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Editorial

In keeping with our tradition of providing a wide variety of articles, we once again present articles which are thought provoking, educational and stimulating.

Our lead article, *The Command of the Australian Defence Force*, is the text of a speech given by GEN John Baker, Chief of Defence Force, Australian Defence Force, at the Singapore Command and Staff College. In this speech, GEN Baker highlights the place of the ADF in today's global environment.

The essay *Battlefield Innovation*, by COL Tay Swee Yee, informs readers that innovation on the battlefield must not take second place in the SAF's quest for excellence. MAJ Derrick Tang Keng Siang's article, *Professional Military Ethics - A Soldier's Contract*, highlights the importance of ethics in the military profession and discusses the need for military professionals to do the right thing in their professional and military lives. *The Attack on Pearl Harbor - The Lessons for Today's Strategic Thinkers* by MAJ Seow Hwey Min examines the circumstances surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor from the perspective of the Japanese and the Americans, and draws out key lessons in maritime strategy.

MAJ Ng Chee Peng argues, in his essay *East Asian Security in the 21st Century: The Politico-Military Role of the United States in the United States-China-Japan Strategic Triangle*, that security in the East Asian region is dependent on the leading role that the US has to play in allaying the suspicions and fears of China and Japan towards each other and ensuring peace and security in the region.

Strategic Surprise by CPT Christopher Lee Wai Keong looks at the barriers to accurate threat perception and the effective response to such perceptions, and suggests strategies in overcoming them. *War Termination* by CPT Leow Meng Fai discusses how the characteristics of a military establishment and its perspectives influence the war termination process.

And finally, *World Conquest - The Heartland Theory of Halford J. Mackinder* by MR Ronald Hee discusses the Heartland Theory and the influence that it has had through three generations of strategists.

We would like to inform our readers that the closing date for entries for the CDF Essay Competition has been extended to 31 December 1998. We hope this will encourage you to send in your entries.

POINTER Editorial Board

The Command of the Australian Defence Force

Speech delivered by General John Baker, Chief of Defence Force, Australian Defence Force, on 12 March 1998 at the Singapore Command and Staff College. General Baker retired from service in July 1998.

I welcome this opportunity to address you, the future leaders of the SAF.

It comes at a time in which military forces all over the world are facing additional stresses and strains from the demands that have been put upon us all. For the commanders of those forces at all levels, we can expect the pressures and the demands to grow over time. But it is not something about which we should all be despondent. Rather, it is something we should take as a challenge and rise to that challenge, so that we can be confident that our forces are the best led and the best prepared, to deal with whatever lies ahead.

I welcome most of the opportunity to talk to a group such as this. Your presence in this room suggests to me that you have the potential to command, otherwise you would not be here; that your Service judges that you are worth investing eight months of full time education because they think you have the capability. No doubt over time some of you will rise to the highest levels of command. You will then feel the pressures, but also the satisfaction, of high level military command, and in that I wish you all well.

We in Australia have, over recent times, put a lot of effort into getting our command organisation set for the future. It has been a fairly painful process because it involved not just organisational but cultural shifts. What I would like to do today is to talk about some of the things that we did and why we did them, rather than the detail. I will not get down to wiring diagrams which you can read for yourselves, but will provide some explanation, some rationale, of what we were doing. And so, I will talk a little bit about the strategic environment, about Australia's strategy for dealing with that environment, about some of the military challenges that I see we face in Australia and hence leading in to the reason behind our new command arrangements. I will do that essentially through Australian eyes and we have our own particular circumstances to meet, but some of the things that we are doing will be of interest to you and perhaps of benefit to you. I leave it to you to make that step of interpretation between what we are doing and how that applies to your circumstances.

Let us look at what we did in Australia and start by an overview of the strategic environment. You can spend, of course, hours talking about the present strategic environment and no doubt you will, or have, and will continue to do so. I do not wish to go through it in detail but there are a few key points that I would like to make.

The strategic environment that we all face in the future will be characterised by change, but it is not just change itself that is important. It is the rate of change which we are all experiencing, and the complexities and uncertainties that they generate for military planners. We all applauded the ending of the Cold War, and the reduction in global tension and prospect of a global nuclear exchange as a very positive development. But what happened is that we moved from a period of predictability into a period of uncertainty, and will probably never ever see again, in our lifetime, the strategic balance that existed during that period of Superpower confrontation, and that introduces a period of uncertainty.

At the end of the Gulf War, people looked at the world through rosy coloured glasses and said that the United Nations at last would be able to achieve its missions and promote peace and stability throughout the world. But Yugoslavia, Cambodia and other areas soon put a lie to that. There were those who said that the growing economic interdependence among nations would be a factor for stability, and we would all trade and never fight. The crisis in financial terms in Asia right now suggests to me that economic factors will still continue to be a cause of tension rather than of peace, because, even in prosperity, not everybody prospers equally and there are winners and losers, and there are inherent tensions in there.

We find today, despite all those predictions, that there are about thirty places in the world right now where people are being killed in various forms of conflict. Conflict which arises out of the old traditional sources,

whether they be racial, religious, ethnic, nationalistic, economic or just historical. Many of those pressures exist within our own region, fortunately mostly under control, but we need to work at keeping them under control so that they do not break out into tension. We do face some major uncertainties: what China is going to do in the future; the changing nature of Japanese defence policy as they strive to win a permanent seat on the Security Council; whether India can achieve its full potential and approach superpower status in the years ahead; and how we will sort out the conflicting claims in the South China Sea. It is interesting to note how, in times of financial crisis, the Korean tension has almost disappeared off the map.

We must be careful that we do not lose sight of, because of short term pressures, long term problems. Let me simply say to you that the key aspect is, for a military planner and leader and commander, that nobody can predict the future with a certainty and a confidence that we as military planners need or desire. Therefore, it is not enough to base your strategy around the threat perception, but you need to derive it from the view of national interests and national gains. We also need to be careful that we do not take an unduly negative view because there are some strong positives available in our region.

I think that the present financial crisis will pass. Through co-operation of the countries in the region and of the outside world, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and others will get through this difficult period and become all the stronger for the lessons that they have learnt and the mechanisms they have put in place to manage. I think that there are strong positives in terms of strategic dialogues between the countries of the region and we have seen the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) start to tackle some of the hard issues. We are starting to really get into confidence building measures. The military and the defence agencies of the region are starting to talk to one another within the ARF and bilaterally, and that can only lead to greater understanding and greater co-operation. There is no better example of that than what we have achieved between Singapore and Australia over recent years.

We see that China has priorities for technical growth and economic reconstruction, and while those priorities are there, China will need to be responsible in its international dealings. So, it is a period in which although there are uncertainties and complexities, there are also opportunities. We the military planners and strategists of this region need to grab those opportunities with both hands, and do all we can to position ourselves for the future.

From Australia's view point, I think there is another fundamental issue that we need to look at. Over a 25-year period, Australia would have gone to being a dominant economy in Southeast Asia to being one of three or four substantially equal economies by the year 2010 to 2015. That is an inevitable consequence of what is happening in the region, and that is a good thing. But, from my view point, if we in Australia wish to maintain our standing and our influence in the region, we need to put ourselves in a position of influencing through different methods other than being the strongest economy. We need to find ways in which we can contribute to the region in different ways. Perhaps it is through exporting not only raw materials but through education and training, that Australia can find a new position for itself in the region. In the military sense, although we have a small military, the standing of the ADF will be a major factor about Australia's standing in the region. This is of great interest to me because I believe one of the fundamental command responsibilities of senior military commanders is not simply to deal with the issues of today but to position your defence force to deal with the uncertainties of the future.

Against that environment, Australia has developed a comprehensive defence strategy for dealing with the future. It has five layers to it. There is no one circumstance which so dictates what we do, that it forms the centrepiece of Australia's strategy. There is no threat to which we need to structure to cope generally. So we need to have an inter-locking policy that covers five broad issues.

The first and key one is that we will develop our capabilities and our defence force structure for the self reliant defence of Australia simply because the fundamental responsibility of any defence force is home defence. We do that not because we fear a threat but to create, to add, to our national standing within the region because we are seen as being competent and capable in defence affairs. We do it so that we are beholden to no one else for our defence, and that gives us an independence of foreign policy. We do it also so that all Australians feel secure and it is from that secure base that we can engage totally with the countries of the regions. I think we in Australia start from a fairly strong base; our history and our

connections gives us a good place to start. But we need to work at it, to continue to have that military influence throughout the region to contribute to the overall national stance.

The second part our strategic approach is to engage wholeheartedly with the countries of the region in every sense: military, economic, social, financial, cultural and so on. Now, we do it in the defence sense not simply to be good neighbours. We do it in the military sense from self interest, because the security of a Australia is enhanced by the stability of the region, and by us contributing to the stability of the region, we enhance our own security. Some people say to me that this is new. Let me tell you that it is not.

For the last fifty years we have engaged in this region. You only need to look at the war graves spread throughout Southeast Asia to see the depth of our commitment over that 50 or 60 years to regional security. What is new are the objectives that we are now trying to achieve, of mutual advancement, mutual gain. So that we can contribute not only to our own security but to the security of the region. So that we can promote confidence building between all the forces and all the countries of the region to remove areas of suspicion and provide an environment in which we can go about seeking prosperity and economic growth, to promote interoperability between the forces of the region. So that if ever there is a crisis, we can deal with it collectively. Last of all, to try to promote economies of scale in materiel and logistics organisations so that we can all benefit, from the relatively small forces that we have, and from co-operation in materiel areas.

The third element of our strategy is that we will do a lot to continue to encourage our large relationships, and the strongest of those of course is our large relationship with the US, for the direct benefits we get out of technology transfer, and information, and access to modern military equipment. We also believe that a large relationship will play a major part in encouraging the US to maintain an effective presence in the Western Pacific. A presence which we see as vital to the stability and peace of the region. Lastly, we encourage that relationship because it allows us to train with the most powerful military force in the world and to satisfy ourselves that our capabilities, that our training, that our skills, are of the world's standard, and that gives confidence in our own ability.

We of course will continue to preserve our close links with the UK because our military heritage still owes much to our links to the UK. We will still learn a lot from them, and, indeed I think, teach them a thing or two about operating in this region. And of course we always support the New Zealanders. I am convinced that if Australia is ever in trouble, the first ones to come to our help will be New Zealand. So we might fight on the football field and we might criticise each other but we are really good friends. So those large relationships are important to us, and indeed the FPDA and other bilateral links, our agreement for maintaining security with Indonesia is an extension of where that is going. One of these days, I think not yet, we might see more multilateral arrangements in this region. Not in the sense of NATO because we do not need in our present strategic circumstances that form of commitment but we do need commitments to co-operate with each other.

The fourth element of our strategy is that we will do whatever we can to promote global stability. Now you have to recognise that a country of 18 million people deep in the southern hemisphere is never going to be a world power. Nonetheless we do have a role to play and that has two dimensions to it. The first is we will continue to be very active in non-proliferation. We will continue, as a country, to do all we can to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, again in a narrow self-interest sense as much as being a good international citizen. We see that the penetration of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems into this region would be so destabilising that it would need us all to start again. We will continue to make loud noises in international forums, the Australian Convention and so on, about chemical, nuclear and biological weapons. We need from time to time to put our forces where our mouth is and hence we are in the Middle East today.

We will also, on a wider scale, continue to participate in coalition, and particularly in United Nations operations, in the hope that the UN can continue to be of some benefit in promoting stability, and also because of the benefits we get out of it. I have seen our contingents go away to UN operations and the thing that impresses me most when they come back is the growth in stature and confidence of the junior leaders. That is the nearest thing that we have, in these days of peace, of operational training for junior leaders, and

that is a really valuable experience. Fortunately, at the moment in one sense, the level of our participation in peacekeeping is at a fairly low level historically. That is good in a sense as it means that there are no immediate pressing issues that need our involvement in our own region. On the other hand, it concerns me that we are not getting that depth of operational experience which we would like. So we will continue to seek opportunities.

The fifth element of our strategy is what I will loosely call national defence. It has two dimensions to it. The first is pulling together national policies in national interests so that our defence policy, our foreign policy, our economic and trade policies, all need to be linked in ways which we have never quite achieved in the past and we are starting to do that in the last twelve months. You will have seen the Defence White Paper and the Foreign Affairs White Paper produced in Australia. What pleases me about the latter is that it could be the first three chapters of our defence plan. For the first time in my memory, our foreign and defence policies are coming together. The mere fact that the financial crisis in the region caused the shift did not matter. It is providing a basis for economic interaction into the region. It provides the basis for us to do things now to help Indonesia to try and overcome some of its crises.

The second element of it is that we in the defence force now draw more heavily on national infrastructure to support our defence effort. In a relatively small defence force, we had less than 40% of our defence force in combat areas. By drawing on civilian resources to do more and more in support, we can increase the proportion of our defence force in the combat and combat support areas from under 40% to over 60%. Even in a time of downsizing you can actually increase the military capabilities that you can deliver in the field. At the same time, we are making, in everything that we contract out, about a 30% saving, so that we can afford to develop the new capabilities that we need to cope with the uncertainties of the future. The classics of these are amphibious AW&C, intelligence and getting into the smart technologies in a period in which we in Australia face no growth in our defence spending for the next five years.

That requires a fairly fundamental cultural shift, but it is necessary to understand that that is not driven primarily by achieving economies. It is driven by our strategic objectives of improving our combat capabilities within a relatively small force and secondly, improving the national capacity to expand, to modify and to upgrade that force should a crisis develop in the future. The more we rely on the civil community for peace time support, the better placed we are to modify our forces in times of crisis. And we will go a long way, much further than most others, in achieving "contracting out" and support from the community.

So I think you can see, with those five broad strands of strategy and policy put together, we can adjust to the evolving circumstances of the future. Over time the priorities we give to each of those elements will change as strategic circumstances change, but we are bent on positioning ourselves to allow us to contribute to national interests and national gains, and to our flexibility to adjust over time.

In achieving that strategy there are of course a number of very significant challenges that we need to face. Let me just talk about four or five of them, again from an Australian perspective.

The first is the changing nature of warfare. I grew up in an environment in which all the strategy and all the tactics I was taught were involved with global conventional conflict with the possible overlay of nuclear war. Many of the senior commanders in the ADF grew up in that same environment. Yet today the ADF is being asked to do a lot of other things: humanitarian work, peacekeeping, UN observer missions, fishery surveillance, even in the deep southern ocean we are now chasing illegal fishermen. These all tend to distract the defence force away from that central military function of defence of the country. We are demanding a lot more of our people because we expect the flexibility to do a whole range of tasks. It needs a different mindset, a different command structure to allow you to cope.

The second area that causes us some challenge is modern technology. The nature of warfare is changing, not simply because of the demands that have been put upon us, but by technology. If you think over a long enough term you can see the significance of that change. Back in the 1800s, the Royal Navy, steaming off Alexandria, fired 5000 shots to score ten hits on the forts of Alexandria, and that is not a comment on the

accuracy of RN shooting. It is a comment on the technology of the time. Then we went into World War One and you saw the massive casualties of trench warfare in Europe; World War Two, the blanket bombing of Europe; in Vietnam, the introduction of technologies, some good, some bad. The Tai-Nguyen Bridge in North Vietnam, after a thousand sorties of conventional aircraft, still stood. Four F4s, with the first laser guided smart weapons, took out that bridge in one operation. Precision weapons had appeared.

In the Gulf War you saw vividly on television the effects of modern weapons, somewhat exaggerated in that you only saw the ones that worked, but nonetheless the impact was there. We are moving from the raw application of brute force as you saw in World War One to the sophisticated application of precision weapons at the right point, at the right time, with the right accuracy and with minimum collateral damage. You do not do that with old fashioned command structures. You need to change the way of operating and commanding forces to allow that to happen.

Thirdly, I think we in Australia face a major problem in manpower. As our forces become more sophisticated, the demands we make of every man and woman in that defence force, from the lowest soldier to the highest commander, are increased. And as we achieve education and training beyond that normally provided in the civil community, we have a very marketable commodity - our people. We in Australia, as an all-volunteer force, where there is no obligation to serve for any specific period, will continue to be raided, particularly in times of economic growth, by the civil community. It is not a national loss but it is a major management problem for the defence force; we will never be able to meet the conditions of civilian employment nor do I want to provide people in the defence force who are only there because of what we pay them. I want them there because they believe in what they do. But we do need to find ways of managing our people, giving them the exciting employment and opportunities, if we are ever to keep them. You need to achieve levels of remuneration that remove from them the concerns of looking after their families. So we have a significant problem, and it will only increase as we increase the quality and the sophistication of our people.

We need also to work harder at using the resources of the community, one of the planks of our strategy, but that involves overcoming some very deep cultural differences within the military. We grew up in an environment in which we wanted all of our own, so we were not relying on anyone, so we could guarantee to deliver results. Now inevitably we are drawing resources from outside our immediate command and it needs a different management, a different control structure to allow that to happen. That can only happen if you achieve a different relationship between the military, the bureaucracy and the civilian industry in the country that we never quite managed before. I think there is a real challenge in that for senior leadership in uniform. It is no longer enough for senior commanders to be good leaders. You also have to be good businessmen and good bureaucrats. There is a contradiction in terms almost, but it is a real challenge.

The last challenge I will talk about here is the challenge of putting your planning horizons long enough to deal with the complexities of modern life. Take the submarine project in Australia. First talked about in the 1970s; first seriously raised as a project in 1982; and first approved by government in 1987. The first submarine was commissioned into naval service 18 months ago; and the last submarine of the six to be commissioned probably in the year 2002. The last one of those will come out of service when I am a hundred and five! An investment of \$5 to \$6 billion dollars made in the 1980s; that is the sort of time frame that we need to be able to deal with in a situation of uncertainty and complexity. Again, it brings you back to the key theme that you need to drive at by what you are trying to achieve and not by what someone else is trying to do to you. You need to be clear on the path of national interest into the long term future to make that level of commitment. Furthermore, we need to look at it in the broadest context because having invested that \$5 or \$6 billion dollars in a submarine capability, when the sixth submarine is launched, where does it lead? Does that technical industrial capability die because six submarines will not sustain an effective industrial base? For the defence policy and capability you are developing you need to link ever closely to the national and industrial objectives that you are achieving.

I think future military commanders have a tremendous challenge out there in front of them in dealing with just those five issues, not to mention many others that are around. How does that affect your command arrangements? We in Australia put a lot of time into looking at how we could position ourselves for the future. The first element was putting in place a command arrangement which allowed us to address all of our strategic objectives and issues, and all of those challenges. It required us to separate strategic

command from the command of the operational forces. Even in the Gulf War, my experience was that the senior commanders in Canberra were so busy meeting the demands of government that there was no way they could concentrate on warfighting.

If you look at the difference between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, you will see precisely what I mean. The Vietnam War was run from Washington. Tactical decisions were made in the White House, and the campaign failed because the commanders in the field were looking upwards instead of looking downwards at their troops in operation. In the Gulf War, it was the exact opposite. Colin Powell and others dealt with the strategic issues in Washington and left Schwarzkopf to fight the war. So we in Australia have taken that lesson and we have separated the strategic level of command in Canberra to the operational command of our forces in Commander Australian Theatre in Sydney. The CDF will deal with the politics, the resource generation, the force structuring, the manpower issues, and give the military mission to an operational commander to meet it.

