The Proliferation Security Initiative : Can It Deliver?
Adrian Choong
Articles
Total copies: 1
Abstract: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multinational initiative that aims to stop the traffi cking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The core of the PSI’s activity revolves around the interdiction of WMD traffi cking at sea. As a framework for interdiction, the PSI suffers from a series of shortcomings in its current form which create signifi cant loopholes that can be exploited by a determined traffi cker. There are signifi cant legal issues that severely restrict the interdiction and seizure of WMD materials at sea. The PSI lacks the participation of key nations in Asia straddling the major shipping routes between North Korea and Iran, two states of proliferationconcern. The PSI also faces structural challenges that affect its transparency. Given these challenges, it is questionable if the PSI in its current form can be effective in preventing proliferation. However, the fundamental logic of the PSI as a non-proliferation tool is sound. The PSI’s best strategy is to build international momentum against illicit traffi cking of WMD and related material and expand the legal freedom to act through growing its membership. PSI participants should continue to increase their effectiveness at detecting and seizing WMDand related materials in their own ports and internal waters, and the PSI can help in these endeavours. A “kinder, gentler” PSI—one that is established fi rmly within the bounds of international law—would be naturally attractive to nations as a way of discharging their international obligations. By backing off from an aggressive interdiction posture, the PSI could win over more adherents and build momentum towards non-proliferation.Keywords: Maritime Security; Nuclear Proliferation; Proliferation Security Initiative; Weapons of Mass Destruction
Source:
Pointer Vol. 38, No. 1 2012
Series:
Pointer Article ; Vol. 38, No. 1
Language:
English
BRN:
129647