importance of work-life balance in their careers. They expect their potential employers to understand the needs of families and give time off so that they can take their children to music classes, drama groups and language

enrichment programs, activities that Gen Y themselves have enjoyed in their adolescence.

Aversion to Hierarchy

Gen Y do not show respect to their superiors based on rank, appointment or seniority of experience. They respect others who believe in them and value them for who they are. They are drawn to companies such as Facebook and Google, which allow them a free hand in their work and value their innovation and creativity. These companies possess a much flatter hierarchy that is very different from that of the military where rank and appointment are the foundation to an effective fighting force. Although the military does appreciate the 3rd generation thinking soldier, most conflict situations require a clear chain of command, decisive actions and swift execution. This can only be achieved if each person fulfils his role without stepping outside of his jurisdiction and questioning the authority.

Gen Y usually prefer to understand the reasons behind the need for action instead of simply executing the orders. "Today's soldiers are different. They're thinking soldiers and the No. 1 question they ask is, 'Why?'" said Staff Sgt. Timothy Howell, a drill sergeant at the Basic Combat Training Brigade at Fort Benning. Enlistees in his generation would never think to question a drill sergeant but would instead focus on looking busy and avoiding eye contact "like animals in the zoo".[9] Superiors who cannot provide satisfactory answers are often at risk of losing the respect and the trust of their Gen Y subordinates. "The difference with Gen Y is that they will not respect people based on position, the size of their office (or ego) or the graying of their hair. Gen Y respect those who validate them for who they are now, and who they want to be."[10]

Motivation and Job Loyalty

A leading US national law firm recently held a focus discussion with young law students and one of the most resonant comments given was the disdain for mundane chores. A young participant remarked, "I command an army[11] in my spare time, and they want me to photocopy".[12] This is a common attitude among Gen Y; they no longer want to climb the corporate ladder. Instead, they want to be in a non-stop elevator directly to the CEO's office. Such is the general perception of Gen Y's disregard for hierarchical structure that it can directly contradict the values and traditions of the military where one has to earn his stripes, crabs and stars to the top. The job-hopping phenomenon among the new generation is not a reflection of fickleness but a preconceived notion that junior jobs do not give them the opportunity to challenge themselves and prove their worth. While they understand the need for some people to fight in the mud, they would rather be the ones in the command post.

To Gen Y, loyalty to the job does not necessarily depend on pay. More important are the opportunities for individual development and growth and the degree of autonomy. A recent Straits Times article noted the trend of "A-level holders turning down overseas Govt scholarships in favour of those offered locally with no strings attached."[13] The bond requirement for

officers and WOSpecs is potentially an obstacle to their signing on with the SAF. Joining the military may satisfy a desire to serve the nation but Gen Y do not equate loyalty to country with loyalty to the SAF. They are also less inclined to join the service due to pay premium. They need to feel that they are doing something meaningful for their community, and on a larger scale, their country. At the same time, they want to be valued not just as numbers on the payroll or blips on the radar but as individuals who have made personal sacrifices to serve the nation. This type of recognition needs to come from both within the organisation and without.

Part 2: Gen Y in the SAF

Research Methodology

In our research, we tried some innovative new methodology that we hope can further enhance the debate over Gen Y. The environmental factors and resultant Gen Y traits described in Part 1 are intuitively logical, but are they an over-generalisation? To guard against this, a survey of Army officers was carried out with 913 respondents[14] (see Figure 1) to determine if officers with a Gen Y upbringing manifested more Gen Y traits, and ultimately if this led them to make lifestyle choices commonly associated with Gen Y.

Environmental Factors	Resultant Gen Y Traits
Growing up in a time of relative peace and affluence	Belief that money is not everything, and seeking other means of self-actualisation (e.g. contribution to society)
Technology in everyday life	Reliance on gadgets e.g. MP3 players, PSP, PDAs Comfort with technology and intuition for operating new devices
Prevalence of internet, ease of access to communication technology and social networking	Need for online connectivity, weaker inter-personal skills More comfortable communicating through text messages/emails than face-to-face interaction
Playing video games since childhood	Need for constant feedback to keep them engaged and assured of their performance. Require feedback as a form of motivation for their work.
Increase social emphasis on higher education	Desire for continuous learning and academic upgrading. Hold higher expectation of growth and development opportunities that come with the job appointments
Parents who are constantly present and involved in upbringing	Belief in work-life balance, and importance of family. More assertive and confident, less willing to be brushed aside.
Increased access to the public's ears through cyber forums, blogs and other new media	Willing to speak up for themselves and will not hesitate to question orders and established practices. Desire greater influence on the public and those around them.

*Table 1. Summary of Environmental Factors and Resultant Gen Y Traits*

Figure 1. Demographic breakdown of respondents

The Gen.Y.Score

We first questioned the convenient assumption that Gen Y is defined by age. After all, the degree of Gen Yness with respect to age would surely be a continuum; the question is how closely this is correlated with age. To put the general age divide theory to test, we devised questions on Gen Y traits to measure how "Gen Y" a person is. By assigning points to certain questions in the survey, we can calculate each individual's Gen.Y.Score and then analyse their growing up environment in relation to their Gen.Y.Score score.

The variable Gen.Y.Score is computed based on individuals' responses to the questions that are meant to identify certain Gen Y traits such as the perceptions that Gen Y work well with technology, spend more time interacting online and desire to have their voices heard through channels such as forums and blogs. We ran the regression of Gen.Y.Score against 7 independent variables to determine which were more statistically significant.[15]

If we were to sketch a profile, our typical Gen Y Officer today is in his early to mid 20's, has at least a university degree and is probably pursuing language classes or another part-time certificate or even other professional diplomas/degrees. He also grew up with a domestic helper at home. He owns multiple gadgets and spends a few hours each day online blogging, gaming, or surfing social networking sites. This is the type of person that would most likely display Gen Y attributes such as being tech-savvy, connectedness and an aversion to hierarchy, and is very much

in agreement with what contemporary literature describes. The next question is whether his lifestyle choices also match the Gen Y stereotype.

Use of Gen.Y.Score

Why do we bother trying to quantify a quality as intangible as whether a person is Gen Y or not? The reason is to provide another angle to see whether these supposedly Gen Y traits and characteristics really affect an individual's choices in life. This is determined using two types of questions in the survey.