Secondly, having given all the operational forces to that commander, we have given him the responsibility of developing the war fighting techniques to allow us to deal with the military environment of the future. Hence, the ADF Warfare Centre is given to our operational commander so that our doctrines, our tactics and our planning are all in concert because in modern military warfare, you will not succeed by mass alone but by being able to apply your capabilities at the right place, at the right time, with the right precision. That is an amalgam of knowing what is going on, having the firepower and the command arrangements to make it all come together. It is the ability to get more out of your platforms than the other guy can get out of his, that will be the difference between success and failure.

The third key feature is that, given the masses of information that are available today, you need to automate your command support processes. It is the only way you can hope to deal with the quantity of information to fuse the data to make sensible decisions. Any of you will know, anyone who has been given the task of establishing a wide area network of some size, how long it takes to do it and how much training and education is needed to get the best value out of that system. It is not only getting the best value out of it, it is having commanders who are confident in the system to make decisions from the data that are put in front of them. That suggests to me that you need in peace time the operational command arrangements and systems that you will take to war. So it is too late once a conflict starts to start putting your command arrangements in place; you would have lost.

It is not only a question of automating your data. It is also a question of time because it is speed of decision to apply those precision weapons that will be important particularly in the early stages of the conflict where rules of engagements are likely to be tight. What you need is staff systems which take unnecessary layers out, which allow you not only to save people, which will always be scarce, but particularly to save time. What we are doing in Australia is modifying our staff arrangements so that the joint staff and the single service staff plan concurrently. Indeed you do not have the same distinction between joint and single service staff. The single service planners are also the joint planners, so that the joint plan and the single service plan are developed concurrently and the big saving of that is time. That requires us also to establish common practices between three Services who grew up with this different historical basis, and there is a bit of culture shock. Indeed there is a bit of a language problem in getting three Services to come together. But unless you do, you cannot get the full benefits of automation.

Lastly, if you want to have your operational forces operating jointly, as I believe they must, you need to support them with joint logistics so that your single operational commander is making key logistics decisions as well as key operational decisions. Otherwise the two will be in conflict, not compatible. What we are putting in place is a joint logistics command, and if you thought that joint operational command was difficult culturally, you should try logistics!

Let me come back, gentlemen, to where I started. This is not a time for military officers to be despondent about the future. Really it is a time to pick up the burden, accept the challenges and to charge full steam ahead because there is no more difficult leadership or management task than taking a nation to war. We, like you, will require of our future leaders to be at the top of the management, leadership and administration

tree in the country. I do not find that daunting. I find that exciting and I hope you do too. Good luck to you all.

Battlefield Innovation

by COL Tay Swee Yee

Introduction

6 October 1973, at 1405 hours, one thousand Egyptian guns opened fire across the Suez Canal into Israeli defence positions. The Yom Kippur War was underway. The seemingly formidable sand ramparts built by the Israelis as part of the Bar-Lev Line defences, towering some 30 to 60 feet in height over the Canal, were ingeniously overcome by the Egyptians. A young Egyptian Army engineer had devised a novel method of excavation. High pressure pumps, mounted on rafts and sucking water from the Canal, ejected jets of water through hoses which thrust aside the sand, breaching gaps in the sand ramparts.¹ Some 100 of these powerful fire-pumps were acquired from Germany. That facilitated the crossing and landing of Egyptian troops and equipment on the far bank using bridges and ferries. The invincibility of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), accrued from past years of victories fighting the neighbouring Arabs, was challenged. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War evinced this and many other lessons on the need for creativity in combat.

Battlefield innovation, or creativity in combat, can determine the outcome of a conflict. "Successful military endeavours always rely on creative insight and action. Generating the unexpected (the "new") or recognising and acting on the unexpected on the battlefield is consistently the key to victory".² For the SAF, it is important that we add impetus to acquiring this culture of creativity during peacetime, so that in times of conflict, we have the mental agility and creative leadership, at all levels of command, to prosecute a war in our favour.

Battlefield Innovation Defined

So what is battlefield innovation, which is synonymous with creativity in combat? "Creativity is the ability to look at the same thing as everyone else but to see something different".³ Applied to the military art, it is about finding solutions to tactical problems posed by the opposing force; it is about finding a qualitative edge to overcome the threat; and it is about looking at ways to improve our military skills, arms and equipment handling as well as work processes. We have to be creative as it can spell the difference between a decisive victory and dismal defeat. "If necessity is the mother of invention, she is surely the matriarch of expediency".⁴ Battlefield innovation is not solely defence-industries driven, but often initiated in the field, although the solutions may have commercial content.

And why is there the need for battlefield innovation? It is because militaries do not always show all their cards prior to a conflict, hence it is difficult to ascertain an opposing force's complete capability. In the Yom Kippur War, the IDF was taken by surprise when the Egyptian Army started using canvas-covered suitcases that revealed the new Soviet Sagger ATGM which took its toll on IDF tanks. In the midst of conflict, the IDF Armoured Corps which was not trained to react against this weapon, had to hastily devise what was later known as anti-Sagger drills to dodge the wire-guided Sagger by aggressive driving - swerving and steering the targetted vehicle in a vigorous zig-zag manner, especially at the terminal phase when the low velocity missile was nearing the vehicle. The drill incorporated laying machine-gun fire in the vicinity of the suspected missile firer position as the firer had to be in visual contact with the target to guide the missile to the target.

All intelligence acquisition capabilities have limitations, and often even with incomplete intelligence reports a military force may have to commence hostilities. It is this need to expect the unexpected that we ought to cultivate in ourselves the ability to innovate, even in times of crisis, so as to reduce or negate the unexpected advantage the threat has over us be it in terms of special weapons and equipment capability, or in terms of special tactics and doctrine.

Historical Examples

History is replete with examples of how battlefield innovations helped in turning the tide of war. As early as the 16th century, the plug bayonet was replaced by the ring bayonet to allow the infantry to continue firing with the bayonet attached. 5

For the Normandy landings, multi-ship breakwaters, or Mulberries as they were called, sailed on 30 May 1944 as part of the invasion force from ports in Scotland to the five designated beaches. These artificial harbours were a tribute to engineering ingenuity. They consisted of cylindrical floats linked together and anchored in deep water to serve as breakwaters. Concrete caissons (phoenixes), some as high as a six-storey building, would be towed across the channel and sunk in place to extend the Mulberry breakwaters. In the sheltered water, rooms were provided for the anchoring of ocean-going as well as coastal ships.6

At the same landing beaches, the Allied forces were confronted with hedgerows at the egress routes, which the American troops were not trained nor prepared to overcome. Tanks were particularly vulnerable when climbing over such obstacles as the lightly armoured tank bellies would be exposed to enemy fire. At such critical moments also, the tank gun could not be depressed sufficiently to return fire. SGT Curtis G. Cullin Jr., an American serving in the 102nd Cavalry Recce Squadron, devised a sort of fork made of iron which could be attached to the front of the tank thus enabling it to cut through a hedgerow rather than climb it. A maintenance expert in the same unit then worked on the technical aspect of the problem and built forks out of salvaged iron bars which the Germans had used for beach obstacles. A frantic pace developed to equip as many tanks as possible with the simple contraption before the final breakout - "Operation Cobra". SGT Cullin was later awarded the Legion of Merit for his innovativeness.7

The Americans were surprised yet again in the initial years of their involvement in South Vietnam when they discovered a unique battle fought inside a 200-mile labyrinth of underground tunnels and complex chambers that the Vietcongs dug just north of Saigon. None of the American troops sent to Vietnam had any instruction on tunnel warfare. As death toll climbed, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), recommended the creation of specialist soldiers later to evolve as the "Tunnel Rats". Volunteers who were able to operate in a claustrophobic environment, and who possessed special type of temperament and courage, were sought from the ranks. Pistols were used instead of rifles to minimise damage to the ears when fighting in the tunnels, and soldiers were trained to engage at short ranges in the dark. They were also schooled in detecting booby traps that existed in the tunnel network.8

Meanwhile, at the Limited Warfare Laboratory (LWL) in Maryland, USA, engineers were trying to develop counter-insurgency hardware to meet the operational needs of the combatants. One of the developments was the "tunnel exploration kit" which comprised three items. For the Tunnel Rats to move around the darkened tunnels, each had a headlamp mounted on a fatigue cap with hands-free, mouth operated switch that the wearer bites to turn the light on and off. In lieu of a manpack signal set, a communication system with sensitive "bone conductor microphone" worn against the bone at the back of the head, or strapped around the throat with reception through the earpiece was developed. Each had a .38 calibre revolver with four-inch barrel complete with silencer and a tiny high intensity aiming light to gun down the Vietcongs.9 However, rigorous field trials were done and these were found to be not ideal and the Tunnel Rats eventually resorted to other field expedient methods.

The mechanised forces propagated a drill, known as the "mad-minute", in response to previous Vietcong sneak attacks on their leaguering (harbouring) sites. It was a minute of intense machine-guns fire in the vicinity of the intended leaguering site to flush out any Vietcongs that may be lying in wait to ambush or attack the leaguering force.

The War of Attrition (from 1967 to 1973) between the IDF and the Egyptians also spun many battlefield innovations. In a bid to prevent the IDF from prying into the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian combat engineers constructed ten-metre high sand walls. IDF front-line intelligence officers with high-powered binoculars, trying to get a height advantage, had to climb onto anything that would help them to peer into Egyptian territory. These included the driver's cab top of half-tracks, hull top of armoured personnel carriers and even on the top of bunker ventilation systems. Subsequently, the IDF Ordnance Corps helped build, according to the Intelligence Corps' specifications, a sixty-foot high cherry picker attached to the turret area of a Sherman tank.10 This tower, though rudimentary, provided the intelligence

officers, and the artillery spotter, with a surveillance platform that was nearly invisible against the desert backdrop.

An innovative IDF intelligence officer, Shabtai Bril, recalled an expensive toy shop that he had visited in the United States, where a sales clerk had demonstrated a radio-controlled model airplane. The motorized airplane was powered by a remote-control device equipped with four transmitting frequencies - two to power the engine, one to control the wing flaps, and a fourth serving as a reserve. With some modifications, Shabtai Bril thought, the reserve frequency could operate a 35mm camera fitted with a zoom lens, which the IDF would have no difficulty fitting to the aircraft's undercarriage. The toys were bought from the store and a series of field trials followed, including determining if the device could survive anti-aircraft gun fire. The unmanned aircraft was controlled by an intelligence officer flying in a Piper Cub, holding the remote-control device on his lap, and monitoring the aircraft using binoculars. Photographs taken over the Sinai front as well as the Jordan Valley, while evading Jordanian anti-aircraft fire and not drawing the attention of the Egyptians, were of superb quality. "The age of the remote piloted vehicle (RPV) had dawned".¹¹

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, members of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) showed ingenuity in dealing with the array of Soviet supplied weapons operated by the Egyptians, after experiencing heavy losses in aircraft. While the IAF knew how to evade the SA-2 Guideline and SA-3 Goa surface-to-air weapons, they had greater difficulty in dealing with the newer and mobile surface-to-air missile, SA-6 Gainful, and the portable SA-7 Grail systems. Counter-measures were experimented with, ranging from simple measures such as dropping of foil strips (window or chaff); to techniques using helicopter spotters in cooperation with attack aircraft; and the shedding of flares to attract the missile infra-red homers.¹² An effective method of attacking SA-6 batteries was conceived, entailing almost vertical dives from height directly above the missile vehicles to exploit the fact that the weapons initial launch trajectory, for maximum acceleration, was low.¹³

In the run up to the 1982 Israeli-Syrian conflict, which was a part of the larger IDF's "Operation Peace of Galilee" in Lebanon, the IAF flew drones which simulated manned aircraft to induce the Syrians to activate their air defences. This was necessary to piece together the Syrian air defence capabilities and to gather intelligence on any new or unfielded weapons that the Syrians could have recently acquired. When the drones were fired upon, accompanying IAF RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft were monitoring electronic emissions to map out the Syrian radar characteristics, communication equipment and procedures, command and control structures, weapons capabilities, and air defence tactics.¹⁴ Much thought was given in employing this tactic. Decoy drones, the Samson, an air-launched unpowered glider and Delilah, a ground-launched powered drone, were used in large numbers to simulate an air attack on Syrian positions. The Samsons, which had the radar profile of the IAF F-4 Phantoms and carrying an electronic counter-measure package, were particularly important. They were released from F-4 Phantoms with the sun behind them. This meant that the Syrians could not possibly track the drones optically and had to resort to their radar. With the Syrian radar now active, follow on Phantoms would then engage the missile positions.

Lessons learnt from past wars were translated into innovations in the design of new equipment as the IDF has successfully shown in the design of the Merkava tank. For example, the smoke launchers that are intended to mask the tank in an extrication are fitted with delay fuses that activate the smoke bombs in the air and in effect cast an instantaneous screen. This contrasts with conventional smoke grenade that activates the smoke screen after the grenade lands on the ground. Beneath the first layer of cast iron hull is a space filled with diesel fuel and then another layer of armour. This spaced armour gives the tank protection from HEAT projectiles and ATGWs. One would also notice the closely spaced chains with ball ends around the lower part of the turret bustle. These detonate HEAT projectiles before they can hit the turret ring. The tank does not carry jerry-cans of drinking water; the 60-litre water tank is built within the hull above the rear hatch that conforms to the contour of the hull to save space.

Fostering the Climate of Creativity in the SAF

Can the climate of creativity be fostered in the military where the buzzwords are "school solution", "zero defect", "don't fix it if it ain't broke" or "don't rock the boat"? Creativity has attendant risks and in seeking improvements and experimentation, mistakes are made. Can the organisation tolerate mistakes? Buy-in of

the senior military leaders is important to propagate the culture of creative thinking. Without it, any creative ideas will remain stillborn as the military, like parts of the civil service, can be bureaucratic. Hence it is important that the senior leadership interest themselves with this concept. The military has to accept that the defence dollars will not be growing any larger, and any improvement to the defence capabilities may have to be, in part, done through innovative and creative solutions not only in defence procurement and equipping but also in our work practices and processes.

It is easier to accept mistakes, associated with experimentation, in peacetime than in wars as no lives will be lost. So long as the experimentation and the mistakes so made are in good intent, superiors must be willing to, not only to tolerate them, but to encourage experimenters to learn from their mistakes. A poor leader stifles creativity.

Military leaders must not be too quick to dismiss, demolish or ignore new military ideas and concepts. We recall the British Army's experiment in the Salisbury Plain prior to World War II on the innovative concept of employing tanks. The British military leadership was slow to recognise the revolutionary potential of armoured mobile warfare and the new tool for controlling this fluid, fast-moving battlefield: the wireless radio.¹⁵ The Germans, on the other hand, were quick to capitalise on the pioneering works of the British and created the panzer divisions and the doctrine of blitzkrieg, which they used with such devastating effect against the British in the early war years.

Does creativity contravene the culture of an Army driven by doctrine? How often does a unit get penalised by exercise controllers for not following published doctrine even though the actions of the unit under assessment was approaching a tactical problem with an innovative solution? Doctrine is an accepted way, though not the only way, of doing things in a particular profession. It is intended as a guide especially for those new to the profession, and as a common form of language. They are of course cynics who proclaim that doctrine is obsolete as soon as it is printed! Doctrine is necessary to guide the development of a military organisation and to get the acts of an intricate organisation like the military with its hierarchical structure of section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade etc. to be coherent and effective. The application of doctrine must be tempered with rationality and if creativity can be featured by way of another method of achieving the same effects, assessors must be open-minded and commend the spirit of innovativeness. Doctrine is a living phenomenon. It is but a way, not the only way, of doing things. Doctrine cannot address every tactical scenario that the established doctrine are to be applied. Certainly doctrine can be changed if a new mode of overcoming a military solution or one that can control the chaos often associated with combat ("controlled chaos") proved effective.

Are We Getting It Right?

The nation in general, and the SAF in particular, are largely on the right track in our attempt to promote and stimulate creativity. Nationally, we have various government bodies to handle this and the National Technology and Science Board had done an excellent job of stewarding this effort, including priming the Young Innovators Club. The young school children have proved their mettle with innovative ideas evident by the inventions featured in the annual Tan Kah Kee Young Inventors' Award, now in its 11th year of existence. Rear-Admiral Teo Chee Hean, our Education Minister, has also announced the inclusion of creative thinking skills in our school curriculum. It remains for the adult workforce to fully subscribe to this culture in their workplace.

Dr. Yoshiro Nakamats, who is credited with more than 2,300 patents (as compared to Thomas Edison's 1,093), and who invented the floppy disk, lauded the Eastern way of education in preparing children for the strong competition in the workplace and its effect on creativity.¹⁶ The Japanese school system, he said, stressed "memorisation" which is necessary up to a point. "Then young people begin free-associating, putting everything together." It is this balance of regimentation and freedom that creativity comes from.

The SAF has been, is still, and will continue to be the pioneering entity in this movement with our PRIDE, WITs and other related programmes. It is critical for the SAF to continually seek innovations in our peacetime training so that the same culture will prevail in times of tension. In this regard, it is heartening to

note that the emphasis on our WITs projects continues to be centred on operation-related projects. Although improvements in the workplace and administration are important, it is the operational area (training methods, doctrine and tactics, improvements to weapons and equipment handling, as well as training safety) that we must continue our emphasis so that we can have the qualitative edge over an adversary. This is the key if we are to be prepared for the expected in a conflict. It is the surest way to maintain the mental agility to be able to overcome, and not be overwhelmed by, something unexpectedly thrust upon us.

Creative Rule of Thumb

Charles Thompson in his book - What a Great Idea! The Key Steps Creative People Take - introduces certain rules of thumb which are instructive.¹⁷ Here are two examples. His first rule is "the best way to get great ideas is to get lots of ideas and throw the bad ones away". There are many solutions to a problem and the idea is to keep all options open and evaluated in terms of feasibility, efficacy, cost-effectiveness etc. so that the option that best meet the need is selected. The second rule is "create ideas that are fifteen minutes ahead of their time ... not light-years ahead". The thrust here is to find marginal improvement to a problem as it is likely to be easier than to find a revolutionary solution, which if a solution is not readily available, the people involved may feel disillusioned. Also, ideas that are fifteen minutes ahead of their time are more likely to be accepted or less likely to be ignored by the management or the military leadership who can visualise if the idea works.

Conclusion

In 1899, the director of the United States Patent Office, the nation's steward of innovation, was quoted to have said "everything that can be invented has been invented".¹⁸ He couldn't have been more wrong.

For the SAF leadership, in our bid to continue to promote military creativity, we have to make changes to management mind-sets. We must temper our notion of "zero-defect". It demands the cultivation of a whole new culture, a more open culture - open to criticism and change, and open to experimentation that has associated risks and mistakes. It demands that we encourage subordinates to leverage and learn from mistakes. That they explore new ideas without fear of retribution. As a small military, this is our best bet for a qualitative difference.

