A deterrence case study : analysing Ukraine's loss of Crimea to Russia
Singapore Armed Forces2021
Magazines
Total copies: 1
In today’s information-centric world, potential aggressors can be discerned if a country possesses the actual means to retaliate and exercise their deterrence stance. The two pillars of Singapore’s defence policy built on diplomacy and deterrence relies on the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to back up the deterrence posture. This case study examines Ukraine’s loss of Crimea from a deterrence viewpoint and argues that the possible failure of her deterrence strategy was largely attributed to the military imbalance between Ukraine and Russia; a miscalculation in the extended deterrence afforded to Ukraine by the United States (US), Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the inability to fully grasp Russia’s valuation of Crimea to foresee her intent. Deterrence cannot be achieved without proof of retaliatory means. Instruments of national power are often required to complement and strengthen the deterrence efforts and therefore, make sense to code the national strategy into the DIME framework and exercise deterrence through the areas of Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic, thus enabling a comprehensive approach towards developing a robust security strategy.
Author:
Imprint:
Singapore, 2021
Collation:
13p.
Frequency:
Monthly, April 2021
Language:
English
BRN:
130511