The first type is objective quantitative questions. One example would be "How frequently do you think your superior should give feedback on your work performance?" After every assignment, monthly or once a year? This measures the degree of polarisation. The second type is ranking questions, where respondents were asked to rank their priorities in life, or choices among a variety of commonly heard policy suggestions and gripes, to determine the relative importance to each person. Most people, whether Gen X or Gen Y, would agree they are all good to have, but the ranking process allows us to elicit the relative importance for each group. For example, many officers treasure the right to sell leave for cash, but is this more important than an increase in medical coverage?

In both types of questions, we split the respondents into two groups, Gen X and Gen Y, to see if there is a significant difference in their choices. Because we have already determined that age is not the defining factor for Gen Yness, the groups are divided in two ways: by age (31 and below is Gen Y) and the median Gen.Y.Score (13 and above is Gen Y). This gives us four groups to compare: $GenX_{Age}$ vs $GenY_{Age}$ and $GenX_{Score}$ vs $GenY_{Score}$, and allows us to gauge whether those who conform more to the stereotypical Gen Y traits really demonstrate difference in preferences on certain issues. In the subsequent sections, "Gen X" and "Gen Y" are used collectively if there is little difference in the results whether split by score or age, else the appropriate subscript will be affixed.

This question came up a lot during peer review, so let me repeat: the terms "Gen X" and "Gen Y" without subscripts are used collectively if there is little difference whether split by score or age.

What Gen Y Wants

The following are the summary and analysis of our results.

Tech Savvy and Staying Connected

The benefits of having tech-savvy soldiers in a technology-centred SAF are clear. But what is less clear is how a military career would appeal to tech-savvy people. Among the tech-savvy, camera phones are a symbolic gadget not just for their imaging capabilities, but because they are the most basic of the suite of functions available in the latest phones. When our respondents ranked the importance of having camera phones, it was clear that $GenY_{Score}$ was more strongly in favour than $GenX_{Score}$. What was surprising was that $GenX_{Age}$ group was actually more in favour than $GenY_{Age}$, showing that this policy actually rankles even more with the older officers.

Figure 2. Comparison of answers to preferred frequency of feedback

It was also clear that our Gen Y respondents placed a higher priority on internet access. The difference was not extremely significant, partly because Gen X had also ranked this highly.

For this and other questions, it is important to remember too that we are surveying a self-selected group: people who have already decided to join the SAF. There may be others who sought other careers partly because of these exact reasons. After all, when the world is at your feet, even hygiene factors can become deciding factors. And as younger people enter the SAF, the perceived need to own common gadgets and the need for internet connectivity will only increase.

Constant Feedback

In our computation of Gen.Y.Score for each respondent, we consider the ownership of gaming devices and time spent gaming as plus points to the respondent's score. If video gaming has really changed the attitudes of individuals toward feedback in real life, we should see a difference in response frequency to the question "How frequently do you think your superior should give you feedback on your work performance?" Looking at the figure below, we note that the difference in results by age is more significant than by Gen.Y.Score. In both cases, the majority of Gen X is satisfied with bi-annual feedback, whereas Gen

Y would prefer monthly feedback or even after every assignment. Thus the survey validates the common claim that Gen Y has a greater need for constant feedback.

Learning Generation

Our respondents unanimously ranked continuing education as the top human resource policy that will make the SAF an attractive organisation to work in. In this aspect, Gen X show a significantly stronger desire for continuing education as compared to Gen Y. Is this in contradiction to the general stereotypes of Gen Y? The answer to this question is complex because those whom we have deemed as belonging to Gen Y have already attained a higher level of education and are more likely to be currently pursuing further studies. This group, therefore, might be less focused on increasing Continuing Education (CE) as an attractive human resource policy in the SAF. However, we do also note that the overall ranking of CE by the Gen Y respondents is still the highest among the other policies. What is clear is that continuing education is one of the best value propositions the military career can offer.

Work–Life Balance

We asked the respondents to rank flexible working hours as one of the policies for change in the future, and found that Gen Y wants flexible working hours significantly more than Gen X.[16] In fact, among the policy changes presented to our respondents, flexible working hours seem to be extremely attractive to all respondents, regardless of age or Gen.Y.Score, ranked second only to continuing education.

And, contrary to our expectations that Gen Y would show less interest in increasing the limits on sale of leave, it appears that both groups are equally ambivalent to such a policy. This reluctance to sell leave could be attributed to our people desiring less work and more life. This is also reflected in the fact that only 50.8% of respondents felt that they had achieved work-life balance, compared with 90% who felt it was important.

Aversion to Hierarchy

We tried to test if Gen Y really hated hierarchy and disrespected their elders from a few angles. To the question whether "age and experience should be respected", only 86% of Gen Y agreed compared with 92% for Gen X. However, both groups were split 50-50 when asked if age should be taken into account for in ranking. If Gen Y is really disgruntled with incompetent superiors, they would probably demonstrate a stronger wish to have a say in the ranking process of their bosses. However, when given the choice for 360 degree appraisal, the response from both Gen X and Y was almost identical.

We also observed that $GenY_{Score}$ seems to gravitate away from ground tours, in stark contrast to $GenX_{Score}$. This seems odd, because ground tours are often regarded as the most meaningful. However, it is consistent with the notion that Gen Y prefers to start high up in the organisation, and to get involved in matters that have greater impact on things within SAF.

Motivation and Job Loyalty

While all respondents show significant desire for community involvement projects as part of their career development, it is surprising to discover that Gen X show a stronger inclination for humanitarian missions. This could be due to different phases of life, as the younger Gen Y could have family commitments that would discourage them from overseas trips. In a separate ordering of life goals, "Contribution to society" also factors much lower for Gen Y. This runs contrary to the expectation that Gen Y places greater importance on social contributions. Instead, our survey showed that $GenY_{Age}$ places a higher emphasis on salary. This difference was insignificant when split by Gen.Y.Score, and may be a reflection of the relative poverty of the younger group.

Job loyalty has always been an issue of concern for Gen Y. We measured these sentiments among our officers by asking our respondents how long they had expected to stay with the organisation when they first signed up for a career in the military. We note that $GenY_{Score}$, generally gravitates toward a shorter expected length with the organisation when they first started. In fact, 42% of them only expected to stay till the end of their bond in contrast to $GenX_{Score}$, of which only about 34% or so expected to stay till the end of their bond, with the remaining expecting to stay 5-10 yrs or longer. The results are even more pronounced when analysed by age. This is in agreement with our expectation that Gen Y would be more prone to job hopping as they are less certain about personal goals when choosing the first job. Gen Y also showed a greater interest in external internships and gap years to gain other experiences outside SAF.