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Professional Military Ethics - A Soldier's Contract

by MAJ Derrick Tang Keng Siang

Introduction

We are now living in an era of materialism and sensual self-gratification, from which most of us cannot escape. This has affected to a great extent in defining one's moral conduct.

When asked about one's job and what one expects to get from employment, most would say "personal advancement", "personal development" and even "personal fulfillment". Everything turns upon what gratifies us. This appears to be the value system at present.

We have in recent years experienced increased levels of anxiety over the rising prices of private properties, the long queue at launches of new private developments, the concerns of not being able to own a car because of expensive COEs, the mad rush to buy shares during IPOs and the creeping credit card debts. These are issues which have dominated the front pages of newspapers and generated concerns amongst us.

Do we ever ponder in the midst of all these preoccupations, how does the sense of military ethics hold as members of the profession of arms? This essay serves as a source of refreshment for us to reflect on the contract which we have as military professionals with the country and society.

Definition of Military Ethics

To help in the definition of military ethics, I would like to quote the words and sentiments of a Rhode Islander in his letter to his wife during the American Civil War (1861-1865). On 14 July 1861, a week before the Battle of Bull Run, Major Sullivan Ballou of the Second Rhode Island Volunteers, then in Washington, D.C., wrote to his wife in Smithfield:

My very dear Sarah:

The indications are very strong that we shall move in a few days, perhaps tomorrow. Lest I should not be able to write again, I feel impelled to write a few lines that may fall under your eye when I shall be no more....

I have no misgivings about, or lack of confidence in, the cause in which I am engaged, and my courage does not halt or falter. I know how strongly American Civilization now leans on the triumph of the Government and how great a debt we owe to those who went before us through the blood and sufferings of the Revolution. And I am willing, perfectly willing, to lay down all my joys in this life to help maintain this Government, and to pay that debt....

Sarah, my love for you is deathless and it seems to bind me with mighty cables that nothing but Omnipotence could break; and yet my love of Country comes over me like a strong wind and bears me irresistibly on with all these chains to the battlefield

Major Sullivan Ballou was killed at the First Battle of Bull Run. His gallantry, professionalism and sacrifice are exactly what military ethics are all about.

Clearly, the difference that sets the military apart, and segregates the military professionals from so many others with whom we might share high values, is that we will preserve and protect the honour and independence of our country with our lives.

When we joined the Singapore Armed Forces, we all had solemnly and sincerely pledged that:

We will always bear true faith and allegiance to the President and the Republic of Singapore.

We will always support and defend the Constitution.

We will preserve and protect the honour and independence of our country with our lives.

In our military profession, this pledge is like a contract with an unlimited liability clause. To put it simply, in the profession of arms if we are called on to lay down our lives for our country, for our families, and for our fellow Singaporeans, we are prepared to do so. This was precisely what Major Sullivan Ballou did in 1861 for his country, family and fellow Americans. Every member of the SAF takes the pledge, to accept this unlimited liability. It is essential that our leaders possess an absolute bedrock of military ethics not unlike those that Major Ballou possessed.

Professional Ethics and Integrity

One of the founding fathers of the US Air Force, General 'Hap' Arnold in his book *Army Flyer* addressed the importance of integrity. In the book, he said : "It is an unwritten law, but as binding as the unwritten common law in English system of jurisprudence, that an officer's word can be depended on to be the absolute truth".

The absolute truth here concerns military ethics. The term ethics is derived from the Greek word *ethos* which literally means a stable, hiding place, or cave - something absolute and unchanging.

While General 'Hap' Arnold said "...an officer's word can be depended on to be the absolute truth". I would like to think that the "word" is applicable to leadership at all levels, that if our word is our bond, then confidence and trust will permeate the ranks. On the other hand, nothing destroys an outfit's effectiveness quicker than a lack of integrity on the part of its leadership.

Whenever one talks about leadership qualities in the military, it is not unusual that the focus is on an officer. This is quite naturally so because of the expectation put upon an officer and an officer being a role model. However, leadership is also about being a leader at whatever level we are assigned and to whatever level we may rise.

A veteran soldier, General Dwight Eisenhower once said, "In order to be a leader, a man must have followers. And to have followers, a man must have their confidence. Hence, the supreme quality for a leader is unquestionably integrity. Without it, no real success is possible, no matter whether it is a section, a football team, in an office or in an army..."

The first of the military ethics is integrity which means wholeness or completeness, continuity of life in all its actions. The leaders at all levels must demonstrate the utmost integrity in everything we do - on duty and off duty.

We cannot assume that military ethics and integrity are givens for people who solemnly take their oath of office as military personnel.

In our military professional training, there must be emphasis on the importance of professional ethics and integrity, the importance of the social elements of professional ethics and integrity, and the responsibility to maintain standards of competence and conduct in the entire profession.

If professional preparation does not inculcate the habits of professional ethics and integrity, are we confident that these habits will be practiced by the same individuals when they become licensed professionals?

If combat occurs, the professional soldiers must fight. To refuse a combat assignment is to break faith with all other members of the profession and is a first-order violation of professional ethics. Just like a teacher refusing to teach and a doctor refusing to treat his patient. Because the stakes are so high in the military case, this breach of professional ethics could be devastating to society.

Ethical Behaviour

Ethical behaviour can be ensured by means of law, fear or personal convictions. Laws and regulations set guidelines of expected or prohibited behaviour. We cannot possibly prescribe every conceivable circumstance for our behaviour, as such laws and regulations are limited in their effects.

A study of history shows that the Greeks, especially Aristotle and Plato, held that there had to be absolutes of virtue. Plato wrote that the purpose of education was to become a good person because a good person behaves nobly. The Greeks understood that virtues existed and that they were based on absolute standards.

Even before the Greeks, in the Babylonian empire, 16 centuries before Christ, there was a moral code by which people lived: the Code of Hammurabi. The ancients recognised that society could not survive unless people lived by some transcendent absolute standards. All through the centuries we were governed by what Harvard historian Christopher Dawson called the "soul" of Western civilization, termed the Judeo-Christian Revelation. In the Age of Reason, this became known as "natural law".

Whether you call it Judeo-Christian tradition or "natural law", the fact remains that, virtually all peoples in societies agree that there are absolute transcendent standards of truth that govern human behaviour.

The other way of ensuring ethical behaviour is to use fear. Fear is a powerful motivator. Repressive management made it their primary tool of coercion and compliance. Fear of career stagnation, public exposure, court martial and job insecurity, all provide significant motivation to conform to a set of moral roles.

However, fear and law are effective only in limited ways. They sometimes lead people to live at the edge of their set boundaries.

Personal convictions form the most effective basis for moral and ethical behaviour. Ideally, we would expect one to instinctively do what is right whether or not regulations give guidance.

Unfortunately, personal convictions change with our society. Relativism which holds to no clear right or wrong has captured most of the intellectual and educational communities.

Professional Integrity

The toughest challenge would be knowing the importance of absolutes and knowing right from wrong. Why is it that we know what is right, yet we still do what is wrong?

When a maintenance personnel signs off a job carried out on a vessel, aircraft or ground equipment, the crew or operator accepts his word and his signature, that the vessel, aircraft or ground equipment is safe and ready for usage or flight. This is an act of trust and faith.

However, we may have seen instances where maintenance activities have not been documented, or have been improperly documented, or, in the worst case, could have been untruthfully documented. When a maintenance personnel is known to skip steps in test procedures, signing off work not carried out, and failing to comply with established requirements, he or she places at risk lives, equipment and operations. In this case not only had the maintenance personnel violated his or her professional integrity, but so had those colleagues and supervisors who had tolerated the conduct and had taken no action to prevent it.

So part of the social aspect of professional integrity involves the joint responsibility shared by all members of the profession. When fellow colleagues bury mistakes of their incompetent colleagues rather than expose these colleagues, they fall short of their responsibilities to the goals of the profession and have sinned against professional integrity. Only fellow professionals are capable of evaluating competence and hence fellow professionals must accept the responsibility of upholding the standards of the profession. In this case, the officer responsible and the maintenance team IC of the maintenance personnel who knew of his repeated safety violations and failed to remove him from the job, would have failed in their responsibilities and violated their professional integrity.

Often the obligations of professional ethics and integrity may be pinned against personal loyalties and friendships. However, where the stakes are high, then professional ethics and integrity should win out.

All these seem obvious in theory but are most difficult to put into practice.

Personal Ethics versus Professional Ethics

How are personal ethics and professional ethics related? Some believe that one can live up to high standards of competence and conduct in one's professional role - in hospitals, in schools or in the military - but live an entirely different kind of moral life. They may be required to do things in their roles as professionals that they could never do as private lay persons.

In the medical profession for instance, abortion is legally permitted but some obstetricians believe that abortion is immoral and it is against their personal ethics to perform abortions. In such situations, doctors or nurses are permitted to refuse to participate on personal ethical grounds. So what is legally permitted is not always or even usually morally obligatory.

In the military, as a private person, one would not even contemplate harming another person, yet as a military professional, one would be licensed to kill (under specific conditions), directly or indirectly for reasons of the state. Any violation would breach professional ethics and could be devastating to society. In the military profession, where the stake is high, we may not be able to separate personal and professional ethics.

Professions exist to serve society's needs for services like education, health, justice and security, etc. The means used to provide these services should be morally decent means and the people in the professions who provide them should be morally decent people.

In direct terms, good leaders ought to be good persons, good doctors ought to be good persons, and good military professionals ought to be good persons. We want to live in a world where the duties of a competent professional can be carried out by a good person with a clear conscience and with confidence.

Conclusion

The military profession has many codes, regulations, mottoes and traditions that combine to form a military ethics on which professional integrity is based. In the SAF, we have our SAF pledge, rules of conduct, SAF declaration and our specific list of core values identified.

When we say that we value integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do, we acknowledge that the essential nature of the military profession is to serve our society. We make specific our commitment to the concept that good soldiers are good persons.

To conclude, in trying to serve our tenure as military professionals, we strive to develop individual appreciation for the importance of military ethics and integrity, by identifying it as a core value of our military profession. Through the code of conduct for the profession, we strive to develop individuals with forthright integrity, to do the right thing in our professional and private lives.

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The Attack on Pearl Harbor - The Lessons for Today's Strategic Thinkers

by MAJ Seow Hwye Min

INTRODUCTION

The attack on Pearl Harbor has often been seen to be more than simply the opening blow of an epic contest in the Pacific between two great maritime powers. In terms of its outcome, there is no doubt that the attack on Pearl Harbor was of great political and military significance.¹ But did it, as some analysts have claimed, 'trigger' the conflict with the United States, thereby leading to the eventual Japanese defeat? In terms of the events leading up to the attack, it is arguable that the pre-emptive strike was the culmination of two conflicting maritime strategies; almost inevitable, in many respects. But Pearl Harbor had not always featured so prominently in maritime strategic thinking. Up till early 1940, although maritime strategists in Japan and America had long come to the conclusion that each was the other's primary threat in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor was never considered a potential battleground in the war plans of either navies. Yet by 1941, the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor had become the focal point of American deterrence policy in Asia and a critical threat to Japanese ambitions. How did Pearl Harbor come to assume such significance?

This essay aims to examine the attack on Pearl Harbor from the strategic perspectives of the two adversaries, with a view to resolving these issues and to draw out key lessons in maritime strategy. In particular, this essay will address the strategic necessity of the attack, the application of maritime force for command of the sea and the factors leading to a failure in deterrence.²

Strategic Necessity?

The strategic aspect of the attack on Pearl Harbor has been heavily criticised by many analysts. They contend that it was strategically unnecessary and that there was a causal effect between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. One analyst asserts that Pearl Harbor "triggered a conflict that eventually destroyed Imperial Japan".³ Samuel Elliot Morrison alleges that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, far from being a "strategic necessity" as the Japanese claimed even after the war, was a strategic imbecility.⁴ It has been described recently as "the most colossal mistake the Japanese could have made, something that an accurate understanding of US history and culture would never have permitted".⁵ Another analyst argues that "strategically, of course, the attack proved to be an enormous mistake. The outrage it aroused only served to rally support and resolve in the people of the United States to prosecute a lengthy war and defeat the Japanese - quite the opposite of its strategic objective".⁶

These arguments imply either that the attack was a *fait accompli* carried out by the Japanese Navy which dragged Japan into a war she had not desired; or that America would not have gone to war with Japan had the attack not occurred. Neither of these proposals are plausible. I shall address each proposal in turn.

Pearl Harbor - A Consequence of Japanese Grand Strategy

Was the Pearl Harbor attack a *fait accompli* carried out by the Japanese Navy which dragged Japan into a war she had not desired? The factors and causes leading to a Japanese grand strategy of war with the United States are complex and historical, and will not be discussed in great detail in this essay.⁷ Suffice to note that the key event leading to the outbreak of war was a decision by America, Britain and Holland to impose a complete embargo on all oil exports to Japan. It meant, as Churchill remarked, that "Japan was deprived, at a stroke, of her vital oil supplies".⁸ Diplomatic talks with America became deadlocked as America demanded not only a complete Japanese withdrawal from Indo-China but from China as well. American Secretary of State Cordell Hull refused to embark on a policy of appeasement with Japan, arguing that it was time to get tough and that economic sanctions would bring Japan to heel.

No government, least of all, a militant Japanese government, could be expected to swallow such humiliating conditions and utter loss of face. In a highly perceptive analysis of Japanese national mentality, then US ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, cabled a long despatch to the State Department to warn them against the acceptance of any theory that the weakening and financial exhaustion of Japan economy would bring about Japan's military collapse, noting that "Japan will even risk national (hari kiri)⁹ rather than cede to foreign pressure".¹⁰

From the Japanese perspective, there was a fatal tendency to see war as inevitable if Japan was to remain a regional power. But at the same time, there was no clear conceptualisation of how the war could eventually be won against an America with overwhelming economic and industrial might. An analyst notes that the Japanese "gave virtually no serious thought to how the conflict might be terminated. Somehow, before too long, they hoped, the Allies would tire of the struggle and agree to a compromise settlement:". ¹¹ Some analysts suggest that Japan was looking to conduct a limited war, after which some form of negotiated settlement could be reached with the Americans whilst still retaining her territorial gains in South East Asia. Internal documents produced by the cabinet and military chiefs did note that "America's total defeat is judged totally impossible",¹² whilst pointing out that it was "not inconceivable" that by seizing the south, Japan would strike a blow at the Allies' source of strategic materials and facilitate Germany's victory in Europe, thus forcing America to a settlement.¹³ However, there did not seem to be an assessment or an overall plan stipulating when and how such a settlement could be reached. Japan seemed to have embarked on a grand strategy in which she had no full confidence of ultimate victory - a veritable hari kiri. The Pearl Harbor attack was devised to support this grand strategy - it was a consequence of Japan's grand strategic policy of war with the United States rather than the reverse.¹⁴

Pearl Harbor - A Convenient Justification for Roosevelt?

Would the United States have refrained from declaring war on Japan had the Pearl Harbor attack not occurred? Even if the Pearl Harbor attack had not been carried out, it is inconceivable that the United States would have continued to maintain peaceful relations with Japan after Japan had declared war on her and invaded the Philippines.¹⁵ Furthermore, in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, critics charged that Roosevelt had sought a "back-door" to enter the war and had intentionally goaded Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor.¹⁶ Irrespective of the merits of these accusations and the subsequent conspiracy theories, they do imply that in the absence of the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt would not have hesitated in seizing upon the Japanese attacks on the Philippines and on British possessions in the Far East as justifications for entering the war against the Axis powers.¹⁷ Admittedly, the attack on Pearl Harbor served as a convenient justification for Roosevelt to bring America into the war and provided the Americans with a rallying cry to unify the country - but its significance as a direct cause of the United States's declaration of war on Japan has clearly been exaggerated.

Pearl Harbor As an Application of Maritime Force

Next, I will examine the Pearl Harbor attack in the context of the military strategy which was developed to support the grand strategy. In this respect, Mahan's influence seemed to have been considerable¹⁸ - the military strategy was based on a perceived need to achieve command of the sea as a means of securing strategic resources. As Colin Gray noted, "Japan went to war in the Pacific in 1941 seeking a defensive oceanic flank for the seizure and exploitation of the raw materials of south east Asia".¹⁹ Command of the sea was the key to securing this defensive oceanic flank, and the destruction of the enemy fleet was the necessary pre-cursor to such command. How was such destruction to be achieved?

Traditionally, Japan's maritime strategy in the event of war with the United States was to attack the Philippines and then hold her main fleet near the Marianas Islands, in anticipation of a decisive battle with the American Fleet which was expected to advance from the East to relieve the American garrison. Minoru Genda, the operational planner for the Pearl Harbor attack, notes that this strategy, widely referred to as Zengen Sakusen, comprised successive slashing operations by auxiliary forces before a showdown between the capital ships of both sides.²⁰ It aimed to ambush the oncoming American Fleet in the south west Pacific

with submarines as well as land-based aircraft before a final decisive showdown was made in the waters around the Marianas Islands.²¹

By the late 1930s, the effectiveness of this strategy was increasingly questioned. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, reportedly referred to it as a "wait and react" strategy, and considered it too formal and structured for practical use. He noted that ascribing only one course of action to a foe was extremely dangerous and questioned whether the Americans would sail an inferior fleet into a battle with the Japanese Fleet under unfavourable conditions. As a student at the Japanese Naval War College similarly queried, "How will the American navy come out into the seas near Japan and stake a decisive battle under conditions obviously unfavourable to them? Such an idea is self-complacent, self-satisfying, a dream of a fool's paradise..."²² Yamamoto argued that the American Fleet was unlikely to seek such a decisive battle but could choose instead to interfere with Japanese operations in the south Pacific at a time and place of her choosing.²³ Furthermore, the American Fleet was bound to grow much stronger in the long run in view of American's far larger economic and industrial base. Yamamoto's radical new strategy, "Operation Hawaii", was to attack and cripple the main body of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the first moments of the war.

To the sceptics, and there were many, Yamamoto argued, "The presence of the US fleet in Hawaii is a dagger pointed at our throats. Should war be declared, the length and breath of our southern operations would immediately be exposed to a serious threat on its flank. The Hawaii operation is absolutely indispensable".²⁴ He also stated that "in the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters ... and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing to take the offensive in the Western Pacific for some time".²⁵ Yamamoto's military strategic objective was the delaying of an inevitable American offensive and not a war-terminating victory per se.²⁶

Some critics maintain that Yamamoto's plan centred on a decisive fleet battle - a concept where possible adverse results were contrary to Japan's ability to execute a protracted war. His defenders correctly counter that "the attack on Pearl Harbor was not an example of a decisive fleet battle but rather was a graduated measure based on the doctrine of offensive tactics in a defensive strategy, in an effort to permit the endurance of a protracted war".²⁷ Nevertheless, both arguments differ only in their attitudes to risk, and not the more crucial question of whether the operation could successfully achieve the military strategic objectives. The latter criteria is, ultimately, best judged by the historical outcome.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out with negligible losses and largely achieved its military strategic aim of preventing the Americans from interfering with Japanese operations. However, the unfortunate absence of the American carriers and Admiral Nagumo's inability and unwillingness to launch further strikes to complete the destruction,²⁸ prevented it from being the devastating and overwhelming success that it could have been. The day after the Pearl Harbor attack, US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, issued a basic war plan in which he ruled that the primary duties of the Pacific Fleet were now defensive.²⁹ As Admiral Fukudome, Yamamoto's Chief of Staff at the time the operation was planned, commented, "we plunged into a desperate war disregarding the issue whether we won or lost. But it was not until February 1944 that the US fleet began its real advance across the Pacific. This gave us two years and two months to prepare for the American assault".³⁰ Without the results attained at Pearl Harbor, it is questionable whether the Japanese could have proceeded so smoothly in the early stages of their land campaign to the south or obtained so much time for consolidation.

Pearl Harbor - Deterrent, Threat or Vulnerable Target?

In 1940, strategic planning in America's Pacific policy centred on the deterrence of Japanese hegemonic ambitions. Stanley Hornbeck, the political advisor at the State Department, advocated a policy of embargo coupled with forward military deployment in the Pacific to paralyse Japan and keep it in a condition of "negative equilibrium".³¹ Convinced, Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet, after its summer manoeuvres of 1940, to remain in its forward base at Pearl Harbor instead of returning to its home port in California.

Essentially, the Fleet's forward presence was designed to deter the Japanese from moving into the resource-rich area of south east Asia.

Although the strategic premise of this policy was sound, its practical feasibility was debatable. Admiral Richardson, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was particularly vehement in his protests. Richardson argued that the Pearl Harbor facilities could not support proper training and logistics requirements, that it was too much exposed to possible attack by the Japanese and that the Fleet would be a better deterrence by remaining at its home port in California.³² Some improvements were subsequently made, but base defence systems were still largely inadequate by the time of the attack.³³

American leaders had been so concerned with analysing Japanese geo-political intentions that they miscalculated Japanese military capabilities and how they could be applied to do the most damage to US interests in the Pacific.³⁴ Specifically, they failed to assess the probable and possible Japanese responses to their concept of deterrence, particularly an attack on the deterrent force itself.³⁵ An analyst notes that "conventional deterrence had to be a function of not only the geographical location of forces but their proven operational capabilities and their likelihood of sustaining a long, hard campaign, not to mention the perception of that capability by the enemy".³⁶ Lack of credibility was thus a key factor in the failure of deterrence. There was a fine line between a force which was seen as a deterrent and one which was considered a prime target for pre-emptive removal. An American Fleet which could deter Japanese ambitions had, by design, to be located within striking distance of Japan in order to constitute a sufficiently visible and potent threat. Such a provocative threat left Japan's Navy with two choices - either to maintain the status quo (i.e. be deterred), or to remove the threat. A key consideration was the credibility of the American force. Once the Japanese Navy had satisfied itself that the American Fleet was not sufficiently capable of defending itself, the balance swung irrevocably towards making a pre-emptive strike to remove the threat.

Modern experts argue that deterrence should not be considered as a reliable means of peacekeeping because factors which can push the adversary to brinkmanship, such as faulty decision-making at the politico-bureaucratic level and domestic political problems, are often beyond the deterrent's control.³⁷ American planners failed to take into account the functioning of the Japanese militant government and the domestic factors of Japanese nationalism and military dominance, when assessing the deterrent value of the American Pacific Fleet in relation to the tough political and economic policies being pursued. Closely linked to this misjudgement was an erroneous assumption on the "rationality" of the Japanese. There was a general tendency to assume "rationality" in the general sense of the word - the intelligent assessment of relative cost-benefit calculations. But rationality can only be based on specific mental models. The Japanese mental model of what was acceptable and feasible was not incorporated into Washington's planning. Ambassador Grew's perceptive warning was alien to American strategic planners. Similarly, the British Ambassador to Japan noted in October 1941 that "little attention seems to have been paid in Washington to Japanese psychology and to the facts of the international situation here".³⁸ As we have seen from the Japanese perspective, going to war, although risky, was not as irrational a choice as the Americans might have perceived it to be.

Conclusion

Pearl Harbor was more than simply the location of a pre-emptive strike by Japan on the United States at the start of their epic conflict in the Pacific. In many ways, the attack on Pearl Harbor was the culmination of decades of maritime strategic thinking and developments in both nations. Japan's grand strategy of securing a resource-rich hinterland through war with the "ABCD powers"³⁹ led naturally to a maritime strategy which necessitated the removal of the primary threat to Japanese command of the sea. It was an inevitable, if flawed, strategy - a result of geo-political ambitions and domestic dominance by a power-hungry Army. The attack on Pearl Harbor was merely the lynchpin of the resulting maritime strategy. In the United States, a policy of containment and economic sanctions seemed to necessitate the positioning of a deterrent naval force within reach of Japan - it was threatening and therefore, it deterred. This was further compounded by a failure to fully appreciate Japanese military capabilities and unique domestic circumstances and mental models. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the resolution of these two conflicting maritime strategies. The outcome was politically and militarily significant, but perhaps not as strategically catastrophic for either nation as some analysts have made it out to be.

Notes

1. The military significance of the attack, i.e. the extent of the military success, is itself the subject of conflicting arguments, but will not be discussed in this essay.

2. Clearly, there are many other lessons in maritime strategy which could be drawn from an analysis of the attack. Within

the constraint of the limited length of this essay however, these three main lessons will be the only ones discussed.

3. John Mueller, 'Military Inconvenience, Political Disaster', *International Security*, Winter 1991/92, Vol. 16, No. 3. p. 132.

4. Samuel Morrison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931 - April 1942*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1948), p. 132.

5. Edward Beach, 'Who's to Blame?', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 91, p. 32.

6. James Van de Velde, 'It Could Have Been Worse' , *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 91, p. 44.

7. See, in particular, Saburo Ienaga, *Japans' Last War*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), for the Japanese perspective on the events and factors which led to Japan going to war.

8. Cited in A. J. Barker, *Pearl Harbour*, (London: Macdonald & Co., 1970), p. 6.

9. Japanese term for ritual suicide.

10. Cited in A. J. Barker, *Op Cit.*, pp. 60-62.

11. Gordon Prange with Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbour*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 21.

12. Saburo Ienaga, *Op Cit.*, p.139.

13. See Saburo Ienaga, *Op Cit.*, pp.139-142 for critical examination of Japan's calculations and estimations of their prospects for victory.

14. Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet and the architect of the Pearl Harbour attack, had to go so far as to request the army to delay their attack by a week to give his fleet additional time to prepare. See John Potter, *Admiral of the Pacific: The Life of Yamamoto*, (London: Heinemann, 1965), p. 71.

The army, which had minimum interest in Pearl Harbor, was anxious to start the war. They originally intended operations to begin on 1 December with a series of co-ordinated attacks. At the beginning of November, Yamamoto ...asked him if he would agree to an attack on the second Sunday in December, instead of the first, to give his fleet a little more time to prepare.

15. Particularly after the Japanese attack on an American air base at Manila on 8 December 1942 which resulted in the loss of nearly a hundred American aircraft. See Basil Collier, *The War In The Far East: 1941-1945*, (London: Heinemann, 1969), p. 125.

16. See Martin Melosi, *The Shadow Of Pearl Harbor: Political Controversy over the Surprise Attack, 1941- 1946*, (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1977) for a comprehensive account of charges against President Roosevelt.

17. Following the Pearl Harbor attack and Japan's declaration of war on the United States, President Roosevelt was particularly anxious that Germany might not follow suit in declaring war on the United States as required under the 1940 Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy - thus depriving the United States the opportunity for entering the war in Europe. It is fair to surmise that at that juncture, Roosevelt

would have seized on any justifications for entering the war against the Axis powers. See Kenneth Davis, *The American Experience of War: 1939-1945*, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1967), pp. 103-106.

18. Interestingly, in his autobiography, Mahan wrote that, so far as he knew, more of his works had been translated into Japanese than into any other language. Cited in Philip Crowl, 'Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian', *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. by Peter Paret, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). p. 474.

19. Colin Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War*, (New York: Macmillan, 1992), p. 251.

20. Minoru Genda with Masataka Chihaya, 'How the Japanese Task Force Idea Materialised', in *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*, ed. by Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, (London: Brassey's 1993), p. 5.

21. Yoji Koda, 'A Commander's Dilemma: Admiral Yamamoto and the "Grand Attrition" Strategy', *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 93, p. 66.

22. Cited in Masataka Chihaya, 'An Intimate Look at the Japanese Navy', in *The Pearl Harbour Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*, ed. by Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 319.

23. John Potter, *Op Cit.*, pp. 46-48.

24. Cited in A. J. Barker, *Pearl Harbor*, (London: Macdonald & Co., 1970), p. 44.

25. As noted by Minoru Genda, the primary operational planner for the Pearl Harbor attack, in an affidavit prepared in connection with the Far East War Crimes Tribunal. I. See Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, *Op Cit.*, p. 13.

26. It should be noted that in some accounts, Yamamoto's aim (as noted in various letters he wrote) was to deal the American Fleet a crushing blow at Pearl Harbor before seeking a negotiated settlement whilst American morale and confidence was low. However, there is generally no substantial evidence which indicates this was the official Navy policy or of any actions taken by Japan immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack to seek such a settlement with the United States. Furthermore, this objective could not have been reconciled with the Japanese amphibious attacks on the Philippines which immediately followed the Pearl Harbor attacks.

27. Jun Tsunoda and Kazutomi Uchida "The Pearl Harbor Attack: Admiral Yamamoto's Fundamental Concept", *Naval War College Review*, Fall 78, p. 88.

28. See Edwin Hoyt, *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict*, (London: Hutchinson, 1986), pp. 230-233, for an account of Yamamoto's displeasure and disappointment with Nagumo's failure to continue with further strikes on Pearl Harbor in order to complete the destruction.

29. John Potter, *Op Cit.*, p. 121.

30. Cited in John Potter, *Ibid.*, p. 126.

31. Stanley K Hornbeck, Memoranda, 4 July and 21 September 1940, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 1990-91 and 2007-13. Cited in M C Meigs, 'This must mean the Philippines', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Aug 85, p. 73.

32. As a result of his vehement arguments, Richardson was removed from his post, and was replaced by the unfortunate Admiral Kimmel.

33. Claude Sasso, 'Scapegoats or Culprits: Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor', *Military Review*, Dec 83, p. 35-37.

34. See Basil Collier, *Op Cit.*, pp. 104-106.

35. War Plan ORANGE, the US Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, assumed that the eastern Pacific, and Pearl Harbor in particular, would be a sanctuary from Japanese attacks, and would form the focal point for a mobilisation of resources before an eventual thrust westwards against Japanese forces and supply lines. See Edward Millar, War Plan ORANGE: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1991) for a comprehensive and detailed examination of the strategy which had been developed and updated during the pre-war years, and which later formed the basis for the Rainbow Plans which guided US strategy throughout the war.

36. M C Meigs, Op Cit., Aug 85, p. 77.

37. Keith Payne and Lawrence Fink, 'Deterrence Without Defense: Gambling on Perfection', Strategic Review, Winter 1989, p. 30.

38. Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 178. The British Ambassador to Japan was Sir Robert Craigie. On his return from internment in Tokyo at the end of the war, Sir Robert Craigie wrote a final report in which he launched a blistering attack on the British and American governments for not having taken the opportunity to avoid war in November 1941.

39. The ABCD powers referred to America, Britain, China and Holland.

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East Asian Security in the 21st Century - The Politico-Military Role of the United States in the United States-China-Japan Strategic Triangle

by MAJ Ng Chee Peng

INTRODUCTION

In the global bipolar environment of the Cold War, the United States, Japan and China (from the 1970s) stood on the same side against a common adversary, the Soviet Union. Their strategic co-operation papered over much of the vast cultural, economic and ideological differences that existed between them, and effectively suppressed any independent regional ambitions that China and Japan might have had in East Asia.¹

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, not only has the United States become the world's sole superpower, but China and Japan have also emerged as major East Asian regional powers in their own right, together accounting for over three-quarters of the East Asian Gross National Product.² With a minimal share in regional economic activity and vast internal problems that limit the effectiveness and readiness of its military forces, Russia's influence in East Asian affairs will likely be minimal in the near future.³ "Regional stability and prosperity in the early part of the 21st century will likely depend more on relations between China, Japan and the United States and the regional role of the United States than on any other factors".⁴ However, the collapse of the bipolar framework of confrontation has also allowed the surfacing of latent differences and competitive tensions between the three countries. Thus the United States has clashed in recent times with China over a range of issues, ranging from China's copyright violations to its human rights record, and tainted its relationship with Japan over trade imbalances and burden-sharing in their security alliance. Questions have arisen over whether the United States should "contain" or "engage" China, and whether the US-Japan security alliance should be continued or drastically modified. Given the importance of the US-China-Japan strategic triangle to security and order in East Asia, it is imperative that the United States pursues a strategy that will ensure a stable configuration in the triangular relationship.

It is the thesis of this paper that the United States should pursue a "Leadership to Partnership" politico-military strategy towards China and Japan to ensure continued stability in the strategic triangle and East Asia at large. Although US leadership is required in the near and medium terms to allay the distrust that China and Japan have over each other's ambitions, rising nationalism in both countries militate against a pure and indefinite US leadership role. The "Leadership to Partnership" strategy overcomes this dilemma by reassuring both China and Japan that the intention of US leadership is not perpetual hegemony but to lead them peacefully to a future equal partnership with the United States.

In this paper, the key factors that will drive the future developments of the strategic triangle are first discussed. The possible US politico-military roles in the strategic triangle are then evaluated. Lastly, a "Leadership to Partnership" strategy is proposed which will ensure peace and stability in the strategic triangle and East Asia at large.

KEY FACTORS DRIVING THE US-CHINA-JAPAN STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

The end of the Cold War has moved the East Asian region from a bipolar stand-off to a multipolar environment, from a "threat-driven" security calculation to an "uncertainty-based" one. In particular, there is great uncertainty over the future direction of the US-China-Japan triangular dynamics, especially since the removal of the common Soviet threat has allowed them to accord greater priority to their own national interests over those of strategic co-operative arrangements.⁵ To determine the appropriate US politico-military role in structuring the strategic triangle in this new environment, it is first necessary to establish the key drivers that will govern the development of this triangular set of relationships.

The Critical Role Of The United States

US politico-military strategy towards China and Japan is perhaps the most critical variable governing the future shape of the strategic triangle. With respect to the China-US leg, China recognises that for the moment at least, "Washington holds the upper hand",⁶ given its superior military and technological capabilities and its vast diplomatic and economic leverage in East Asia. The United States has the ability to nudge China towards being a benign, reclusive or belligerent regional player.⁷ US influence in the Japan-US leg is even more preponderant. The Yoshida doctrine practised by Japan since the 1950s has meant almost complete deference to the United States in most major foreign and security policy decisions.⁸ US influence extends even to shaping China-Japan relations. "Chinese security analysts watch closely what the United States says about its relationship with Japan".⁹ Given China's aversion to an increased Japanese military role in the region, any US move encouraging Japan towards an independent security stature would, for example, likely push China-Japan security relations onto a more competitive and combative footing.

Concerns Over China's Rising Power

China's economic performance over the last 15 years has been impressive. According to the World Bank's purchasing power parity estimates, China has become the world's second largest economy after the United States.¹⁰ Projections by a 1995 Rand Study predict that China's GDP will surpass that of the United States by 2010.¹¹ Provided she does not implode, China will be a formidable economic powerhouse in the 21st century. This economic prowess will translate into a stronger military might in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Advanced aircraft like the SU-27s and MIG-31s, aerial refuelling and new warships have already been introduced, with a blue-water naval capability reportedly in the pipeline. Given the great uncertainty over how China will exercise her increasing might, the US role in steering China towards being a responsible international player will be crucial.

Japan's Quest For A Greater International Role, Independent Of The United States

Japan recognises that it is as yet not ready for a politico-military role totally independent of the United States. As such, it has continued to support the US-Japan security alliance as the foundation of Japanese defence and security policy. The alliance provides Japan with military protection, a hedge against uncertainty over the future of China, Korea and Russia, and confers legitimacy for Japan to play a larger political and security role regionally and globally.¹² But the severe criticisms levied against Japan in the 1991 Gulf War taught the Japanese that cheque-book diplomacy would not be sufficient in the future. There are now strident nationalistic calls in Japan for her to resume a "normal nation" status and play a bigger role internationally.¹³ While there is opposition to these neo-conservatives, the likelihood is that Japan will increasingly seek a regional politico-military role commensurate with her economic prowess.¹⁴ Japan, seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has overcome constitutional constraints to deploy Self-Defence Forces overseas, and accepted a larger role in the US-Japan alliance as laid out by the new guidelines in September 1997.¹⁵ Japan has some military capability to back up its claim to a larger international role. The United States must find the right approach to manage Japan's search for a wider international role that will not alarm China and destabilise the strategic triangle.

Deep Underlying Distrust Between China And Japan

The close Sino-Japanese economic ties¹⁶ appear currently to support an orderly and even co-operative relationship, with recent high-level reciprocal visits¹⁷ intended to symbolise a warm relationship. But beneath this veneer is an underlying reality of deep distrust of each other's intentions and ambitions. China's "historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan"¹⁸ is conditioned by deeply etched memories of Japanese aggression in the first half of this century, especially its brutal invasion and pillage in the 1930s and 1940s, and its perceived failure to fully account for these atrocities.¹⁹ On the Japanese side, there are fears over China's growing economic strength, its development of a blue-water naval capability, and its assertion of maritime territorial claims. Another source of potential tension in Sino-Japanese relations is the competition for influence in Southeast Asia. A properly formulated US role in the strategic triangle must take fully into account these deep suspicions and distrust between China and Japan.

POSSIBLE US POLITICO-MILITARY ROLES

The analysis of the key driving forces for the strategic triangle points to two things. First, the future shape of the strategic triangle is unclear. Second, the US politico-military role will be a key to maintaining stability in the triangle. What exactly this role should be, however, would have to be determined. In trying to define the US politico-military role in the strategic triangle, the following major possibilities are examined.

1. Strategic Withdrawal From East Asia

This option advocates a US withdrawal from a strategic role in East Asia, leaving China and Japan to balance each other. It argues that since neither China nor Japan can threaten the United States militarily, the United States need not involve herself politically or militarily in the region, thus keeping herself out of war and conflicts in the region.

Such an option will, however, be extremely costly to the United States. US trade with East Asia stood at nearly US \$400 billion in 1994, accounting for nearly 3 million US jobs.²⁰ A "power vacuum" caused by a US withdrawal will give rise to competition and conflict between China and Japan to be the regional leader; the resulting instability will threaten the viability of US trade with the region, and hence US jobs and businesses, as well as the security of US possessions in East Asia. The United States will in addition lose all its political and diplomatic leverage in the region.