Figure 3. Expected length of service when officers first signed on

When asked to rank the policy to remove bonds on scholarships, promotions and military courses, Gen Y respondents gave significantly higher importance to the policy to remove bonds. The difference is statistically significant even at the 1% level. This clearly indicates that the younger officers are more opposed to bonds than the older ones.

Summary of Findings

So what have we proved or disproved about the common understanding of Gen Y? Money, rather than meaning, is still more important to them, especially in the early years. It is true that they are very attached to their gadgets and internet connectivity. They also show a strong desire for frequent performance feedback. While they greatly value learning opportunities, Gen X does as well. Both generations see work-life balance as very important, and for Gen Y especially, this could be achieved through greater flexibility in working hours and location. Finally, Gen Y shows a greater expectation for multiple careers, and a stronger dislike for being bonded.

Part 3: So What?

What have we learned from a short study on this new generation that has created so much buzz in the media? Are military values and traditions being challenged by Gen Y? What are the new considerations for policy formulation to attract and retain regulars who will increasingly show Gen Y characteristics? How will this impact the way we manage our NSF and NSmen?

Thoughts for Commanders and Leaders

When Gen Y Ask Why

When Gen Y ask Why, it is not a brazen challenge of authority, unless we choose to make it so. Every soldier has encountered instructions that he felt was illogical or downright irrational; the difference is that – partly because of their upbringing – Gen Y are more willing to speak up and seek an explanation than previous generations. Sometimes these questions are good, because they could lead us to question the old paradigm in which legacy practices or procedures are not keeping up with new technologies and systems. This could lead to productivity gains and streamlined processes, and is one way in which we can leverage on the IT-savvy and fresh mindsets of the next generation.

So the next time Gen Y ask why and you are unsure, do not remind them of their place in the hierarchy, and the need to follow orders regardless. Instead, there is nothing wrong in admitting that you do not know, and using this as an opportunity to find out; this could even result in a better way of doing things, and earn you greater respect as a leader. Gen Y can also be made to understand the right time to ask questions (e.g. in training), so that their trust in your decisions will be established when it is time to follow unquestioningly (e.g. in evaluation, operations).

Giving Your Men Meaning in NS

Our findings in this regard have largely verified the mainstream research, and what many of our commanders already know. The best way to manage the next generation is to give them respect as people, and not to waste their time with seemingly pointless tasks. Give them a sense of ownership over complete projects, not just menial tasks, and value them as partners, not just cogs in a machine. These are some of the key thrusts of NSF-NS Management Framework, along with employing NSF in cohesive units and improvements to the leadership selection process, to ensure that only capable and competent commanders are chosen to lead. We already know what needs to be addressed in these areas, but only the individual commander can make an impact on the people under him.

Tell Them How They're Doing

While we do not advocate more frequent AFRs, we hope that a greater awareness of this need will encourage everyone to provide more frequent informal feedback to those around them. (It is also important that the informal feedback – especially praise – match the feedback given eventually through the formal channels such as AFR or ranking.) Informal feedback can be given at anytime, during a break in the mission or over drinks in the canteen. This need not be just for Gen Y subordinates, but should eventually include peers and even superiors. Perhaps this change is the easiest to effect because it merely takes a change in attitude of the people themselves. However, this is also possibly the hardest policy because the organisation cannot enforce this culture.

It has to be built slowly from the ground up, and again will depend very much on the belief and determination of each commander.

Thoughts for Policy–Makers

Creating a Conducive Working Environment

Much of the difficulty faced by Gen Y in adjusting to military life stems from security policies. For a generation that grew up depending on gadgets, the deprivation of these devices is a source of frustration for NSFs, and may be an increasingly important factor in a potential recruit's decision to join the organisation. It is a sign that the world outside has moved forward technologically, and our security policies are not keeping up. To some, this may be seen as the organisation's paranoia with security taking precedence over the individual's right to own fashionable and useful accessories. After all, all companies have trade secrets to protect, but few go to the same lengths of limiting access to personal electronics and the internet. It can also be taken as a lack of faith in the employees, as one of our respondents wrote, "Banning of camera phone shows that the management distrusts its employees. While for sensitive units it may be understandable, a complete ban for all camps is uncalled for. Education should be the way to curb unauthorised photographs in camps."

The important point is that the organisation begins with a gesture of good faith by showing its trust in its employees to act responsibly. This goes beyond merely giving Gen Y the satisfaction of owning new gadgets

because it also shows the flexibility of the organisation in adapting to changing cultural trends and acknowledging the needs of its people. It is also beneficial to the organisation, because devices like PDAs improve productivity, and the internet allows access to a global pool of knowledge, that is an invaluable resource for all kinds of work.

Promoting Online Community and Discourse

Gen Y are accustomed to sharing their lives with others, through social networking, blogs and forums, yet they have very little space to be heard once they join the SAF. Postings on public sites like Facebook or blogs are frowned upon, and few NSFs have eSILK or even intranet accounts. Ironically, both on the internet and intranet, it seems that the people most willing to flout the rules of information management are the angry and disillusioned ones with little good things to say. If we start from the belief that we do have committed and engaged NSFs and NSmen, who want to share their positive experiences and defining moments, giving them a voice online will help to balance the small but vocal minority.

At the G-1 Retreat, CO AOMC shared his solution to managing internet security concerns: after complaints about security breaches, he invited the entire battalion to add him on Friendster. He found that this way, he was able to tell people to take sensitive photos down on their own. He also discovered that the new communication channel brought him closer to his men and gave him better insight into their feelings.

Gen Y is also accustomed to online and even anonymous collaboration, sometimes even more so than in a localised setting. Providing them with cyberspace to air their views may be more effective than in LO circles or AARs, because they are more adept at online communication. This already takes place in the U.S. Army, with websites like Company Command[17] providing discussion and sharing of best practices for U.S. Army OCs across the world. In this case, it appears that the value of information sharing has out-weighed the security concerns of the US DoD. In the SAF, this could be achieved by providing more intranet terminals for NSFs and upgrading the eSILK infrastructure, or by cautiously loosening the restrictions on the internet.

Cyberspace also provides a powerful channel for internal communication. It has proven particularly effective not as a means of information dissemination, but in winning people over to new ideas or causes. Some very successful examples include corporate blogger Robert Scoble who helped boost Microsoft's public image and the Obama campaign team, who used blogging and a myriad of other new media to win over the younger generation. Mahatir blogs, as does George Yeo, but within the SAF examples are few: BG(NS) Jimmy Khoo wrote a 3-part intranet expose on "The Seven Deadly Sins" as former Future Systems Architect (but unfortunately did not have a commenting feature) and BG Tan Chuan-Jin writes the Chairman Blog for NDP 2009. One commenter appreciated the fact that "this NDP is different in its extent of outreach to the

masses." Blogging is not for everyone but in the right hands, it is a powerful way to engage people within the organisation, not in a monologue, but a dialogue or even a discussion.