2. External Balancer (Dismantling The US-Japan Security Alliance)

This option argues that a limited US politico-military engagement would be most effective if the United States were to be a "makeweight" or "external balancer" in a 19th century-style balance of power strategy. The US-Japan security alliance would be dismantled and the United States would play China and Japan off against each other to maintain a regional balance of power.²¹

Such a strategy is dangerous and short-sighted. The US-Japan alliance has for five decades served as a "cap in the bottle"²² against a rearmed and resurgent Japan. Fears of a stand-alone Japanese military capability is prevalent across Asia, especially in China. Without the indirect "containment" of Japan imposed by the alliance, "Tokyo will be forced to fend for itself militarily, fuelling an expensive and dangerous arms race in the region",²³ making US involvement as an external balancer even more costly and dangerous as it seeks to balance the increased regional forces. A conflict between China and Japan would also be more likely with the latter's resurgence as an independent power.²⁴ Besides, the US-Japan alliance serves crucial US interests, such as burden-sharing and maintaining US forward military presence in the region. "With no armed forces west of Hawaii, America's military, political, economic, and psychological influence in Asia would collapse".²⁵ In short, it would be counter-productive for the US to dismantle the US-Japan alliance and assume an external balancer role in the strategic triangle, given the historical mistrust between China and Japan, and the usefulness of the alliance to the US.

3. Condominium With Japan Against China

This realist²⁶ strategy contends that China is a threat that must be "contained" in an old-style Cold War fashion. Bernstein and Munro, for example, call for "strengthening Japan" so that together, the United States and Japan can "prevent China from becoming the hostile hegemony that could interfere with the US pursuit of its interests in Asia".²⁷

Such a strategy is seriously flawed. Although "neo-cold warriors paint it [China] as a geostrategic threat comparable to the old Soviet Union",²⁸ it is not all clear that China is indeed the threat that it is made out to be. While China is indeed an emerging economic and military power, a net assessment indicates that "China's technological and military capabilities are losing ground rather than catching up with those of the United States",²⁹ even "optimistic economic growth projections give China only two-fifths of US per-capita income in 2025, far from providing ... the ability to expel the US from East Asia",³⁰ Capabilities aside, for

China to be a threat, the intent must also be present, and here again the evidence supporting an expansionist intent on China's part is not conclusive. "China has not been an evangelical power driven by a missionary zeal to spread its way of life around the world",³¹ and history does not suggest that China seeks to conquer or absorb other countries in the region.³² Second, given that China may not be a threat, it is premature and even dangerous to succumb to an "enemy-deprivation syndrome"³³ and pursue a self-fulfilling containment strategy that would certainly create an enemy out of China. Third, the United States and China have many common interests which should not be jeopardised by an adversarial relationship. China is potentially a very profitable market for US businesses and investments. Most of the important regional security problems, such as the Korean issue, can be more effectively addressed with China's co-operation than its opposition. As US President Clinton put it, the "emergence of a stable, an open, a prosperous China, a strong China confident of its place in the world and willing to assume its responsibilities as a great nation is in our deepest interest".³⁴ Fourth, it is simply not sound policy for the United States to put all its eggs in Japan's basket. The United States can enter into a condominium with Japan to counter China "only by risking that someday, when Japan is stronger, Tokyo will jettison the geopolitical constraints of surrogacy and use its economic and military capabilities for its own oft-shown purposes".³⁵ It would not seem wise for the United States to side solely with Japan and alienate China.³⁶

4. Integrating China And Japan Through Multilateral Regional Security Arrangements

This option argues for the United States to create or make use of emerging multilateral regional security arrangements to integrate China and Japan into East Asia. These promote confidence-building and allow China and Japan to become involved in regional security matters in a manner non-threatening to each other and East Asian countries.

Multilateral security arrangements will not, however, be sufficient to integrate China and Japan into East Asia. China views them suspiciously as "fronts for other powers"³⁷ to contain her, although she seeks whenever possible to use them for diplomatic advantage, such as using "the ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum]"³⁸ 7(a) to divide and rule. China also has had unhappy experiences with multilateral institutions, which failed in 1931 to defend China against Japanese incursions, and worked against her in the Korean War in 1950. As for Japan, there are fears in East Asia and within Japan itself that multilateral arrangements will dilute the importance of the US-Japan bilateral alliance and serve as a "cover" for reducing the US role in the region. The experience of emerging East Asian multilateral arrangements has also not been encouraging; indeed, some caricature the ASEAN Regional Forum as being "all ARF and no bite",³⁸ as shown by its lack of initiative during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. Multilateral arrangements in East Asia may be similar to the "League of Nations - promising, but not sufficient to provide a real sense of security",³⁹ and certainly not sufficient to ensure stability in the strategic triangle.

"LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSHIP" STRATEGY

Based on the preceding analysis of the four possibilities and the key factors driving the strategic triangle, it is the thesis of this paper that the United States should pursue a "Leadership to Partnership" politico-military strategy towards China and Japan to ensure continued stability in the strategic triangle and East Asia at large. "Leadership" implies that the United States plays the key or guiding role in determining the shape and direction of the strategic triangle, while "partnership" signifies an equal relationship in which each side has the same say in the development of the triangle. In the negative sense, "Leadership to Partnership" means leadership giving way (involuntarily) to partnership; in the positive sense, it means active leadership to bring about eventual equal partnership. It is in this positive sense that the "Leadership to Partnership" strategy is to be framed. Simply stated, it means US leadership to bring China and Japan to a future equal partnership.

In the near to medium term,⁴⁰ US leadership is required because of:

(a) Fears in China and East Asia, engendered by deep-seated memories of Japanese aggression in World War II, of a rearmed and resurgent Japan. Japan can presently play a larger role in regional security affairs only if China and other East Asian countries are convinced that Japan remains firmly locked

in a US-led security alliance that would prevent a demilitarised Japan. US leadership is a lesser necessary evil to China than Japanese remilitarisation, for although the Chinese "harbour suspicion toward the United States, they view Japan with even less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in attitudes toward America".⁴¹

(b) **Concerns over how China will exercise her emerging power.** On one hand, China's growing economic prosperity and interdependence with regional countries make it unlikely that she would pursue military adventurism abroad as this would jeopardise her economic relations with her main trading partners. On the other hand, China's rising nationalism and "obsession with sovereignty"⁴² are a source of grave concern for Japan and some East Asian countries. US leadership will be required to allay these concerns by steering China towards a responsible and constructive regional role while reassuring her that there is no intention of containing or otherwise hampering her growth.

In the long term, an equal "partnership" would have to prevail as:

(a) **Japan desires and acquires a politico-military security role independent of the United States.** Despite the recent strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, it is implicit in the Yoshida doctrine that Japan would aim for an independent strategic status eventually; Yoshida himself had stated, "The day will come when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then".⁴³ In the face of rising Japanese nationalism, questions are already being raised in Japan, especially in Okinawa, about the desirability of a continued US presence and Japan's generous host-nation support. Former Prime Minister Nakasone argues "for genuine independence of the nation, rather than worrying about what other countries might feel about [constitutional] revision".⁴⁴ Japan would not remain forever deferent to the United States; eventually, she would demand an equal, true partnership with the United States, not the nominal, "in-name" partnership now.

(b) **China will, with increased economic, political and military might, demand at least an equal say as the United States in regional security affairs.** Nationalism has already replaced communism as the central unifying force in China.⁴⁵ This nationalism, coupled with her strong desire to reverse the past century of foreign domination and humiliation, will propel China to demand at least an equal partnership with the United States once she has sufficient diplomatic/political, economic and military clout.

A successful US strategy must ensure peace and stability in the strategic triangle, and be acceptable to both China and Japan. A "partnership" strategy is not feasible or possible now because of the deep distrust between China and Japan, which effectively means that neither would accept the other being elevated to be an equal partner of the United States. At the same time, a US leadership role now without the commitment to an eventual partnership is also unpalatable to China and increasingly, Japan. "For one to lead, others must want to follow".⁴⁶ The "Leadership to Partnership" strategy offers a solution by offering both US leadership and a future equal partnership. It is superior to a "pure leadership" strategy,⁴⁷ because it is more acceptable to China and Japan, by reassuring them that US leadership is not forever, that it is in place now only because of the unique prevailing circumstances, that it is in fact meant to lead them to an equal partnership. It is also superior to a "pure partnership" strategy not only because the latter is not feasible now, but also because it allows the United States time and flexibility to set the terms and "start-states" of the eventual partnerships.

What will the "Leadership to Partnership" strategy mean in practice? In the near to medium term, the United States should help integrate China and Japan politically and militarily into East Asia by overcoming regional and their respective fears about each other's rising powers. The US-Japan security alliance should be continued with the objective of developing Japan into a balanced power, although China must be reassured in words and deeds that the alliance is not directed against her. The United States should also actively engage China politically and militarily to encourage her to play a constructive and responsible role in regional affairs, including a commitment to non-coercive means of resolving issues. Multilateral security arrangements can be used to complement this strategy. A US military presence in East Asia is still required for deterrence and to demonstrate US commitment. However, the strategy will make clear upfront that the intention of US leadership is not to perpetuate its position as the "big brother", but rather to make partners out of China and Japan, to lead them politically and militarily to a position where all sides will be comfortable

and ready to trust and accept each other as a true and equal partner. When this condition comes about, the "partnership" component of the strategy will come to the forefront. This is a strategy that benefits all three parties while taking into account the prevailing realities.

CONCLUSION

The triangular dynamics between the United States, China and Japan remain in a state of flux. The end of the Cold War has allowed the surfacing of latent tensions and competitive pressures that were previously suppressed by a common Soviet threat. In particular, there are presently fears in China of a rearmed and resurgent Japan independent of the United States; this is reciprocated by concerns in Japan of China's growing economic and military strength and how she will exercise her rising power. While a US leadership role is necessary to allay these concerns and to integrate China and Japan into responsible and constructive regional players, rising nationalism in both China and Japan, and their desires to assume larger international roles, militate against a "pure leadership" role by the United States.

It is therefore the conclusion of this paper that the United States should pursue a "Leadership to Partnership" strategy to both exercise decisive leadership at this critical juncture, and make this acceptable to China and Japan by declaring upfront that the intention of US leadership is to guide them to become full and equal partners of the United States. The prospect of indefinite and permanent leadership, even benign leadership, is unpalatable to both China and Japan. Only a "Leadership to Partnership" strategy combining US leadership with a clear commitment to a future equal partnership will ensure continued peace and stability in the US-China-Japan strategic triangle and East Asia at large.

ENDNOTES

1 There is no conclusive definition of the boundaries of "East Asia", although it is generally seen to comprise the countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia and Russia), and Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, and Indonesia).

2 Center for Naval Analyses, Regional Issues Team, Japan 2010: Prospective Profiles, CNA Research Memorandum 95-208 (Alexandria, VA: 1996), 23.

3 Thomas L. Wilborn, International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United-States Strategic Triangle, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 1-2; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War, " in East Asian Security ed. Michael E. Brown and other(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 48-49.

4 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalisation of the US-Japan Alliance," Asian Survey, April 1997, 402.

5 Wilborn, 7-8.

6 The phrase is borrowed from Arthur Waldron, "Agenda 2000: Eight Steps Toward a New China Policy," Orbis, Winter 1997, 78.

7 Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The U.S. Role (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 26-29.

8 Under the Yoshida doctrine, formulated by the former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japan's general international strategy through the 1950s and 1960s was to rely primarily on the United States for security, avoid international disputes, and concentrate on economic recovery and development. Although modifications to the Yoshida doctrine were made periodically in the decades since its inception, Japan has, until recently, still essentially stuck to this doctrine of using "cheque-book diplomacy" to answer to its international responsibilities while relying on the United States for security and foreign policy directions. See David Arase, "A Militarised Japan?," in Desmond Ball, ed., The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 84-87.

9 Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik", Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996, 48.

10 Samuel S. Kim, "A 'Rising China': Determining Great Power Status," *Current*, November 1997, 24.

11 Ibid, 25.

12 Garrett and Glasser, 386.

13 For example, Tsutomu Hata, a former Japanese Prime Minister, and Ichiro Ozawa, a former secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party and a co-founder of the Japan Renewal Party, advocate "normal nation" status and expanded military roles for Japan. See Arase, 97.

14 See, for example, Ball, 5, and Arase, 101.

15 As a recent Yomiuri Shimbun poll shows, even a majority (60%) of the Japanese public, long thought to be averse to Japan acquiring a larger international role, now favours some form of constitutional revision to facilitate an enlarged international contribution. See "Kenpo Kaisei 60% Ga Sansei," (Constitutional revision 60% approval), Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 March 1997, quoted in David L. Asher, "Fresh Perspectives on East Asia's Future: A US-Japan Alliance for the Next Century," *Orbis*, Summer 1997, 371.

16 Japan was China's largest trading partner in 1995, while China was Japan's 5th largest export market in 1994. See Robert S. Ross, *Managing a Changing Relationship : China's Japan Policy in the 1990s* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 8.

17 Both Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng have visited Tokyo, while several Japanese Prime Ministers have gone to Beijing, including former Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1997. Even Japan's Emperor Akihito has visited China in 1992.

18 Christensen, 41.

19 Hence China has been extremely sensitive over, and critical of, hikes in Japanese military spending, Japan's overtures towards Taiwan, its bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the deployment of Japanese Self-Defence Forces overseas for peacekeeping missions.

20 Joseph Nye, "East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1995, 93.

21 See, for example, Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "East Asian Security : The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1995, 106 and 110.

22 Major-General Henry C. Stackpole III (USMC), quoted in Edward Olsen, "Target Japan as America's Economic Foe," *Orbis* , Fall 1992, 493.

23 Editorial, "Remember the Big Picture," *The Singapore Straits Times*, 7 November 1995, 28.

24 All three of Japan's wars in the past century (1894-95, 1904-05, 1931-45) originated in disputes related to China. When Japan had an independent military policy, that policy was driven by China. Without the US-Japan alliance and the US nuclear umbrella, Japan might conceivably acquire an independent nuclear capability as a deterrence against China; as former Japanese Prime Minister Hata stated in June 1994, Japan already has the ability to produce nuclear weapons. See Arase, 98.

25 Donald P. Gregg, " The Case for Continued US Engagement," *Orbis*, Summer 1997, 382. The basing of US forces in Japan also allows the United States to respond more quickly to contingencies and crises throughout and beyond.

26 There are two main schools of thought with respect to dealing with China. The liberalist approach believes that as China develops and grows more interdependent economically with the world, it would become more pluralistic politically and more responsible in its foreign dealings. The realist approach views China as only biding its time and conforming to international rules as it gathers economic strength; once economic modernisation had been achieved, China would not hesitate to flex its muscles and become a regional or even global hegemony.

27 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 218-220. In fact, China, rightly or wrongly, sees the new guidelines laid out in September 1997 for the US-

Japan security alliance, which envisages an expanded military role for Japan and a geographical area of operations that tacitly includes the Taiwan Straits, as a manifestation of such a strategy, although Washington and Tokyo insist that the defence framework is not directed against China.

28 The Economist, 25-31 October 1997, 15.

29 Robert S. Ross, "Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong," The National Interest, Fall 1997, 43.

30 Joseph Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific," Survival, Winter 1997-98, 70.

31 Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's speech at the "Create 21" Asahi Symposium, Osaka on 19 November 1996, quoted in Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific", 73.

32 David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses", International Security, Autumn 1996, 187.

33 Owen Harris, "How Not to Handle China," National Review, 5 May 1997, 35.

34 U.S. President Bill Clinton's November 1996 statement in Canberra, enroute to the APEC leaders' meeting, quoted in A.D. McLennan, "Balance, Not Containment", The National Interest, Fall 1997, 60.

35 Olsen, 498.

36 But perhaps the final point against this strategy comes from a so-called "China-basher" himself, Bernstein, who now criticises those who "see China, incorrectly in our view, as a new incarnation of the old Soviet expansionist menace that must be contained at all cost. But China does not entertain any ambition to dominate the world; nor does it have the resources to entertain such an ambition." See Richard Bernstein, "China Basher Bashes Bashing," New York Times, 29 June 1997, E16.

37 Christensen, 38.

37(a) McLennan, 58

38 Michael Vatikiotis, "All ARF and No Bite," Far East Economic Review, 2 May 1996, 20.

39 Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," 93.

40 The "near", "medium" and "long term" as used here are not driven by absolute time periods but by events. Hence in this case, the near and medium term would be when fears still remain prevalent in East Asia of an independent Japan and a strong China, while the long term would come about when Japan and China have proven themselves to be responsible and constructive regional players and are accepted as such by each other and East Asia at large.

41 Christensen, 41.

42 Wilborn, 11.

43 The former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, the formulator of the Yoshida doctrine, quoted in Arase, 84.

44 Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Rethinking the Constitution : Make it a Japanese Document," Japan Quarterly, July-September 1997, 8.

45 Wilborn, 10.

46 Brad Roberts, Weapon Proliferation And World Order, (Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1993), 358.

47 An example of a "pure leadership" strategy is advocated by Nye, "East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement," 94-102. Another type of leadership strategy is the "Leadership for Enlargement" strategy.

Anthony Lake, for example, argued that "our [US] leadership be steadied around our central purpose," which is the "enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." See Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 39, 27 September 1993, 659-660. The problem, of course, is that such a strategy is totally unacceptable to China, which regards it as an affront to its national sovereignty and tantamount to a Soviet-style expansionism, perhaps minus the use of force. Furthermore, the implicit assumption underlying such a strategy, that market democracies are inherently more peaceful and that wars/conflicts would be less likely in a world comprising only these democracies, is tenuous. Kenneth Waltz, for example, argues that this assumption "would be justified only if the minimum interest of states in preserving themselves became the maximum interest of all of them - and each could rely fully upon the steadfast adherence to this definition by all of the others. Stating the condition makes apparent the utopian quality of liberal...expectations." See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 227.

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Strategic Surprise

by CPT Christopher Lee Wai Keong

INTRODUCTION

Surprise is often the one element that strategists depend on to maximize the effects of operations. It is often seen as the one factor that could diminish risks and to enhance chances of an operation's success. Surprise assumes an even greater role when planning for an operation in which the odds are very much against the aggressor, as in the case of an inferior force striking a superior one.

This essay examines the phenomena of strategic surprise, looking at the barriers to accurate threat perception and effective response, and finally suggesting strategies to overcome them.

What is Strategic Surprise

Strategic surprise is the sudden realization that one has been operating on the basis of an erroneous threat perception. It occurs through failure to predict, much less anticipate, an acute and immediate foreign threat to the "vital" national interests. Note that by definition, strategic surprise is not the mere over- or under-estimation of an opponent's capabilities; it occurs through the failure to anticipate immediate (as distinguished from potential) threats posed by hostile as well as peaceful actions.

Strategic surprise may take place at either of two stages : (a) acquisition, transmission, evaluation, and dissemination of the strategic warnings by the intelligence community, and (b) perception (recognition) of the strategic threat by the national policy makers. Whereas failures at either or both of these stages (that result in erroneous threat perception) produce surprise when the threat materializes, accurate threat perception by policy makers rules out, by definition, the possibility of strategic surprise.

Warning, Threat Perception and Response

Conventional wisdom has it that warning and response are two closely related phenomena. However, warning and response are not linked to each other either directly or inextricably. For one thing, warning is only one determinant of threat perception and likewise, response is only one type of action. Another thing is that relationship between warning and threat perception, as well as between threat perception and action (response), is a rather complex one, in the sense that warning is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce a response.

In view of the complexity of the relationship between warning and response, both phenomena will be viewed initially as part of analytically discrete processes, one of threat perception, the other of action consideration and implementation. Once the unique features of each phenomenon have been studied, we will then look at the dynamic-interactive dimension of their relationship.

On Warning and Threat Perception

One is tempted to suggest that the key factor shaping policymakers' perception of threat is the quality of warning they receive. This suggestion is not without merit as intelligence, which is a subset of warning, clearly carries some weight with policymakers. However, evidence suggests that warning is not the only important factor shaping policymakers' threat perception as warning, on occasion, fails to produce an alarming threat perception, while alarming threat perception may emerge when warning is absent.

The initial reaction of policy makers to warning largely depends on three factors: (a) features of the warning itself; (b) possession of other pertinent information of the issue at hand; and (c) political and personality traits of the policymakers.

Features of the Warning

The transparency of the national interest and the high stakes involved, for both the policy makers and their country, make it highly improbable that any information designated by the intelligence as a warning will not get to the attention of top leadership. Their reaction to the warning will hence be determined by its quality and form.

The quality of a warning varies greatly from one case to another, and it is quite evident that a warning which is explicit, categorical, and the like is more likely to carry the day with policymakers than one which is inferior in one or more of those aspects. However, even warnings that rank fairly low on most or all of those dimensions cannot be rejected without leaving behind some residual awareness. Thus, at the minimum, warnings will raise the awareness of policymakers to the possibility that certain ominous developments will take place. Klaus Knorr correctly points out that "once the possibility of threat is recognized, whatever the probability attached to it, true surprise is excluded".

Other Relevant Information

A warning issued by intelligence is usually not the only type of information policymakers possess when they come to assess the situation and determine whether it indeed poses a major threat. The political leadership usually possesses certain additional sources of information which are partially or wholly unavailable and inaccessible to those in the intelligence agencies issuing the warning. They include, among other things, assessments by experts other than those in the intelligence community, confidential diplomatic communications with foreign governments, and, on occasion, the leadership of the principal antagonist posing the threat about which intelligence may have been warning about.

When President Sadat of Egypt publicly announced in early November 1977 his willingness to travel to Jerusalem, suspicion of his ulterior motives ran high among most of the Israeli leadership, especially the Israeli intelligence. They feared that the visit would deceive the Israelis and distract their attention from Egyptian war preparations. The Israeli government, however, dismissed the various warnings. Available evidence suggests that Begin and his foreign minister Dayan were able to dismiss the warnings because they were quite familiar with Sadat's public moves.

But policymakers ought to question the validity not only of any intelligence warning included, but also of information they obtain from other sources. Otherwise, they might easily succumb to the temptation to use other sources to dismiss the welcome warning. The performance of the British prime minister during the Falkland crisis seems to be a case in point.

The evidence available strongly suggests that the British intelligence explicitly warned its government in July 1981, well ahead of the Argentine invasion in April 1982, of the distinct possibility of such an action. While Prime Minister Thatcher was clearly intrigued by the warning and other threat indicators reaching her, that was not the case with her foreign minister, Lord Carrington. He consistently downplayed the Argentine threat so much so that the prime minister effectively decided to accept the judgment of her experienced and trusted foreign minister on the matter. As a result, the warning and other threat indicators were largely discounted until it was too late to effectively launch an effective military response to the impending Argentine action.

Political and Personality Traits of the Policy maker

The attitude of the policymakers toward incoming warnings is not entirely information-driven. To an important degree, it is also determined by the personality of the policymakers themselves, which combines

features of both "ordinary" human beings and "political animals". Being ordinary human beings, policymakers manifest common biases such as perceptions, expectations, consistency seeking, etc., in information processing. Being political animals, they may well introduce additional biases such as political outlook, policy commitments, etc., into their processing of information.

However, contrary to the prevailing view, personality traits of policymakers do not necessarily predispose them to dismiss or downgrade a warning and other threat indicators. There is a strong case to be made to the effect that the personality variables are as likely to improve their receptivity to a warning as they are to retard it.

There is ample evidence to support the proposition that policymakers' personalities do, at least in some cases, sensitize them to threat indicators. Steve Chan points out that those who had some anticipation of surprise events like Pearl Harbour, Korea and Cuba, "such as Ambassador Grew, Ambassador Muccio, and Senator Keating, did not appear to be more open-minded or less committed to their enemy's intention than their less clairvoyant colleagues" (1979:174).

When Winston Churchill first predicted a German attack on the Soviet Union as early as June 1940, more than a year before the actual event, it amounted to a little more than uncanny political speculation. In fact, British intelligence was strongly inclined to believe that Germany would not attack the Soviet Union before it invaded Britain. However, Churchill held on to his views and British intelligence finally came to share them, but only two to three weeks before the attack actually took place.

Threat Perception and Response

Suppose that an intended surprise target does manage to obtain an ideal warning, and that this warning translates into an alarming threat perception. Does this guarantee that an appropriate response will follow?

After having perceived that there is indeed a threat, policymakers still have to decide whether, how, and when to respond to this threat. The existence of this intervening stage between threat perception and response means that threat perception will not result in any observable action in the following three cases : (1) no response is believed to be feasible; (2) a decision is made not to respond (or no decision is made to respond); and (3) a decision to respond is made but not carried out. It is also possible to conceive of a fourth scenario in which some action is initiated but is either not intended to counter the threat as such, or proves ineffective in doing so. These then, seem to be four logically exhaustive and mutually exclusive dichotomous scenarios conforming to a single observable outcome - unpreparedness.

According to the first scenario, a response is regarded as not feasible. This state of affairs may be the result of either unavailability of resources to mount a response before a threat materializes or, and less nicely, a lack of authority to initiate any kind of response. Both of these are a function of the timing of the threat recognition. It might be reached at such a late or otherwise inopportune point in time that the initiation of a response is virtually impossible. Thus for example, General MacArthur had argued that even if the United States had managed a 72-hour advance warning of the North Korean intention to invade the South it would have made very little difference for getting any sizable body of U.S. troops from Japan to Korea was a matter of three weeks.

The second scenario involves a situation in which while response options are available, a decision is made not to respond. A decision not to respond can be guided by one or more of three principle considerations; response that might be deemed to be impractical, undesirable, or unnecessary. Moral and political considerations seem particularly important in this context. The decision of the Israeli cabinet on 6 October 1973 not to launch a preemptive air strike against Egypt and Syria is a case in point.

On the morning of 6 October 1973, the Israeli policymakers were virtually certain that the Arabs would launch a massive attack against Israel later that day. They were also fully aware of the fact that the military reserves were not as yet mobilized (though not perfectly cognizant of the implications of the fact), and highly confident of the capacity of the Israeli Air Force to launch a massive preemptive strike against both

Syria and Egypt before the attack began. And yet, they decided not to go ahead with the preemptive strike. The evidence strongly suggests that they did so on the logic that the political price Israel would have to pay for the preemptive strike would be intolerable.

Another case where response could be deemed undesirable touches upon a problem unique to warnings derived from intelligence. When threat perception originates in the form of a warning, and the warning is from a much coveted and highly sensitive intelligence source, there is strong incentive to refrain from any action that might expose the source. An example from World War II will illustrate this point.

According to several historical accounts, Winston Churchill possessed advance warning of Germany's intention to launch a massive bombing raid against the city of Coventry on the nights of 14 and 15 November 1940. Churchill then made the painful decision not to evacuate the city's inhabitants for fear of exposing his source of information - the German Air Force's Enigma (Ultra) - the Allies' most important and sensitive source of information on Germany.

A decision not to respond is also possible when policymakers are convinced that a response is not necessary to counter an impending threat. They may do so if they are under the impression that existing policies, standard operating procedures, state of readiness and the like will suffice to handle the threat. The example from the Yom Kippur War would serve to illustrate the point.

Until the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, it was widely believed that the regular army would be able to hold out against a massive Arab attack long enough to facilitate orderly mobilization of reserves, a process normally requiring 48-72 hours. Bearing this in mind and knowing that the regular army had been on maximum alert since the preceeding day, the top Israeli leaders were alarmed to learn on the morning of 6 October that a full-scale Arab attack was expected to take place later in the day. They reasoned that despite the lack of sufficient warning to mobilize the reserves, the military situation did not warrant the politically costly decision to launch a preemptive strike. As it turned out, the Israeli army did manage to hold out until the reserves were mobilized. But this was achieved only because the mobilization was quicker than anticipated, and at a very high cost, particularly in terms of human casualties. The high casualty figures subsequently led some of the policymakers to lament their earlier decision.

Warning and Response: Some Practical Considerations

We have looked at warning and threat perception, threat perception and response separately, and under ideal conditions. Let us now integrate the three aspects of strategic surprise and look into possible solutions for rectifying and/or offsetting these deficiencies.

It is widely believed that the quality of warning generally improves only as the time of the confrontation draws near, to the point that warning does not become either definite or complete, if it ever does, until shortly before the threat materializes. If this is indeed the case, then states must be able to carry out one or more of the following strategies : (1) initiate at least some response on the basis of partial and/or ambiguous warning; (2) mount a "decisive" response on the basis of a very short warning; or (3) tolerate some disaster - withstand the initial impact of a surprise move - and still mount a decisive response.

Each of these strategies will be examined separately, and the possibility of combining them will also be discussed. The evaluation of the strategies will be made on the basis of their impact on the likelihood of military confrontation, the cost of military confrontation if it occurs, and the cost in peacetime.

Strategy 1

Initiating response on the basis of partial or uncertain warnings has two rather obvious but nonetheless important advantages. It diminishes the likelihood of being caught by surprise, and does not require a considerable investment in peacetime readiness. Both advantages, however, come at a very significant cost; the increase in likelihood of false alarms.

There are three risks of having too many false alarms. Firstly, they may result in a significant waste of resources when they provoke unnecessary action. Secondly, they may erode future receptivity to future warning through what is known as the "cry wolf syndrome". But the worst risk is that they will significantly increase the likelihood of a military response. They can do so in two principle ways. First, false warnings can create a strong incentive to preempt. Second, even if the target opts for a reaction to the false warning that is defensive in nature, it is still possible that this response is misinterpreted as offensive, and could lead the opponent into a hostile action that he did not have in mind originally.

But while the strategy of acting on the basis of uncertain warnings can have undesirable consequences and be highly destabilizing, just like the "launch on warning" strategy in the nuclear context, this need not necessarily be the case. This is so because there are several types of limited responses that can diminish vulnerability to strategic threats without making confrontation significantly more likely, and perhaps even making it less likely. The six possible uses of inconclusive warnings are:

1. To step up information search.
2. To alert forces in order to reduce their vulnerability and improve their readiness.
3. To reinforce deterrence by signalling a more credible commitment.
4. To take measures that will reduce one's political/diplomatic costs from the emergent crisis in the domestic or international arena.
5. To conduct a decision rehearsal, i.e., rehearse the decision problem one would be confronted with if the warning of crises proved to be justified.
6. To review one's commitment to a weak ally who would become the target should the crisis emerge.

Strategy 2

The second strategy seeks to compensate for belated warnings by developing a capability to mount, on very short notice, "decisive" preventive and/or preemptive responses. This could be done, for example, by making arrangements for the rapid mobilization of reserves (e.g. the militia system of Israel and Switzerland), propositioning arms, munitions, and supplies in strategic locations, and developing a massive air-lift capability (e.g. POMCUS - pre-positioned American war material in Western Europe, the American Rapid Deployment Force), etc.

The greatest attraction of this strategy is that it makes it possible and practical to exercise flexibility in response to a threat by delaying irrevocable or fully provocative action until warnings of higher reliability and certainty become available. By making it possible to delay the determination of whether the threat is real or imagined until much closer to the event, this strategy reduces the probability of both surprise and false alarms.

It is in its actual implementation that Strategy 2 might acquire some destabilizing elements as well. Some types of advanced preparations to minimize response time are prone to mishaps which in turn might trigger a chain reaction. Other preparations enhance not only defensive but also offensive capability, thereby creating for both sides an incentive to preempt at the first sign of trouble (e.g. civil defence in the nuclear age). By far the most serious drawback of this strategy is its cost in peacetime. Maintaining a viable response capability of the kind required by this strategy necessitates a massive initial investment as well as sustained expenditure for maintenance, modernization, training, etc.

Strategy 3

As defined earlier, the essence of Strategy 3 is to develop the capacity to "tolerate" the opponent's initiation of hostilities and still be able to mount a decisive response. But as Israel found out on 6 October 1973, even Strategies 1 and 2 combined can be insufficient for preventing a costly and painful setback from taking place. When for one reason or another a country fails to implement the two other strategies, it is on the exigence of Strategy 3 that survival, independence, sovereignty, or welfare may ultimately depend. The capacity to withstand a painful initial setback and still respond decisively plays an even more important role in enhancing deterrence and preventing accidental and deliberate war than any of the other strategies. After all, it completely removes the burden of warning from intelligence and enables the target to defer his response until the threat actually materializes. The importance of this strategy is particularly evident in the nuclear era when a "second strike" capability obviates the need for a much more destabilizing Type 1 Strategy. The strategy nonetheless entails significant costs in peacetime, to ensure survivability of the capacity to respond after an initial setback, and even more considerable ones in the event that confrontation does occur.

All three principal strategies to compensate for uncertainty of warnings have considerable merit, but all have serious drawbacks. Furthermore none of the strategies are adequate by themselves. The challenge is to find the right mix of several or all of these strategies.

It is to be made clear that these strategies do not minimise the uncertainty of warnings, and they do not in any way help to produce an accurate threat perception. As such, they leave much to be desired. Because it is costly and risky to compensate for uncertainty, a strong incentive exists to reduce it, however marginally. Similarly, because the accuracy and timing of a threat perception can significantly affect the success of any response initiated to counter it, there is premium for improving both. We now look at two complementary approaches for redressing these problems.

The "Intelligence" Solution

The first approach for enhancing the capacity to respond effectively, and reducing the reliance on strategies that are inherently costly and risky, is one that seeks to minimize uncertainty by making efforts to produce satisfactory warnings sooner. Efforts along these lines usually proceed in several complementary directions. One would be the upgrading of intelligence collection, especially of certain types of collections that are most likely to produce early warning, namely Sigint and Humint. Intensification of collection is likely to result in a better intelligence product, although it has some limitations as discussed above and the undesirable side effects of information overload. Some of the side effects can be offset by an increase in manpower for screening the information, automating the process and by collecting of information in a more selective and focused manner.

The other effort would be in the area of improvement in the evaluation of information. It is important that intelligence agencies improve their ability - at the level of both the individual analyst and the organization as a whole- to identify and warn of impending strategic threats. There are currently two directions in doing so. One is the incorporation into the evaluation process of quantitative methods based on recent developments in the fields of social science and computer technology. The other is the development and adoption of analytical techniques and organizational arrangements designed to overcome and/or compensate for common pathologies in information processing and threat assessment. Here, the idea is to raise analysts' awareness of the problems inherent in the evaluation process, and to introduce into the process review procedures, dissent channels, periodic reappraisal and post-mortem analyses etc. Modern computer technology and other advances in secure real-time communications are also being used to improve the final stage of the intelligence report - dissemination - by improving the speed, scope and reliability of information transmission.

The "Consumption" Problem

The second complementary approach to the response problem is one that aims at a smoother, faster, and more reliable translation of intelligence warning as well as other information and advice, into threat perception. The critical problem to overcome in this area is policymakers' difficulties in absorbing and reacting to information pertaining to a strategic threat. Eliminating the problem is virtually impossible, since

its roots lie in the general weakness and limitations of individuals and small groups as processors of information and makers of choice. Nonetheless, the task of diminishing the problem in the area is by no means hopeless.

The identification and diagnosis of the pathologies and impediments inherent in threat perception and decision making has raised the consciousness of these problems among practitioners of defence and foreign policy. Some progress has been made in the development and implementation of formulas for improving threat perception and policy-making through modification of the advisory process (e.g., through the introduction of multiple advocacy, devils advocates, and dissent channels). Much more can be done in this area to ensure that the development and implementation of discriminatory (and therefore more effective) practices for dealing with strategic threats are carried out.

Conclusion

The only way to avert a disaster stemming from strategic surprise is an integrated approach to overcoming the barriers to warnings and accurate threat perception. It is only through the careful integration of the above mentioned strategies and suggested solutions that this goal can be achieved.

In closing, I would like to draw an analogy to a chain regarding the utility of remedies to warning and response problems. The strength of a chain is equivalent to the strength of its weakest link. When significant weaknesses exist in all or most of the links, improvements in only some of them, as drastic as they may be, will not result in any significant differences in the strength of the chain as a whole. Improvements are required across the board.

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War Termination

by CPT Leow Meng Fai

INTRODUCTION

Wars have always haunted mankind. It has killed millions, both combatants and non-combatants, and maimed countless more in the name of conflict resolution. Despite the immense efforts and research by many people on the inevitability of war and how they start or can be prevented, wars are still being waged. This century alone has seen two World Wars with countless smaller scale conflicts; the major one in this decade being the 1990 Persian Gulf War.

Along with efforts in realising how to prevent wars, the military aspects of winning wars have been emphasised. Throughout history, the rise and fall of countries and civilizations have depended on their fortunes on the battlefield. Many studies have therefore been carried out on the military strategy in war; how to prepare, manoeuvre, attack and win the war. Implicit in the understanding, and sometimes taken for granted, is the expectation of victory. Few leaders seriously consider a war ending not on the victorious side but on the losing end. Scant thought is given as to how and when to end the war. Compared to the field of preventing wars and military strategy, war termination, or how and when wars end, is therefore a comparatively less explored field of study.¹ The increasingly destructive nature of modern warfare brought about by advances in technology has made it even more imperative that war as an enigma be better understood in its entirety to hopefully limit its applications.

The rational-choice approach² assumes that war termination by a state can be evaluated in terms of a rational decision. A state will prudently evaluate the various consequences of the alternatives and will make the best decision to maximise her interests in the pursuit of her national goals. During World War II, Germany's and Japan's intransigent refusals as early as 1944 to accept the turning of the tide highlights the limitations of the rational-choice approach in war termination. Many other factors like international and internal politics, the perspectives and positions of the military, and even individual personalities of the leaders, hold sway.

This essay will highlight the political context of war termination. It will present how the characteristics of the military establishment and its perspectives influence the process of war termination. Even though war termination is fundamentally a political decision, the military also has important roles to play in the war termination process. War termination will be discussed using the 1990 Gulf War as a case study to show that war termination is primarily a political decision in which the military applies military means to help attain political ends.

The Political Context of War Termination

Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" underlines the fundamental political nature of waging wars. He viewed wars as instruments of policy to achieve political goals. As such, before waging wars, clear pre-defined political goals should be set up and translated into war aims. It is important that war termination must be carefully considered as part of the war aims. Even if final victory over the defeated party is assumed to be the final outcome, this victory must be considered militarily attainable right from the onset of hostilities.