Providing Flexibility for Work–Life Balance

Work-life balance policies also need a breath of fresh air. Star Cruises, JB shopping trips and marriage talks will not satisfy our Gen Y soldiers. Instead, flexible working hours and the ability to bring work home are much better solutions to the work-life demands of our people. Envision a day when our people can be home in time for dinner with their families, catch a soccer match, and yet still be more productive over the secure Virtual Private Network. The technologies exist, as long as we are willing to adopt them. Most of our respondents indicated that they are willing to work on weekends as long as it's for something urgent and important. It would be a huge encouragement to allow them to do the non-urgent work at a place and time of their choosing.

A More Transparent SAF

Gen Y is more assertive, self-confident, and is more inclined to seek out the explanation for decisions. This will likely lead them to question certain processes within the SAF that are currently "black boxes" such as leadership selection and ranking, both among NSF and regulars. While Gen X already grumbles about such matters, Gen Y is likely to be even more vocal.

Building a Competitive Continuing Education Proposition

Education has always been one of the biggest reasons why people join the military, and with Gen Y this will continue to be the strongest pull factor. As competition from employers increases, this is one area in which the SAF needs to maintain an edge if we are to attract good people. Apart from educational milestones like degrees, it will also be important to support our people in other learning pursuits such as language classes and certificates, perhaps through the increase in FLEX credits or a separate learning fund.

Reversing a Culture of Bonds

The SAF has built a culture of contractual obligation, with the imposition of bonds, MSP, MTE and MOS for everything from overseas training to promotion. Gen Y do not like bonds. They are not convinced of the need to be bonded for professional training that does not benefit the individual, or the MOS that comes with a promotion. After all, no other organisation, not even the Police, has such a practice. Excessive bondage makes the organisation come across as transactional, and shows a lack of confidence in the military career proposition to retain talents. This sentiment will only grow as the Gen Y population increases, and it is timely to rethink these policies to ensure the career continues to be appealing to this generation and those to come.

Conclusion

So what do Heng89 and his friends mean for the SAF? More importantly, how can we leverage on Gen Y to strengthen the organisation? We hope that reading this article has given you a better understanding of Gen Y, and will help us all to adapt and facilitate better teamwork between the generations. We see this article not as the end of our research but the beginning of a new discussion and a journey of understanding that we hope you will join us on. Together we can develop an organisation that is nimble not just in the spectrum of operations, but also in adapting itself to the constantly changing needs of the people that make it up. Today the challenge is Gen Y; but in 2015 the first members of Gen Z will enlist in the SAF. What then? 🖋

The full version of this article, including greater elaboration into the data analysis, can be found on Andrew Wan's eSILK blog titled "Gen whY (a tribute to an exceptional NSF)" on the MINDEF intranet. It is accessible to all MINDEF/SAF employees with an OA terminal and an eSILK account.

Endnotes

1   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_generations
2   Newman, J. M., *Leading Generation Y*, (Pennsylvania, USA: Carlisle Barracks, 2008), p5.
3   Fritzson, A., Howell Jr., L. W., & Zakheim, D. S., *Military of Millennials.* Retrieved 04 June, 2009, from strategy+business: http://www.strategy-business.com/resiliencereport/resilience/rr00056.
4   NAS Recruitment Communications, *Generation Y: The Millennials Ready or Not, Here They Come*, 2006. Retrieved on 04 June, 2009, from NAS Insights: www.nasrecruitment.com/talenttips/NASinsights/GenerationY.pdf
5   A "frag" is a "kill" of another player in first-person shooting games, mainly used to keep score.
6   Battlenet is the online gaming portal for Blizzard's best-selling game series DIABLO.
7   WOW refers to World of Warcraft, one of the most popular MMORPGs ever created.
8   Newman, *Leading Generation Y*, p17.
9   Kitfield, J., *Successes: Generation Y Is Producing Good Soldiers*, (19 Jan, 2007). Retrieved 04 June, 2009, from National Journal Cover Stories: http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2007/sotu/sotu07.htm
10 Peter, S. (n.d.). *PeterSheahan.* Retrieved 04 June, 2009, from PeterSheahan: http://www.petersheahan.com.au/cpa/exe/exe_file_get.asp?fileName=Understanding+Generation+Y.pdf
11 In MMOGs, gamers not only control computerised armies, but may also command tens or hundreds of other human players across the globe.
12 Peter, S. (n.d.). *PeterSheahan.*
13 Heng, J., "Bond free", *Straits Times* (9 Sept, 2008), pA6.
14 Our respondents included 697 regulars and 216 NSFs.
15 In statistics, the level of significance tells us the likelihood that our conclusion is due to random chance rather than a real underlying relationship. Hence a 1% level is more significant than 5%.
16 The average ranking of this policy is about 3.96 among $GenY_{Score}$ and 4.38 among $GenX_{Score}$. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The difference in ranking between $GenY_{Age}$ and $GenX_{Age}$ is even more significant, with absolute ranking difference of 0.68 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. In English, this means that the difference in mean rank order is not due to random chance but that the two populations doing the survey really do have different mean rank order with regard to the flexible working hours.
17 http://companycommand.army.mil/

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

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The Technology Trap: Science and the Military

by MAJ Jason Phua Kia Suan

Introduction

It has been argued that the current state of the world was shaped by the colonisation of much of the globe by Europeans. Technology was the key factor that allowed the Spaniards to overcome the Incas despite being overwhelmingly outnumbered; it was instrumental in allowing the relatively small British Empire to conquer the Indians (from both the Indian sub-continent and North America) and also explains why the Dutch could dominate the East Indies from halfway across the globe.[1] The sophistication and pace of development of modern technology makes it even more imperative for nations now to seriously consider technological factors in national defence preparation.[2] *The Technology Trap* by Timothy Garden examines the impact of technology on the military through the years. In his book, Garden presents a synopsis of his views on the important technological developments throughout the history of warfare relevant for the land, sea and air domains. He also identifies and makes an assessment of the military implications of extant

scientific research in eight specific fields of technology before presenting his views on how technology can best be exploited in the future. The theme of the military's relationship with technology that is addressed by this book would make interesting reading for any military buff, and is particularly pertinent for the RSAF today, considering that technology is one of the key thrusts of the RSAF's transformation vision.