One finds that not all wars have started with well defined aims. This is especially true of preventive or pre-emptive wars. Japan at the start of World War II was convinced of the inevitability of war with America as the American Pacific Fleet and the American Army at Philippines posed the main obstacles to her vision of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The US military buildup and oil embargo on Japan thus spurred the Japanese to declare war on America sooner than later. She opened hostilities by raiding Pearl Harbor even though she had no concrete vision of how the war with America would be won. She acknowledged that America's resources and industrial base made it unlikely that America could be defeated outright. Instead

she hoped "to be able to influence the trend of affairs and bring the war to an end".³ Her war aims were ill-defined as they only focused on removing the immediate obstacles to her goal of conquering resource-rich East Asia. The Japanese leaders had not forgotten that the war they wanted to embark on must have an ending, but realised they had no answer to it.

Assuming political leaders initiate wars with well-defined aims, the process of terminating a war at the end of the day is primarily a political decision, ie made by the political leadership based on political considerations, as wars are started to achieve political objectives. Only in cases of outright conquest, which is rare in this century, is war termination a military act. It is a political decision, as translating military conditions on the battlefield into war termination requires political agreement within the political leadership and also between the opposing sides. The political leadership must carefully weigh the present results obtained against the pre-war political objectives before deciding whether to escalate or de-escalate the fighting, modify the existing war aims or begin the end-game process of negotiations with a view to ending the conflict.

Vietnam War

The Vietnam war is considered to be a low point in the history of the US military. The US military was pulled out from the theatre of war hastily in line with the revised US policy of disengagement, leaving South Vietnam to finally fall to communist North Vietnam in 1975. The US military had deployed more than half a million people at the height of the war. Yarmolinsky⁴ claims that the failure of the American war effort was because of limited commitment by the political leadership due to the strong anti-war movement. In contrast, the military was totally committed to the objectives, especially so when it had already suffered casualties in pursuit of the objectives.

The US military was unable to win the war outright as it was never given a free hand to wage the war due to the political costs of the war. It thus fell upon the political leadership to plan for a minimally satisfactory war ending, using the limited military assets and abiding by a time frame that were acceptable to the public. The decision to end the war lay in the political leadership but President Lyndon Johnson was unwilling to admit that the war could not be won nor courageous enough to do so. Thus the war dragged on inconclusively for several years without any victory in sight.

War Termination as Conflict Resolution

War termination does not just revolve around the cessation of hostilities only. It should be treated in a longer context of time to include the idea of conflict resolution. This broader approach will measure the ultimate success of war termination as opposed to merely the success of the ceasefire only. Ending a war and addressing the background to the war will end the war and not just merely suspend hostilities.

For example, the end of World War I did not herald a lasting peace for Europe. The punitive economic measures enforced onto Germany as part of the Versailles Treaty in no way created a stable peace. It imposed hardship and stirred resentment among the German population. This enabled the rise of an autocratic dictator, Adolf Hitler, to unleash the dogs of war onto Europe again barely a generation later.

Military Perspectives

If war termination is fundamentally a political decision, how do the characteristics of the military and its perspectives influence this process?

Professor Samuel Huntington's vision of a professional military establishment which serves the will of political masters is presently accepted in most democracies to be the ideal system. The handful of military regimes like Libya and Myanmar are isolated and treated as pariahs by most nations in the world. Since a professional military establishment exists to serve political goals, it is important that the political leadership gives due thought to the political objectives of a war and consequently its termination. While the decision to

terminate a war is a political one, the military establishment is charged with the means of ending the war and it is often the case that its position and perspectives are influenced by the very characteristics that are a hallmark of the military profession. These perspectives have a profound impact on the political decision of war termination.

Take for example, General MacArthur's no compromise statement that "in war there is no substitute for victory".⁵ This statement perhaps personifies the ultimate goal of every military operation. Crucial to the recognition of victory is the symbiotic relationship with defeat; there must be a defeated enemy for the victor to dominate over⁶ and this is best personified by accepting an unconditional surrender of the enemy. As professional soldiers, we are sub-consciously imbued by this maxim that in war, there is no substitute for victory. Military personnel possess a strong desire to ensure that assigned tasks are completed successfully and their confidence in their own solutions makes it harder for them to accept a war ending short of victory. From a tradition of past conflicts, the notion of victory has widely pervaded into the military as the only form of ending a war with honour. The Americans of World War II returned to a gratified home population as heroes while the defeated German forces, many who had fought longer and suffered greater deprivation, trudged home in ignominy. Thirty years later, the tables were turned when there was no welcoming reception for the Vietnam War veterans returning to the US.

This notion of victory and an unconditional surrender of the adversary as the only type of peace with honour that can be achieved is incorrect. Honour is a recognition that pertains to the conduct and ending of wars. It is a virtue that should be accorded based on the justness of the cause and the means used to achieve the aims. Aristotle felt that one should go to war in order to have peace and not the other way around. If one rightly believes in the logic of this statement, then war termination must be viewed in the context of the greater peace that follows for both adversaries. And victory, with an unconditional surrender of the adversary, is not the only form of peace with honour for the military to aspire to.

A wrong obsession with victory often perverts the political process of war termination as the military prolongs the battle to hand the adversary a greater defeat or to forestall the final surrender. Outright defeat of an adversary is going to be a rarer occurrence. This is because of the increasing costs of any conflict in terms of destruction and human lives. A strategy of annihilation or total destruction of the enemy will often blind us to other means of achieving the pre-war objectives. The growing trend will be for the adversaries to negotiate an agreement that satisfies the pre-war political aims or most of them in an attempt to lessen the costs of the war.

Besides its natural desire to be victorious, the military, as part of its culture of obedience to a legitimate authority, tends to obey orders unflinchingly in a gung-ho "can do" attitude. The military is reluctant to make excuses when the operation fails and this creates a natural bias to presume that the operation will not fail. If it indeed fails, then it is not necessarily a wrong solution to start with but was instead wrongly applied. When coupled with the military's predisposition to the use of military options, it leads to a tendency for the military to offer more of the same military solution if it initially fails. This bias has consequences for the ending of wars as smaller conflicts can escalate into larger ones if the tendency is left unchecked.

Roles of the Military

While war termination is a political decision, the role of the military in the process of war termination is less clear. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, General Moltke⁷ urged the German Crown Prince, even after the fall of Paris, to allow the Prussian troops to fight and hand the French a complete defeat so that they could dictate whatever peace terms they wished. To the Crown Prince's question on the long term political implications of such an approach Moltke was quoted as saying "I am concerned only with military matters".⁸

To relinquish the military of any role in war termination merely because war termination is a political decision is short-sighted. Reed instead argues that military strategy concerns itself with applying military means to achieve political ends, and these political ends go beyond mere destruction of enemy forces.⁹ The military can assist political decision-makers in war termination by relating military conditions to strategic

aims, for example in planning for the level of destruction of an adversary's forces if the aim was to neutralise the military threat.

In the war termination process, the military can also support the end game and negotiation process through infliction of losses on the adversary so that his cost-vs-benefit calculations will create an incentive for him to cease hostilities. The military can also serve to increase the leverage available to political decision-makers in the war termination phase. For example, in the case of a totally defeated party like Japan in World War 2, the Japanese military still retained some leverage in the surrender negotiations. The possibility that it might not submit cooperatively to the Allied occupying powers induced the Allies to modify the original terms of unconditional surrender to accept the retention of the Japanese Emperor.¹⁰

Another role that the military can play is not to lose sight of the nation's interest in ending the war. According to Ikle, it can happen that "military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated manoeuvres, remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, and not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans serve the nation's interests".¹¹

The Gulf War

In the 1990 Gulf War, the Coalition forces led by the United States scored a stunning victory over a much vaunted Iraqi military force of 38 divisions. A total of 60,000 Iraqi POWs were captured as compared to 41 Coalition POWs. The ground war was ended after only 100 hours of fighting.

The war aims of the Gulf War were based on the UN resolutions to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and to attack the Iraqis as necessary to achieve this aim. Three days into the ground campaign, much of the Iraqi forces were in ruins and the highway from Kuwait to southern Iraq was a scene of carnage. The Iraqi forces were forced into a bottleneck in southern Iraq as their other retreat lines over the Euphrates river had been demolished.

The American President, George Bush, was perturbed by the scenes of carnage on the highway as the Coalition forces handed the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Southern Iraq a crushing defeat. The Coalition commander, General Schwarzkopf, on Day 3 of the ground campaign chose to support an early end to the war by declaring that the campaign objectives would have been achieved after four days. He did not choose to capture Baghdad even though no Iraqi opposition stood in his way as this was never part of the UN resolution. He recognised that the war was political in nature and once the political aim of liberating Kuwait was achieved, military aims should not take over by defeating Iraq without modifying the original political aims. This was rightly so as it would have prolonged the war unnecessarily in a quest to defeat the Iraqis outright. Furthermore he understood that the diplomatic fragility of the Coalition would be broken as the Coalition partners were only prepared to liberate Kuwait.

While recognising that war termination was a political decision, General Schwarzkopf employed military means to help the war termination process. His envelopment campaign strategy effectively destroyed the centre of gravity of the Iraqi army, the Republican Guard forces, and other less elite units. This effectively removed the threat posed by the Iraqi military in the region after the war which was one of the strategic aims. Furthermore his troops were well positioned to threaten Baghdad, thus creating an additional incentive for Iraq to negotiate an end to the war through influencing her cost-vs-benefit equations.

Conclusion

Wars have a political agenda and to effectively bring a conflict to termination, the political nature of the conflict must be addressed. The military as a professional establishment is charged with the means to achieve these political objectives. Decisive military advantage alone however does not necessarily confer an end to the war. The decision to terminate the war is primarily a political decision due to the underlying nature of war as an instrument of policy. The military however has important roles to play in the war termination process in addition to the direct military objective of destroying the adversary's forces. It can

also help the war termination process by recognising the very characteristics of the military profession which may colour its perspectives on war termination.

At the end of the day, we must recognise that war termination is only a bridge between the war phase and the post-hostilities phase. War termination must therefore be viewed in the longer context of conflict resolution. In some cases, winning the war is also not necessarily followed by winning the peace.¹² It is important that the roles of the military are understood and its means effectively employed so that the political objectives of the war can be successfully met.

ENDNOTES

1 In the words of James Reed, war termination is a neglected, but not ignored, field.

2 See Michael Handel, War Termination-A Critical Survey, pg 28-43.

3 Nobuta Ike, Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), pg 139-40 & 153.

4 Yarmolinsky, Adam, "Professional military perspectives on war termination", in On the Ending of Wars.

5 General Douglas MacArthur's statement was expressed in an address to a joint meeting of Congress, Apr 19, 1951, after his dismissal as commander of the United Nations forces in the Korean war.

6 The "ideal" defeat is unconditional surrender. For this the victor dominates the defeated who is clearly submissive to the victor's will. In a sense the victor requires the defeated as the victory is meaningless if the defeated does not serve the victor. See Carroll, Bernise A, "Victory and Defeat: The mystique of dominance" in On the Endings of Wars.

7 Count Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Prussian General Staff. Described by David Chandler as "the ablest military mind since Napoleon", Atlas of Military Strategy, (New York: The Free Press, 1980), pg 198.

8 James Reed, Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning, pg 41 to 52.

9 Ibid, pg 43.

10 The Allied publics and American domestic public applied pressure to make Japan's defeat an unconditional surrender and to exact retribution from the Emperor. However the US Army wished to retain the emperor as a means of securing Japanese compliance with the surrender and of administering the occupation. In the end, the US position in the Japanese surrender negotiations implied that the emperor would continue to play a role for the moment during the post-hostilities phase, but made no explicit commitment for the future. Leon V Sigal, Fighting to a Finish, pg 251.

11 Colin Powell, My American Journey,pg 519.

12 In the Vietnam war, the communists forces may have emerged victorious over South Vietnam, but they were also "forced" to withdraw from the Cambodian conflict later. Presently the Vietnamese economy is in tatters and heavily dependant on foreign aid, including US foreign aid.

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12 Soucy, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R II. "War Termination and Joint Planning" in Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 8, Summer 95, pg 95-101.

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World Conquest : The Heartland Theory of Halford J. Mackinder

by MR Ronald Hee

Born in 1861, the eminent lecturer and British MP, Halford J. Mackinder, was a geographer by training. In 1904, he wrote an article that changed how politicians and military men viewed the world. It was a perception that influenced Hitler to send his panzers east against Soviet Russia. It was a perception that, only recently, with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, had seemed all too relevant, relevant enough to be part of the intellectual underpinnings for superpower foreign policy. The theory that had so influenced nearly three generations of strategists was called simply, the Heartland Theory.

In a nutshell, Mackinder saw history as a struggle between land-based and sea-based powers. He saw that the world had become a "closed" system, with no new lands left for the Europeans powers to discover, to conquer, and to fight over without affecting events elsewhere. Sea and land-based powers would then struggle for dominance of the world, and the victor would be in a position to set up a world empire.

The determining factor in this struggle was geography; "Man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls".¹ The geographical features of the globe, in large measure, is seen as defining the nature of this world struggle, defining the opposing sides, and defining the areas of conflict. Defeat and victory would hinge on the "pivot-state"; the state in control of the "heartland" of the "world-island".

The "world-island" is the landmass of Euro-Asia-Africa. The control of this landmass by any one state would enable it to organise overwhelming human and material resources, to the detriment of the rest of the world. As the "heartland" of this landmass was inaccessible to attacks from sea-based powers, this organisation could take place largely unimpeded.

Once this organisation was underway, victory would be all but inevitable, even if all the sea--based powers were to unite against this "pivot-state". In time, this "pivot-state" would reach open waters, and, with the resources of the "world island" behind it, it would be unstoppable; "the oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight".²

A look at Map I perhaps illustrates matters more clearly. 'What Mackinder called in 1904 the "pivot area", he subsequently called the "heartland" by 1919. The "heart" of Mackinder's theory is contained in a famous and succinct dictum:

Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island'

Who rules the World-Island commands the World

In practical terms, this dictum points to a struggle for the control of Eastern Europe (including European Russia) by the land powers. The sea powers would then have to fight the victor to prevent control of the Euro-Asian-African landmass and ultimately the world. At the height of World War II, a good 40 years after this dictum was first coined, it was said that "there is no escape from the logic of this conclusion and it is the most powerful, practical argument for intelligent international organisation that could be presented".⁴

In retrospect, it might be argued that, during the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon had nearly succeeded in controlling this heartland, and the British were at times rather desperately raising coalition after coalition to thwart this control. Napoleon's Continental System aimed to unite Europe against England, closing off the continent from English trade. It can be argued farther, that Napoleon came to grief only after the breakdown

of the Continental System and his disastrous fight against the other great land power of Europe, Tzarist Russia.

With the defeat of Napoleon, the paramount sea power, Britain, continued its struggle, now against the successor "pivot-state", Russia. Throughout what Kipling called "The Great Game" of 19th century diplomacy, Britain sought to keep Russia bottled up, by preventing access through China and Japan in the east, India in the south, and Turkey in the south-west, with her allies in Europe.

Writing in 1904 while his own British Empire was still the paramount sea power, Mackinder sought to warn that the game was changing, that, as Marxists were once so fond of pontificating, the "correlation of forces" was shifting. This change was being brought about not so much by the heartland's vast wealth and size, but due to technical changes mobilising these resources:

It was an unprecedented thing in the year 1900 that Britain should maintain a quarter of a million men in her war with the Boers at a distance of six thousand miles over the ocean; but it was as remarkable a feat for Russia to place an army of more than a quarter of a million men against the Japanese in Manchuria in 1904 at a distance of four thousand miles by rail. (*italics mine*)⁵

What Mackinder foresaw was that the traditional advantage of mobility enjoyed by the sea power, was now being met in equal measure by mobility on land, brought about by the railroad and by the motor vehicle. The British way of war, as explained by Mackinder's contemporary, Alfred T. Mahan, was to land relatively small bodies of troops at points of their choosing, to effect a strategic result. Victory was assured by the control of the seas.

Certainly the British way of war had resulted in one of the world's greatest empires - at its height, covering one quarter of the world's landmass - built at relatively low cost by a small island nation. But the rules were changing. As Mackinder foresaw, by World War I, the equal mobility of the land-based powers would mean bloody stalemates, and a draining of resources from the main effort; the failures at Dardanelles and Gallipoli are bloody examples.

During that war, Germany and her allies were not in undisputed control of Eastern Europe, thanks again to Russia. But what if they were? The history of the world might well have been very much different. In 1902, Mackinder had warned, "In the presence of vast Powers, broad based on the resources of half continents, Britain could not again become mistress of the seas...."⁶

It is the opinion of this writer that one of the greatest computer games ever designed is Civilization, by MicroProse, surpassed only by its sequel, Civilization II. In this game, the player matches his wits against other powers led by the likes of Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar and Mao Zedong, for control of the world, in a game spanning 6,000 years of human history, from the Stone Age to the Space Age, developing, along the way, all the technologies that make up the modern world. To play the game is to play geopolitics the way Mackinder saw it; to defeat all of one's rivals on the Euro-Asian-African landmass, would ensure victory, for the control of such vast resources meant that even an enemy in control of everything else on earth, could not hope to prevail. World conquest from either the Americas or Australia is, at best, difficult.

With the end of World War I, perhaps Mackinder's most enthusiastic followers could be found among the Germans. Karl Haushofer, another Mackinder contemporary, wrote and lectured widely on geopolitics, and is said to have influenced Hitler's thinking. Of Mackinder's theory, Haushofer exclaimed, "Never have I seen anything greater than these few pages of a geopolitical masterwork."⁷ For Haushofer, Hitler, and the Nazi leadership, the lessons of World War I were clear - Germany's salvation lay in the subjugation of lebensraum in eastern Europe and beyond, to be wrested from Soviet Russia; "dominate the Heartland, both for its strategic advantages and for its rich resources; then and only then could she match the Anglo-Saxon powers; all other policies, such as [a] ... naval challenge were wasteful and mistaken diversions".⁸

Mackinder hinted as much in 1904, that a union of the organised brain that was Germany, upon the vast, rich body that was Russia, would put that union in an unassailable position. With this in mind, the Russo-

German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 came as no surprise, nor did the subsequent carving up of Eastern Europe between the two land giants. Hitler had seen the Pact as a means to keep Russia at bay while he built his base in Europe. By 1941, he felt ready to attack Russia, an attack which also should have come as no surprise to a student of Mackinder; nor should Hitler's failure in the vastness of that country, just like Napoleon before him.

It is precisely such a juncture, whether by force or by agreement, that Mackinder sought to forestall in *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, written in 1919. "It is a vital necessity [for lasting peace]", he wrote, "that there should be a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia".⁹ If these states remained viable, he reasoned, then Eastern Europe would be broken up, denying Germany, Russia, or any other power, dominance. But this viability, he warned, depended on the cooperation of the sea-based powers.

Written specifically to influence the politicians re-drawing the map of Europe at Versailles, Mackinder was partially successful. It was these sea-based powers that had made these Eastern European states possible after World War I. And it was these sea-based powers' failure to support these states in the 1930s, that led to the dominance of the region by one power, and, in the end, very nearly the creation of the heartland power - Nazi Germany -Mackinder warned of.

Fortunately for the sea-based powers, the two land behemoths of Nazi-controlled Europe, and communist-controlled Russia went for each other throats, instead of keeping a united front against the Anglo-Americans. Despite what the sea-based powers may claim, it was in this clash of titans that Germany was defeated; "the real stuffing was knocked out of the German army on its Eastern Front, where it suffered over four-fifths of its casualties..."¹⁰

With Nazi Germany so preoccupied, the sea-based powers could continue in their strategy of the periphery, successfully defeating the Germans in North Africa, landing commando and sabotage forces along the coasts of Europe, and keeping Russia in the fight with vital supplies sent by ship. The best example of the application of sea power was the Normandy landings of 1944. The landings gave the sea powers a short route to the heart of Germany, and the war ended just over a year after the landings. But in 1944 the landings were an extremely perilous undertaking; impossible if the Non-Aggression Pact had still been in force,¹¹ and more likely, an invasion from Normandy across to Britain, had the Germans and Russians been active partners, or if either power had been defeated by the other.

Mention has been made of the sea power theories of Mahan. Of World War II, it has been said that "Mahanite methods were ineffectual against a power which had adopted a Mackinderite programme".¹² Yet the theories of the two men are not as opposing as some believe. Boiled down to the bare essentials, the two theories are two sides of the same coin; "the chief difference between Mahan and Mackinder centred around the method of securing command over the world island".¹³ Mackinder saw Mahanite sea power as on the wane, and his warning of the rising strength of the land power gave rise to the containment school after World War II.

After World War II, the baton passed to a new sea power, from the fatally weakened British Empire, to the US. With Germany in ashes, the great land power rival once again became Russia. In 1943, while Russia had just started to gain the upper hand against the Nazis, Mackinder warned of the rise of Russia, as a land power for the first time, in control of both Eastern Europe as well as the heartland; "the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land power on the globe," and the heartland "for the first time in history ...is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality".¹⁴

Soviet Russia had to be "contained" within the heartland; the world island had to remain at least partially safe for democracy. Writing in 1962, Professor Pearce commented that with the "Cold War [being] waged by carefully limited land, sea and air forces in the peninsulas of the World Island, far from being outdated, [the Heartland Theory] appears to be more relevant than ever".¹⁵ Map II shows the American right-wing view of the world; an embattled sea-based Uncle Sam against the colossal land-based Russian Bear.

In the 1980's, Zbigniew Brzezinski, once the National Security Advisor under the Carter Administration, echoed the words of Mackinder; "Whoever controls Eurasia dominates the globe. If the Soviet Union captures the peripheries of this landmass ... it would not only win control of vast human, economic and military resources, but also gain access to the geostrategic approaches to the Western Hemisphere - the Atlantic and the Pacific...."¹⁶

Certainly such a Mackinderite view of the world continued under the neo-containment of the Reagan years, little changed since the 1950's:

Whether the underlying process is perceived in the grandiose form of Kissinger's geopolitical mechanics, the Nixon 'game plan' or an anti-Communist crusade, the prevailing American mental map [during the Reagan Administration] is a Mackinderesque projection divided between white and red camps with a contested field of pinkish green between. The image which sustains the insanity of nuclear deterrence is of a violently aggressive Russian heartland which must be held in check ... and other nations become mere dominoes in the hegemonic struggle....¹⁷

Yet, is control over such vast territories as the world island really possible?

A number of criticisms have been raised against Mackinder's theories, perhaps the most telling is nationalism. Writing in an era where national strength was determined by the extent of one's imperial possessions, how so vast an empire as the world island could be controlled and exploited over the long term, appeared to not have been taken fully into account. The explosion of nationalism after 1945¹⁸ created a great many more nation-states than had existed before; the explosion of 1989-91 created several more in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Rather than falling under the sway of one power, the world island has been heading in the opposite direction. With the 20-20 vision of hindsight, it is easy to accuse the Cold War policy makers of such a Mackinderite fixation, that they failed to see that the "evil empire" had enough difficulties keeping its own nations in line, let alone its satellites in Eastern Europe, to seriously think of adding more nations under its control.

This fixation meant lost opportunities. This fixation saw the communists as a monolithic block, bent on following the Heartland Theory to its final conclusion. This fixation meant that the true nature of the Sino-Soviet split, leading to two rival communist powers in dispute of the heartland, remained unexplored and unexploited for 20 years, until Nixon's 1972 visit to China.

As far back as 1904, at the very first reading of the Heartland Theory, there was already criticism. It was pointed out then that both the ship and the rail were destined to lose in importance to air transport, and this would render the theory partly inoperable.¹⁹ In Mackinder's defence, it should be stated that air transport remains, today at least, at best an auxiliary means to project power. At best air transport can only bring the advance, key elements into a trouble spot. The bulk of the troops and supplies must come the usual way.

Against the numbers a land power could muster, the small forces that can be brought in by air, would be grossly insufficient. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, the early deployment of the 82nd Airborne to Saudi Arabia may or may not have saved that country from an Iraqi invasion. Certainly, in those early days, had Saddam Hussein chosen to do so, those few, brave men would have slowed down the Iraqi tank divisions about as much as a speed bump.

Perhaps the worst criticism that can be levelled at the Heartland Theory is that it is based on one view of the globe, for "policy is made in the minds of men; its contours may not concur with a true map of the world".²⁰ See Map I and II and containment looked necessary against the Soviet Union. To see Map III, is to perhaps see the Russian view. The Soviet Union appears surrounded by enemies, and no way is the rodina (or heartland, as the case may be) secure from attack.

During the Malta summit of December 1989, a map similar to Map III may have been presented to President Bush by President Gorbachev. The map is said to show a Soviet Union surrounded by US bases and warships. Bush apparently retorted that the map showed the Soviet Union as a large, white, blob, with no indication of

the vast military power contained therein. He concluded by offering a counter-map; "I'll get the CIA to do a map of how things look to us. Then we'll compare and see whose is more accurate".²¹

While it remains true that "nature in large measure controls", just geography alone is a limited view of affairs among nations; "relations among states are governed by much more than the extent of their physical proximity.... The way the populations of these countries organise themselves, the resources available and their ability to exploit them, the nature of their beliefs, fears and aspirations still provide the basic raw material of international politics".²² If "man initiates", then it is up to men whether to seek dominance over others, and not the dictates of geography.

Perhaps the secure heartland itself, so vital to Mackinder's theories, has already ceased to exist. Mackinder himself defined "the heartland [as] the region to which, under modern conditions, sea power can be refused access...."²³ Under "modern conditions", there is no spot on the Eurasian landmass that cannot be targeted by nuclear missiles fired from submarines; not to mention bombers and missiles flying from American bases. Further, the increasing reach, potency and accuracy of conventional weapons have to be taken into account, as demonstrated so graphically during the Gulf War.

It is with some irony that Mackinder was to pass away in 1947, the year many consider to be the start of the 50-year life-and-death playing out of the Heartland Theory, known as the Cold War. Is Mackinder still relevant today? Despite the vulnerability of the heartland, which, it must be added, will become vulnerable only in the event of all-out war, the evidence seems to suggest so.

The Soviet Union may be gone, but Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States still remain. The collapse of the land-based superpower may only be temporary. Certainly much of the Soviet Union's military strength is still in place, albeit now split into many hands. It has been suggested that Russia, by letting go of Eastern Europe, had seen it as a liability, and intended that this liability be passed on to Western Europe, which, in turn, lulled into a false sense of security, would disband NATO.²⁴ Perhaps.

Certainly, if Russia is able to get its act together, remove the last vestiges of Marxist dogma, and successfully reclothe itself in free market capitalism, then it might one day, again, become a superpower. And once again, the paramount sea power would be faced with a land power rival for the world. Kipling's "Great Game", now seemingly over, would begin anew in earnest.

Today, with little fanfare, the US is building up its influence and military presence in the Middle East despite a general draw-down in its military commitments and expenditure. Why? Oil is certainly a large part of the answer. But in geopolitical terms, perhaps it is also to ensure that these supplies do not become victim to a new land power aggressor, and to prevent that land power's access to the seas - just as Mackinder argued had to be done, and the British had carried out through the 19th Century. Perhaps Kipling's "Great Game" has not ended after all.

In the end, the basic argument of the Heartland Theory is still relevant; "the great geographical realities remain: land power versus sea power, heartland versus rimland, centre versus periphery.... Mackinder died but his ideas live on".²⁵

ENDNOTES

1. Mackinder, H.J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p186.
2. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot in History", p200.
3. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals*, p150.
4. Eliot, G.F., as quoted in Robin, W.C., "Struggle for the Heartland: An Introduction to Geopolitics", p62.
5. Mackinder, as quoted in Kennedy, P., *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945*, p52.

6. Mackinder, *ibid*, p48.
7. Haushofer, K., as quoted in Parker, W.H., *Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft*, p159.
8. *ibid*, p177.
9. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals*, *op cit.*, p158.
10. Kennedy, *op cit.*, p79.
11. The inside front cover of Wilmot, C., *The Struggle for Europe*, is a map labelled, "Distribution of German Divisions, June 6th 1944. "The German had 59 divisions in France, but 157 divisions facing Russia.
12. Kennedy, *op cit.*, p75.
13. Walters, R.E., *The Nuclear Trap: An Escape Route*, p39.
14. Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace", p272-3.
15. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals*, *op cit.*, p.xi.
16. Brzezinski, Z., *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest*, pp22-23.
17. O'Sullivan, P., *Geopolitics*, p117.
18. 50 Nations signed the United Nations Charter in June 1945. By September 1994, the UN had 184 member states. (Source: *The World Almanac*, 1995)
19. Strausz-Hupe, R., *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*, p116.
20. Walters, *op cit.*, p175.
21. Demko & Wood, *Reordering the World*, p57.
22. Freedman, L., *Atlas of Global Strategy*, p14.
23. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals*, *op cit.*, p110.
24. Hall, G.M., *Geopolitics and the Decline of Empire*, p107.
25. Parker, *op cit.*, p175.

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Personality Profile:

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

One of the great figures of the 20th century, Atatürk was the first president of modern Turkey. After World War I, he resisted the dividing up of his country among the victorious nations and rescued the surviving Turkish remnant of the defeated Ottoman Empire. He galvanized his people against invading Greek forces and repulsed aggression by British, French, and Italian troops. He led a Turkish nationalist campaign and founded the modern Republic of Turkey, for which he is still revered by the Turks.

Atatürk was born in 1881 in Salonika (now Thessalon'ki, Greece), then part of the Ottoman Empire, and was given the name Mustafa. His father, Ali Rıza, was a minor customs officer, and his mother, Zübeyde Hanım, came from a peasant family. Ali Rıza died when Mustafa was seven years old, but not before seeing to it that his son's earliest education was carried out in a modern, secular school, rather than in a religious school. This move was to have immense historical significance for the Turkish nation. From young, Mustafa had admired the military cadets in his neighbourhood and was determined to take up a military career. Against his mother's wishes, Mustafa entered the Military Secondary School in Salonika, where he received the nickname of Kemal, meaning "The Perfect One," from his mathematics teacher; he was thereafter known as Mustafa Kemal. In 1895 he entered the Military High School in Monastir (now Bitola, Macedonia) as a boarding student, and after that he entered the War College in Istanbul in 1899. Mustafa Kemal graduated as a second lieutenant in 1902 and ranked 8th in his class of 459 students. He then entered the General Staff College, graduating in 1905 as a staff captain and ranking fifth out of a class of 57. He had established himself as one of the Ottoman Empire's leading young officers.

When World War I broke out, the Ottoman Empire entered on the side of the Central Powers. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal was given command of the 19th Division, which was being organized in the Gallipoli Peninsula. In February 1915, the Allies attempted to take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Istanbul as the ultimate objective. Mustafa Kemal's success in defending Gallipoli gained him a reputation as a hero and superb military strategist, and he was hailed as the "Saviour of Istanbul". On 1 June 1915, Mustafa Kemal was promoted to Colonel.

In 1916 Mustafa Kemal was assigned to the Russian front and promoted to general, acquiring the title of pasha. Despite having poorly equipped troops, he was the only Turkish general to win any victories over the Russians, capturing Bitlis and Mus. After the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917, which effectively took Russia out of the war, Mustafa was appointed to the command of the 7th Army in Syria. Appalled by the sad state of the army there, Mustafa Kemal resigned from his post and returned without permission to Istanbul. The government sought to put good face and placed Mustafa Kemal on sick leave for three months. In August 1918, Mustafa Kemal was assigned to command the collapsing Ottoman forces in Syria. He found the situation there worse than he had expected and withdrew to save the lives of as many of his soldiers as possible.

Fighting was halted by the Mudros Armistice (October 1918). To ensure the continuation of his rule, Sultan Mehmed VI cooperated willingly with the Allies, who assumed control of the government. The Allies did not wait for a peace treaty to begin claiming Ottoman territory, and Allied troops quickly moved in to occupy sections of Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal, with his armies having been disbanded, returned to Istanbul on 13 November 1918, just as Allied ships sailed up the Bosphorus. This scene, as well as the city's occupation by Allied troops, left a lasting impression on Mustafa Kemal. He was determined to oust them. He began meeting with selected friends to formulate a policy to save Turkey, and they developed a plan for an Anatolian national movement centred on Ankara.

Meanwhile, there was social disorder in various parts of Anatolia. Fearing anarchy, the sultan sent Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia as inspector general of the 3rd Army in May 1919. Abandoning his official reason for being in Anatolia, which was to restore order, he told the people there that he had come to save the nation from slipping through the fingers of its people. Under pressure from the Allies, the sultan dismissed Mustafa

Kemal and gave orders for his arrest. Mustafa Kemal avoided dismissal from the army by resigning. As a civilian, he pressed on to Erzurum, where General Kazim Karabekir, commander of the 15th Army Corps was based. At this critical moment, when Mustafa Kemal had no military support or official status, Kazim threw in his lot with Mustafa Kemal, placing his troops at Mustafa Kemal's disposal. This was a crucial turning point in the struggle for independence. Kazim had called for a congress of all defence-of-rights associations to be held in Erzurum on 23 July 1919. Mustafa Kemal was elected president of the Erzurum Congress and thereby gained an official status. The congress also created a provisional government, and set up a steering committee, which then elected Mustafa Kemal as head.

Mustafa Kemal publicly declared that the sultan was unable to rid the country of the Allied occupation and established the seat of his provisional government in Ankara in January 1920. In March 1920, reactionaries took over the Istanbul government and pressured the prominent Ottoman religious leaders into declaring that Mustafa Kemal and his associates were infidels who should be shot on sight. The die was cast, it would be the sultan's government or Mustafa Kemal's. New elections were held, and a new parliament, called the Grand National Assembly (GNA), convened in Ankara on 23 April 1920. The assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as its president.

On 10 August 1920 the sultan signed the Treaty of Sevres with the Allies. By the provisions of this treaty, the Ottoman state was greatly reduced in size, with Greece one of the major beneficiaries. Armenia was declared independent. Mustafa Kemal repudiated the treaty. With military aid from the Soviet Union, he set out to drive the Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace and to subdue the new Armenian state. As the war against the Greeks started to go well for Mustafa Kemal's forces, France and Italy negotiated with the nationalist government in Ankara. They withdrew their troops from Anatolia. This left the Armenians in southeastern Anatolia without the protection of the French troops. With the French and Italians out of the picture, Kazim then moved against the Armenian Socialist Republic. The Armenians eventually surrendered in November 1920 and signed the Treaty of Alexandropol on 3 December. On 4 August 1921, Mustafa Kemal assumed personal direction of the war against the Greeks. He defeated the Greeks at the Battle of the Sakarya (August-September 1921) and was given the title of Ghazi. In August 1922, he initiated a surprise offensive that pushed the Greeks to the sea at Izmir and out of Anatolia.

On 1 November 1922, the GNA voted to abolish the sultanate, and this led to the flight into exile of Sultan Mehmed VI. The Allies then invited the Ankara government to discussions that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, ending nine terrible years of war and devastation. On 29 October 1923, the Turkish republic was proclaimed, Mustafa Kemal was elected its first president, and Ankara was named the capital. Turkey was now in complete control of its territory and sovereignty.

Mustafa Kemal then embarked upon the reform of his country, his goal being to bring it out of the Middle Ages into modern times. His instrument was the Republican People's Party. His programme was embodied in the party's "Six Arrows": republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolution. The religious schools were dismantled in 1924, followed by the abolition of the religious courts. In 1925, the religious brotherhoods, strongholds of conservatism, were outlawed. The emancipation of women was encouraged by Mustafa Kemal's marriage in 1923 to a Western-educated woman, Latife Hanim, and was set in motion by a number of laws. Almost overnight the whole system of Islamic law was discarded. From February to June 1926 the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code, and the German commercial code were adopted wholesale. As a result, women's emancipation was strengthened by the abolition of polygamy, marriage was made a civil contract, and divorce was recognized as a civil action.

Another important reform was the replacement of the Arabic by the Latin alphabet. Education benefited from this reform, as the youth of Turkey were encouraged to take advantage of new educational opportunities that gave access to the Western scientific and humanistic traditions. Yet another vital step was the adoption of surnames or family names, which was decreed by the GNA in 1934. The assembly gave Mustafa Kemal the name Atatürk ("Father of the Turks").

After having set Turkey on the path of modernization, Atatürk sought to develop his country's foreign policy. He signed a treaty with Great Britain in June 1926, and one with Greece in December 1930.

Ataturk died on 10 November 1938, in the Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul. His picture, name, and words are still omnipresent in Turkey. Turkish politicians, regardless of party affiliation, claim to be the inheritors of Ataturk's mantle, but none has matched the breadth of vision, dedication, and selflessness of the Father of the Turks.

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Selected Books and Reports:

Francis Fukuyama

Francis Fukuyama was formerly the deputy director of the US State Department's policy planning staff and is currently an analyst with the RAND Corporation, a non-profit organisation that seeks to improve public policy through research and analysis.

His book *The End of History and the Last Man* sparked off numerous debates about the future of the world in the post - Cold War era. This book also considers the way in which different countries were coming to share increasingly similar political and economic institutions.

His second book, *Trust - The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, highlights the most important issue facing the United States, Britain and other industrial democracies - economic competitiveness. In his investigation, Fukuyama is of the opinion that trust, community and social commitments all have important parts to play in the growth of economic prosperity.

Fukuyama's research papers include *The US-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War* and *The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization*. His first assesses the long-term trends in Japan's thinking about its relationship with the United States in light of broad changes in Japanese strategy and then analyses ways in which the US should re-evaluate its own security relationship with Japan in light of the economic competition between the two countries. The second paper examines the changes that have taken place in commercial corporations over the past 10 - 15 years, in order to understand what lessons might be applied to the US Army. The paper asserts that many of these changes have been greatly aided by advances in information technology and seeks to understand how the ongoing information revolution might make possible organisational innovations.

The books and research papers mentioned in this article are available in the SAFTI Library.