Part 1: Lessons from the Past

Garden begins by considering the most important military applications of technology in the land, sea, air and space arenas over the years. He posits that the development in naval warfare since the obsolescence of sail power (in itself caused by the technological advantage of steam power) was a watershed in naval warfare development. In the following period, Garden extracts the following lessons that can be drawn from the application of technology specifically for naval warfare and packages them into one of the following: "Speed and maneuverability; firepower and accuracy; radius of action; detection and detectability; vulnerability and survivability; support requirements and cost effectiveness". In addition, he suggests that the gestation period for technologies to mature and be applied in the naval sphere has also decreased.[3]

The lessons from the history of naval warfare mirror some principal considerations that the decision makers had in mind in equipping our airforce to facilitate the effective employment of air power. These considerations are manifested when one looks at the current RSAF Order of Battle (ORBAT) that has been optimised to allow technology to be employed to achieve speed and maneuverability, one example being the use of helicopters to support heliborne operations. Platforms and systems acquired by the RSAF such as the F-16 series of aircraft have allowed the RSAF to maintain the technological edge over potential adversaries in terms of firepower and accuracy. With air-to-air refueling capability, the RSAF has one of the longest radius among armed forces in Southeast Asia. Given Garden's observation that the gestation period for the adoption of new technologies has decreased, the RSAF continues to forge ahead, best illustrated by the acquisition of new platforms such as the F-15SG. This is important as the "best time to execute transformation is when you are at the peak."[4]

In the account of the history of land warfare, Garden details how technological developments have made land battles more ruthlessly efficient at killing combatants. He observes that historically, armies have been slow to identify relevant technologies that would have provided a major advantage in war despite these technologies being available. Among the examples cited are the reluctance to leverage on motorised transport, armoured vehicles, and radio communications. He identifies intelligence, mobility, firepower and survivability as four focus areas specific to land warfare where technology has been influential in the past, and would continue to shape land warfare in the future.[5]

Unlike the armies in history, the RSAF cannot be accused of being slow adopters of technology, just as the case of naval warfare; the RSAF has indeed applied the lessons from the past as articulated by Garden. Where the RSAF may be lacking is the arena of intelligence. Anecdotal accounts and personal experience has resulted in a perception that despite state of the art systems and an extensive intelligence organisation, the understanding and application of the key principles of intelligence at the ground level could be improved. This is especially so in the practice of counter-intelligence matters as information that falls in the wrong hands can hand the enemy a powerful and decisive leverage over us.

Garden contends that it is more difficult to make a measured assessment of the history of air warfare, as it is somewhat shorter than the long and checkered history of land and naval battles. He suggests that, over its short history, technological developments in aviation related fields has not only resulted in a new dimension where warfare is conducted, but also greatly altered how land and naval battles are fought. The chapter on air and space warfare details how new aviation technology, just as the history of land and naval warfare, saw new innovations being initially dismissed by the top brass in the military. Unique to air warfare, Garden acknowledges the visionary roles played by characters such as Douhet and Mitchell in contributing to re-shaping strategic thinking on air warfare. For example, the contribution of thinkers such as Alfred Mahan is absent from the book's discussion on naval warfare. Providing a taste of the next section in the book that looks into the contribution of specific fields, the effects of associated air warfare relevant technologies such as radar, reconnaissance and long-range communication on air warfare were presented. A discussion on the vital contribution of research conducted by the commercial sector completes the discussion on air warfare.[6]

The RSAF shares Garden's acknowledgement that the air campaign will be inextricably linked to conflict in the land and naval spheres. This will be clear when the full spectrum operations vision of the Third Generation RSAF is realised. Nevertheless, the application of cutting edge technology is not the end product, as the right foundation must be laid to prepare the people to meet the new challenges that arise.

Part 2: Science Today

The second part of the book deals with existing research into physics, computer science, space technology, chemistry, material science, biotechnology and electronics. Garden makes an assessment of what each of these fields has to offer for the military. The chapters on nuclear, chemical, materials science, biotechnology and space developments have little relevance to Singapore's military context except for useful ideas that suggest how research into drug use could maximise combat performance, chemical research could result in better prophylactic measures for chemical warfare, and considerations on the vulnerability of satellites to modern military countermeasures.[7]

In the realm of physics, Garden outlines how high-energy lasers and high-powered microwaves could have military applications, but expressed reservations based on the limitations of their high power and control requirements.[8] The jury is still out regarding the feasibility of such technology. Recent developments have suggested that Garden may have made a wrong assessment; mobile tactical high energy laser weapons have already been prototyped[9], although it must be said that other considerations such as cost effectiveness and reliability are still uncertain. With this in mind, the RSAF would do well to keep tabs on new research in these areas that can potentially provide protection against threats such as rockets that an adversary may launch against key installations like airfields.

His analysis on computer science provides much food for thought, with computers now vital for every aspect of warfare, from intelligence gathering to simulating the effects of nuclear weapons. This chapter concludes by suggesting that research on targeting the adversary's reliance on computers could potentially reap the most rewards.[10] Realising the RSAF's 3rd Generation vision would entail mastery of networks, information and command systems that hinge on the best use of computer technology. However, it is equally vital that in this era of emphasis on technology, with flat organisation structures, and joint integration, for the training challenges that come with these developments to be well addressed also.[11] Preparing the people to deal with these challenges is one factor that Garden has not considered in the book.

The chapter on electronics focuses on how the electromagnetic spectrum could be exploited for military use. The field of electronics covered here encompasses a wide spectrum, with Garden's most interesting observation being how advances in solid state technology now allow the use of decoys that can overcome limitations of traditional countermeasures such as chaff. Similar advances can lead to enhancements in the ways infrared sensors and night vision image intensifiers are employed in the military.[12] The most obvious application of Garden observations that is apparent in the RSAF today is the increasing use of unmanned vehicles. Air power is handicapped by a lack of persistence, a fact identified by classical airpower theorists that include Warden, Mitchell and Douhet.[13] Unmanned aerial vehicles can overcome one of the main deficiencies of air power. In addition to the RSAF, the capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles has been demonstrated in recent conflicts (for example, Afghanistan) where forces can achieve information dominance in excess of what was possible with only conventional means.

Part 3: War in the Future

In final section of the book, Garden implies that land and naval battles in the future will invariably be shaped by the participation of air elements. He puts forth the notion that traditional methods of controlling the seas would be futile, due to the prohibitive cost of building a navy capable of surviving in the face of an opponent that holds an advantage in the air. While the book's conclusion on the land battle acknowledges the necessity of land warfare as the final

arbitrator of victory or defeat, Garden cautioned that mastery of the air was a prerequisite if one was to allow the various innovations applicable specifically for land warfare (for example, tank armour and sensemaking devices for the infantry soldier) to impact on the outcome of the land battle.[14]

An interesting point often not considered in the discourse on military technology is the issue of cost effectiveness. Garden's call to give this due regard is important for the RSAF given that in Singapore, the defence spending is the single largest item in the overall government budget.[15] Working with a tight budget, as is often the case with RSAF procurement programs, challenges us to come up with unconventional solutions, which is especially important in maximising the defence dollar.[16]

Garden concludes by contending that forces attempting to prevent their opponents from conducting air operations by closing their airfields will characterise air warfare in the future. In this there is no end to "measure and countermeasure" development, with neither the offensive nor defensive side having an operational or economic edge. In the absence of any state dominating the space domain, Garden identifies air power as the key to military strength, and foresees continual development in the cycle of measure and countermeasure, with policymakers having to effectively judge the potential effects of new technologies on all dimensions of warfare, while weighing the potential costs of development that may come at the expense of other strategic national interests.[17]

Technology can help in alleviating the challenges faced by Singapore's strategic reality of having to contend with changing demographics that will shrink the available labour pool. This will adversely affect the manpower situation not only for the RSAF, but even extends to the nation, as the pool of skilled labour will have to be distributed between both the military and non-military sectors. The RSAF has acknowledged this[18] and the increasing use of technology such as advanced logistics support equipment has allowed fewer men to accomplish the same task. The use of common shared, networked situation pictures also greatly saves on manpower demands.

Conclusion

The effective employment of technology is imperative for nation states that desire to maintain a military edge to advance their national interests. This is apparent, as all great powers have gone to great lengths to provide their armed forces with advanced technology so as to maintain a comparative advantage over potential adversaries.[19] *The Technology Trap* provides the reader with an intimate understanding of the wide-ranging issues and considerations related to the intimate relationship between the military and technology. The book covers a vast diasporas, yet remains applicable to Singapore's unique military situation. Garden's abstraction of military employment of technology is especially relevant for the RSAF in the context of harnessing technology as a key enabler of transformation towards a third generation airforce.

Endnotes

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FEATURED AUTHOR

Paul Kennedy

Professor Paul Michael Kennedy is a British historian specialising in international relations and grand strategy. He has written several prominent books on the history of British foreign policy and power struggles of the last two centuries.

Born in the north of England, at Wallsend-on-Tyne, in 1945, he attended the University of Newcastle, where he graduated with first class honours in history, and received his doctorate from St. Antony's College, Oxford.

Kennedy has researched and lectured at a variety of places in Europe and North America. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and a former Visiting Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey, US and of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Germany. In 2007-2008, Kennedy was the Phillipe Roman Professor of History and International Affairs at the London School of Economics.

Presently, Kennedy is the J. Richardson Dilworth professor of British history at Yale University. He is also the Director of International Security Studies and along with John Lewis Gaddis and Charles Hill, both lecturers at Yale, teaches the Studies in Grand Strategy course[1] there. He is currently on the editorial board of numerous scholarly journals and writes for The New York Times, The Atlantic, and many foreign-language newspapers and magazines. His monthly column on current global issues is distributed worldwide by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate/Tribune Media Services.

In 2001, he was made a Commander of the British Empire while in 2005, he was awarded the National Maritime Museum's Caird Medal for his contributions to naval history.[2]

He is the author of 13 books, four of which is showcased in this article.

Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, first published in 1983, contains eight essays on some of the most important themes in modern international history. Six of the essays dealt with British-related issues. They discuss about the British "infamous" appeasement policy[3], its military focus and the success behind the long duration of the British empire.

The first essay piece, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865-1939", is an interesting read for those who have always thought of appeasement in a negative light. According to the author, the tradition of appeasement started much earlier than the early 20th century and was based on four points: morality, economics, global position and domestic circumstances. With the Second World War, the "negative rather than the positive motives for appeasement were coming to the fore and thereby encouraging the notion that the policy was a craven surrender to threats rather than the wise and rational application of moral principles".

In his answer to his last essay's title, "Why did the British Empire Last so Long?", he categorised the reasons into three parts: domestic politics and opinions, the handling of nationalistic movements and relations with other powers. He describes the pride, if not passivity, of the British commoners, beneficial ties the governed had with the empire, the appeasement policy and the suspicion and distrust among the other powers as some of the factors that resulted in a lasting British empire.

With its depth of historical knowledge in this volume of essays, *The Economist* wrote that readers are "likely to find their thinking about current problems profoundly influenced by historical essays as wide-ranging and thoughtful as these".[4] Kennedy's *Strategy and Diplomacy* will provide intellectual stimulation with its delightful pieces.

A deeper and wider coverage of the global powers' ebb and flow in world history can be found in his later publication, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987). This bestseller narrates chronologically the power changes over five centuries, since the formation of "new monarchies" of Western Europe and the beginnings of the transoceanic, global system of states. It is not strictly a book on military history, as it traces the changes which occurred in the global economic balances since 1500. Economics and strategy are two important concepts at work here, as each of the leading states in the international system strove to enhance its wealth and its power, to become (or to remain) both rich and strong.[5]

The book is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter discusses about the power centres during the 1500s – the Ming Dynasty in China, the Ottoman Empire, the Moghul Empire, Muscovy and Tokugawa Japan. Each empire's magnificence as well as its gradual decline is dissected carefully. For example, the Ming Dynasty, with its prosperity epitomised by Admiral Zheng He's treasure fleet, declined as the nation locked itself from the outside world and returned to the conservatism of the Confucian bureaucracy.[6]

Kennedy then shifts the focus to the western world. The following five chapters, covering from 1519 to 1942, examine Europe's growth, its expanding trade circles, the wars and battles, the technology boom and the great overseas empires. With the accelerated crumbling of the empires by the Second World War, two new powers rose in the foreground. The last two chapters, under the bigger theme of "Strategy and Economics Today and Tomorrow", covers the bipolar world and the 21st century. Providing insights into the 21st century, the last chapter looks at the states which will be major players internationally. In Kennedy's view, they are China, Japan, the European Economic Community, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Such a book encapsulates what modern history is about. The deep analysis of the historical facts and the wide coverage of the different powers give the book its simple yet appropriate title. *Newsweek* reviewed the book and wrote that "Kennedy gives epic meaning to the nation's relative economic and industrial decline". Translated into 23 languages due to its popularity, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Power* is one modern history book not to be missed.

Departing from the usual historical detail of *Rise and Fall*, Kennedy's *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (1993) offers the reader an analysis of world affairs by considering the human factors of technology, economic change and population growth. Kennedy views that better communications, new financial systems, biotechnology and increased automation and robotics have changed the economic prospects for the

have and the have-nots. As the poorer parts of the world increase exponentially in numbers, the challenge of the future will be to use "power of technology" to meet the demands thrown up by "the power of population".[7] According to his argument, these newer forces for change bearing upon our planet could cause instability and conflict in the future. Therefore, he urges governments and peoples to reconsider the older definitions of what constitutes a threat to national and international security.

The book is split into three segments. The first examines the major changes that have shaped our world and their general implications. The segment attempts to link the topics of population explosion and increased illegal migration, robotics revolution and global labour demand, and technology and shrinking national sovereignty together. After discussing the demographic, environmental and technological changes bearing upon the human society, the following segment zooms into specific regions which are affected. This segment looks at Japan, India, China, Russia and the republics formerly under the USSR, Europe and the US. It also compares and contrasts several East Asian tigers with the poorer African countries in the chapter "Winners and Losers in the Developing World". The concluding segment of the book is a chapter on the steps to preparing for the twenty-first century.

The latest addition to his works is *The Parliament of Men: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations* (2006). The book's title originates from Locksley Hall, a poem by Alfred Lord Tennyson that talks about the future of warfare

and the possibility of utopia.[8] In this work, Kennedy gives a thorough history of this international institution and proceeds methodically through the United Nations' (UN) charter and its various branches, concentrating more on structures than on personalities.

Organised thematically, the core of the book consists of six broad and insightful mini-histories of the last sixty years of global security; peacekeeping efforts; economic development; environmental, social and cultural advancement; human rights; and the creation of an international civil society. Kennedy notes the indispensable role played by the UN charter in shaping policy addressing the six issues and studies it at the beginning. However, new international changes have brought about new challenges such as widespread corruption and a shift in balance of world power. To remedy the problems, Kennedy proposes numerous reforms in the concluding section. These include the establishment of a stand-by force of 100,000 soldiers, development of a sophisticated intelligence capacity and the increase of eight or nine non-permanent members to the Security Council.

The Parliament of Men has been described as an "authoritative" and "impressive" account of the UN[9] Kennedy's brilliance as a historian is again displayed in this book.

As an established historian, Prof Kennedy has written many books to enlighten readers and policy-makers over the world. His sharp analysis has given new insights to old subjects. *POINTER* is pleased to produce this write-up on Paul Kennedy.

Endnotes

[1] This course is a rigorous interdisciplinary study of leadership, statecraft and diplomacy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Hill_(diplomat) Accessed on 27 Jul 09.

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[4] Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, back cover.

[5] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York: Random House, Inc.,1989), pxv.

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General Sir Michael Rose

In recognition of the United Nations' (UN) global peacekeeping efforts to maintain peace and mitigate the effects of armed conflict on innocent civilians, the remaining issues of the present volume of *POINTER* will feature the multi-national commanders of the UN peacekeeping missions. In the first of a three part series, the first personality profile features the British Army's General Sir Michael Rose.

Introduction

General Sir Michael Rose commanded the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia between January 1994 and January 1995. As UNPROFOR commander, his roles included the maintenance of peace between the warring Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims and lay the ground for a political settlement of the conflict; prevent the conflict from spreading beyond Bosnia; and to ensure the uninterrupted flow and delivery of humanitarian aid to stricken communities in war-ravaged Bosnia. General Rose had the authority to request for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military assistance to enforce his peacekeeping mandate against violators of the UN-brokered ceasefire; to separate the belligerents through the imposition of total exclusion zones for heavy weapons in Sarajevo and Gorazde; and to rebuff any attempts to interfere with the delivery of humanitarian aid, principally to besieged Bosnian Muslim enclaves designated as safe areas by the UN in Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa and

Srebrenica. During his tenure, General Rose sought to keep the peace between the warring Bosnian parties but faced mounting criticism for his reluctance to request for air strikes to punish Bosnian Serb aggression and their interference with UN humanitarian aid convoys. General Rose's policy of upholding the traditional peacekeeping principles of

maintaining impartiality, exercising restraint, displaying tact and diplomacy, and eschewing the use of force except for self-defence was deemed ill-suited to the situation prevailing in Bosnia. It finally took his successor, British General Sir Rupert Smith to force the Western governments to impose a solution on the warring Bosnians and bring peace to the region.

Early Life and British Army Career

Michael Rose was born in British-ruled India at Quetta in 1940, the son of a British officer. His mother re-married another British officer serving with the Indian Army, John Masters, who fought with the Chindits against the Japanese behind enemy lines during the Burma Campaign. Rose's stepfather subsequently wrote about his experiences during the Second World War as well as a series of popular historical novels based on his experiences living in the British Raj.

Rose received his education at Cheltenham College; St Edmund Hall at the University of Oxford where he read philosophy, politics and economics; and the Sorbonne in Paris. In 1964, he was commissioned into the British Army's Coldstream Guards. He subsequently joined the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment and served in various Cold War hotspots in Malaya and Oman. In the latter, he served with General Sir Peter de la Billiere, whom later commanded the British contribution to the American-led coalition that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991. Between 1979 and 1982, the then Lieutenant-Colonel Rose commanded

22 SAS Regiment, the British Army's principal special forces unit. During his stint, the SAS was catapulted into the global media glare when it successfully mounted the hostage rescue operation to relieve the siege of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980. Six Iranian terrorists had forcibly taken over the Embassy and 26 hostages were held. The siege was lifted with minimum casualties and all six terrorists were either killed or wounded.

In 1982, Argentina invaded the British-ruled Falkland Islands. 22 SAS was activated and sailed together with the British naval task force to re-take the Falklands. Rose exercised command of his special forces troops from his cabin based on board the British command ship, *HMS Fearless*, planning a series of daring raids against the Argentine forces. Rose subsequently participated in the successful assault on Mount Kent, a strategic high ground that overlooked Port Stanley, the principal objective of Britain's military expedition. Rose also mounted psychological operations against the Argentines, making radio transmissions urging the Argentines to surrender. On the afternoon of 14 June 1982, Rose conducted negotiations with the Argentine governor of the re-named Islas Malvinas (the Argentine name for the Falklands), Major General Mario Benjamin Menendez on his terms of surrender. The successful conclusion of the negotiations paved the way for the formal surrender of the Argentines to the British commander, Major General Jeremy Moore on the same evening. For his sterling performance during the Falklands Campaign, Rose received a Mention in Dispatches and a promotion to Colonel.

In November 1983, Rose was appointed commander of the 39th Infantry Brigade and completed a stint in Northern Ireland policing the troubled province. He subsequently spent a year at the Royal College of Defence Studies before commanding the School of Infantry. His next deployment saw his return to the special forces as Director Special Forces, overseeing the SAS and the Royal Marines' Special Boat Squadron. He was promoted to General Officer Commanding of North-East District and 2nd Infantry Division commander. Between September 1991 and April 1993, Rose was Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, subsequently deploying to command the United Kingdom (UK) Field Army and Inspector of the Territorial Army. During 1993, he was the Deputy Joint Force Commander overseeing the UK contribution to the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia. This background led to his nomination to command UNPROFOR in January 1994. He received his knighthood in the same year before taking command of UNPROFOR.

Commander, UNPROFOR

The UN had created the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission to the former Yugoslavia in February 1992. From its outset, UNPROFOR was beset by ambiguity and contradictions. The international community was divided on the appropriate response to the slide into conflict and chaos in the former Yugoslavia. There was reluctance by Western governments to be militarily involved in a murderous and messy civil war between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. But the scale of

atrocities committed by all three parties – principally perpetrated, but not solely, by the Serbs – amounting to genocide and forced population removals or 'ethnic cleansing', a term popularised by the mass media, necessitated action by the international community. In the NATO capitals, the Western European governments were only prepared to commit ground troops provided the Americans were involved. Since Washington ruled out the contribution of ground troops, preferring the application of airpower instead, NATO, to its relief, was able to avoid taking any action. Western governments also had to factor in the Russians in their strategic calculus as any action against the principal belligerent of the Yugoslavian civil war, the Serbs, may provoke the Russians, which has been the Serb's historical patron. The compromise solution that proved acceptable to the international community was the creation of a peacekeeping mission under UN auspices, backed by NATO's airpower, to keep the peace in the former Yugoslavia and provide humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid provision obviated the need to take any hard decisions on an effective military intervention – with its attendant massive losses anathema to casualty-averse European capitals – to bring about peace in Bosnia.

UNPROFOR, however, became hostages to fortune as the warring sides in Bosnia did not perceive it to be an impartial body. The Serbs viewed UNPROFOR as standing in their way of vanquishing their enemies hiding in the designated UN safe areas that were protected by UNPROFOR troops. UN humanitarian aid convoys to besieged Muslim communities provided succour

to their enemies from the Serbian perspective. The militarily weak Muslims used UNPROFOR as a shield against Serb aggression, finding ways to circumvent the UN arms embargo to develop their military capability to defend themselves. The Muslims were also not above violating demilitarised zones to provoke Serb retaliation and trigger NATO intervention. They also viewed UN brokered ceasefires with suspicion, concerned that it would lead to the permanent partition of their country, though such ceasefires were critical to the safe passage of humanitarian aid convoys. The Croats sought to bandwagon with the Muslims to balance the Serbs though no love was lost between Croats and Muslims in a marriage of convenience. In this light, it was a miracle that UNPROFOR was able to partially fulfil its mandate and avoided outright failure, though UNPROFOR was not a wholly successful peacekeeping operation either.

General Rose had to step into this confusing matrix of conflicting interests, policy drift and insufficient resources to make the best out of a bad situation. It did not help that the Western media tended to be overly sympathetic to the hard-pressed Muslims, and Rose's attempts to debunk the Muslim government's excessive claims of civilian casualties due to Serb actions incurred the ire of Western governments.

Rose never had enough troops to keep the peace in Bosnia, much less to conduct peace enforcement to compel the warring sides to the peace table. Punishing an errant party – principally the Serbs – may place his UN troops in danger and turn them into hostages to prevent any massive use of NATO airstrikes in Bosnia. The use of air strikes other than for purely self-defence purposes to protect UN peacekeepers would imperil the peacekeeping mission. Maintaining the impartiality of the UN and retaining the consent and co-operation of all the warring parties were key to the success or failure of the mission. Diplomacy and negotiations with the warring parties were the order of the day, backed by the rare NATO air strike as a demonstration of resolve.

Rose would subsequently be criticised for not taking a firmer line with the Serbs. Western governments criticised him for not making more effective use of the NATO airpower at his disposal to influence the situation on the ground to stop and even reverse 'ethnic cleansing'. The limited air strikes he sanctioned were dismissed as pin-prick attacks to no avail. More critically, no-one was closer to the goal of creating the conditions for a political settlement of the conflict.

There is another body of opinion, however, which doubts the claims of airpower advocates that the Bosnian Serbs could be cowed into submission by massive NATO airstrikes. Diplomacy, not force, would provide the long sought after political settlement to end the conflict. The structural features of the Bosnian conflict gradually changed, further improving the prospects for peace. The Muslims were steadily gaining in strength while the Bosnian Serbs became increasingly isolated from their Serb backers in Belgrade. Bosnian Croat forces, backed by the Croatian Army, were able to deal a decisive blow against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. The

Western governments finally reached consensus on the greater use of air power, but backed by the introduction of an Anglo-French heavy armoured battle group strongly supported by artillery to protect the UN peacekeepers. The Americans provided further impetus to the peace process. They were fearful of the potential likelihood of mounting a costly rescue mission to extract beleaguered UN peacekeepers from Bosnia as the prospect of Presidential elections loomed. The controversial road to peace finally arrived in November 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords ending the war in Bosnia, months after Rose handed over his UNPROFOR command to General Sir Rupert Smith in January 1995.

Conclusion

After his year long stint in Bosnia, Rose returned to the UK where he was appointed Adjutant General, assuming responsibility for personnel and administrative matters in the British Army. He also became a member of the Army Board. He retired from the Army and remains active in public life, writing and commenting on contemporary military affairs in the mass media.

General Sir Michael Rose's stint as Commander, UNPROFOR remains mired in controversy. He was ill-served by his self-exculpatory autobiography, *Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994* published in 1998, widely viewed as a flawed account by his book reviewers. Granted the prevailing dysfunctional structure that Rose had to operate in, where no country was willing to commit to the use of force to the Bosnian conflict, and to what end, it remains difficult to envisage that the agency of a single man could successfully institute a peaceful solution quickly to an intractable conflict. Though peace did not reign during Rose's tenure, the marginally successful delivery of UN humanitarian aid to innocent civilians made the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia a partial success rather than an outright failure.

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